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Interstate Pluralism: The Role ofFederalism in the 
Same-Sex Marriage Debate 
Jeffrey L. Rensberger* 
Abstract: This Article discusses the role of federalism in the debate 
over interstate recognition of same-sex marriages. It examines and 
rejects as simplistic the ar._Jfument that the role of full faith and credit is 
to promote greater national uniformity. Instead, full faith and credit 
requires a balancing between the policy of uniformity and its 
counterweight, state autonomy and particularism (which is termed 
ainterstate pluralism))). The Article identifies how interstate pluralism 
is reflected in a wide variety of ways in the law. It then seeks to 
demomtrate the benefits to the individual of being able to choose from 
different le._qal communities. It then uses extensive economic and 
demographic data to demonstrate just how pluralistic states are. It 
concludes that state.r should generally apply forum law to decide whether 
to recognize same-sex marriages. 
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This Article discusses the role of interstate pluralism-a term I 
use to refer to a particular thread of federalism-in the same-sex 
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marriage debate. There has been much written about what one may 
call the substance of same-sex marriages. This body of scholarship 
addresses whether there is a constitutional right to wed someone of 
the same sex 1 and whether same-sex marriages are a good idea as a 
matter of family law or other policy.2 In addition, much has been 
written on what might be called the procedural aspects of same-sex 
marriage. This latter category of scholarship addresses the interstate 
recognition issues raised by same-sex marriages, such as whether one 
state must or should recognize a same-sex marriage created in 
another state. 3 Much of this literature focuses on whether the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause or other law requires a sister state to 
recognize such a marriage, an issue of compulsion. Whether a state 
should recognize the marriage assuming it is not compelled to do so 
is less frequently explored. 
These two bodies of literature approach same-sex marriage from 
different perspectives. Those addressing a constitutional right to 
same-sex marriage logically focus on the individuals involved. Those 
addressing the interstate recognition issues logically tend to focus on 
the interests of the states-both the interests of the state that created 
1. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, The Positi1>e in the Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex 
Marriage in the Aftermath ~~f'Lawrencc v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1184 (2004); William C. 
Duncan, The State Interests in Marriage, 2 AVE MARIA L. REV. 153 (2004); Val D. Ricks, 
MarriaJre and the Constitutional R(qht to Free Sex: The State Marriage Amendment.\' as 
Rnponie, 7 ~LA. COASTAL L. REV. 271 (2005); Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution Should 
Protect the Right to Same-Sex Marriacqe, 49 WAYNE L. REv. 975 (2004); Mark Strasser, 
Lawrence and Same-Sex Marriage Bans: On Comtitutional Interpretation and Sophistical 
Rhetoric, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1003 (2004). 
2. See, cg., Dougbs W. Allen, An Economic Assessment of Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 29 
HARV. ).L. & PUB. PoL'Y 949 (2006 ); Dale Carpenter, Bad Arguments Against Gay Marriage, 
7 FLA. CoASTAL L. REv. 181 (2005); Chai R. Fcldblum, Gay is Good: The Moral Case for 
Marrialre Equality and More, 17 YALE ).L. & FEMINISM 139 (2005); Larry E. Ribstein, A 
Standard Form Approach to Same-Sex Marriage, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 309 (2005); Lynn D. 
Wardle, The "End" of Marriage, 44 FAM. Cr. REV. 45 (2006 ). 
3. See, c...q., Patrick ). Borchers, The Essentit~l Irrelevance of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause to the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 38 CREIGHTON L. REv. 353 (2005 ); Andrew 
Koppelman, Against Blanket Interstate Nonrecognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 17 YALE ).L. & 
FEMINISM 205 (2005 ); Richard S. Myers, The Public Policy Doctrine and Interjurisdictional 
Recocqnition of Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 531 (2005); 
William A. Reppy, )r., The Framework of Full Faith and Credit and Interstate Recognition of 
Same-Sex Marriages, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 393 (2005); Mark D. Rosen, Why the Defense of 
Marriage Act is Not (Yet?) Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many 
Societal Actors that Determine What the Constitution Requires, 90 MINN. L. REV. 915, 934-39 
(2006 ); Emily j. Sack, CiPil Unions and the Meaning of the Public Policy Exception at the 
Boundaries of Domestic Relations Law, 3 AVE MA!UA L. REv. 497 (2005 ). 
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the marriage and the interest of the states in which recogmt1on is 
sought. Although the primary focus of this Article is the interests of 
the states involved, it will attempt to bring these two wings of the 
analysis together. It is my position that a properly functioning federal 
structure in which marriage is defined differently from state to state 
will actually facilitate the individual's participation in marriage. 
Lacking from much of the discussion is an analysis of the role 
that federalism has to play in same-sex marriages. To the extent it is 
discussed, it is usually in the context of full faith and credit. That is, 
in analyzing the application of full faith and credit to same-sex 
marriages, some argue that federalism requires states to give full t:1ith 
and credit to a same-sex marriage from another state. federalism 
means different things in different contexts. I will explain below in 
detail the conception of federalism upon which my thesis rests. for 
now, the concept of federalism I have in mind concerns the 
relationship between the states as co-equals, which is sometimes 
referred to as horizontal federalism. In the context of interstate 
same-sex marriages, I will invoke the term "interstate pluralism," 
which is intended to give some flavor of the interstate relations that I 
have in mind. 
Part I of this Article introduces the premise that uniformity is the 
goal of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and explores its bases in 
Supreme Court case law. Part II argues that this conception of full 
faith and credit is an oversimplitlcation and identifies the competing 
value of interstate pluralism. Part II then demonstrates the existence 
of interstate pluralism in a variety of areas of the law and identities its 
benefits. Part III responds to the argument that the states are really 
not that different and that there is but one national shared culture. It 
makes extensive use of demographic and economic data to illustrate 
the degree of difference among the states. Part IV then sets out the 
implications of the foregoing for interstate recognition of same-sex 
marnages. 
I. NATIONAL UNIPORMITY, FUI,L fAITH AND CREDIT, AND 
INTERSTATE PLURALISM 
It is commonly stated that full faith and credit exists to create a 
single unified nation from the constituent parts-the states. 4 The 
4. See infra notes 23~26 and accompanying text. Mark Rosen has provided an 
insightful account of the overuse of the goal of unit(mnity. He argues primarily that explaining 
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Supreme Court has said this several times. 5 Many commentators on 
interstate recognition of same-sex marriages rely on the policy of 
unitlcation said to underlie full faith and credit to support their 
arguments for interstate recognition.6 But basing full faith and credit 
solely upon a foundation of uniformity is a gross oversimplification. 
Full faith and credit is not concerned only with uniformity; rather, it 
is a complex balance between uniformity and a competing policy. 
The competing policy sometimes goes under the heading of 
horizontal federalism. That will do, but as I explain below, the term 
"interstate pluralism" better captures the nature of this 
countervailing policy. 
A. The Overstated Goal of Uniformity 
Although this Article is not about the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA)/ some of the arguments about DOMA illustrate the point 
I do wish to discuss. 
Congress enacted DOMA under the power granted by the Full 
faith and Credit Clause. 8 The tlrst sentence of that clause provides 
that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. "9 The 
second sentence provides that "Congress may by general Laws 
prescribe" the "[ e ]fleet" of such state judicial proceedings, 
legislation, and records. 10 Thus, DOMA is an exercise of Congress's 
power under the second sentence to prescribe the interstate effects of 
state law. 11 
full faith and credit as being solely driven by uniformity misreads the Supreme Court's eases. 
See Rosen mpm note 3, at 934-39. He concludes that the full faith and Credit Clause "aims 
not only at unifYing the states, but also at ensuring that the states remain meaningfully 
empowered, distinct polities." Id. at 935. The discussion in this Part largely agrees with his 
analysis. 
5. Sec, c.._lf., Baker v. c;eneral Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 223 (1998); Magnolia 
Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439-40 (I943); Milwaukee County v. M.E. White 
Co., 296 U.S. 268,276-77 (1935). 
6. Sec infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. 
7. 2R U.S.C. § 1738C (1996). 
8. Sa infra note II. 
9. U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ I. 
10. Id. 
II. Congress rested its legislative power to enact DOMA on the Etlect Clause. See 
)elrrey L. Rensberger, Same-Sex Marria.ws and the Defense of'Marria.qe Act: A Deviant View of 
1111 E>:pcrimcnt in Full Faith and Credit, 32 CREI(;HTON L. REV. 409, 4II n.5 ( 1998 ). 
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So far, so good, except f(x prior judicial interpretations of the 
first sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The Supreme 
Court has for many years applied the first sentence of the full faith 
and Credit Clause as if it were self-executing. 12 That is, even in the 
absence of effectuating legislation by Congress, the Supreme Court 
has reversed state courts for having failed to give full faith and credit 
to another state's laws or judgments.!.' This is possible only if the 
first sentence of the full faith and Credit Clause in itself and 
without any assistance from the second sentence places limitations on 
the states. This presents an interesting puzzle. 
If the Constitution itself (the first sentence) requires a certain 
level of full faith and credit (as the Supreme Court's case law 
suggests), then how can Congress ever fuHill its function of 
prescribing the interstate effects of state law and state judgments? 
Any legislation by Congress to set an "effect" of sister-state law 
would appear to be an impermissible alteration of a constitutional 
command. This is the argument that has been raised against DOMA 
as a matter of constitutional law. 14 That is, it is argued that DOMA is 
an impermissible attempt by Congress to amend the self-executing 
Full Faith and Credit Clause by ordinary legislation. 
One of the proposed exits from the entanglement created by the 
two sentences of the Full faith and Credit Clause is to read the first 
sentence of the full Faith and Credit Clause ("full Faith and Credit 
shall be given in each State ... ") as self-executing to the extent it 
sets a floor of full faith and credit-a minimum constitutionally 
required core ofinterstate recognition. Congress's role in prescribing 
effects is limited to laying on additional levels of increased interstate 
12. See Fauntleroy v·. I,um, 210 U.S. 230, 23R (I 90R) ("The validity of J the J judgment 
... is, as we believe, the result of the Constitution as it always has been understood"); sec aim 
Bradford Elcc. Light Co. v. Clapper, 2R6 lJ .S. 145, I 54-59 (I 932 ). Rut sec R.1lph U. Whitten, 
Full Faith and Credit for Dummies, 3R CREIGHTON L. REV. 465.466-70 (2005). Whitten 
argues that the Full Faith and Credit Clause was designed onlv to assure that "public acts I or 
statutes), non-judicial records, and judicial proceedings (or judgments) of c.Kh st.ltc had to be 
admitted into evidence as conclusive proof of their own existence and contents," and was not 
intended to "command that any pclrticular ctkct be given to the st.ltutc, record, or judgment." 
Id. at 466. 
13. Thomas v. Wash. c;as Light Co., 44R U.S. 261,273 n.IR (19RO) lplur.1lity opinion) 
("Congress' power in this area is not exclusive, f(>r this Court has given dfcct to the CI.HISC 
beyond that required by implementing legislation."). 
14. See infra notes 17-22 and accompanying text. 
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recognition. 1" Congress, under this view, can legislate to provide for 
greater, but never less, national uniformity of state laws and 
judgments than already exists under the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause's first sentence. 16 
Under this reading of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, some 
argue DOMA is unconstitutional, 17 for it purports to give less 
interstate effect to a state judgment than the residual self-executing 
portion of the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires. 18 This argument 
dovetails neatly into the policy argument made against DOMA 
alluded to above: the whole point of full faith and credit is to create a 
single nation out of many states by enhancing uniformity, and 
DOMA, which allows states to not recognize same-sex marriages, 
cuts against the unifYing purpose of full faith and credit. In 
summary, it is argued that full faith and credit strives to create 
uniformity, that Congress can increase, but not decrease, uniformity, 
and for these reasons DOMA is both unconstitutional and unwise. 
Going beyond DOMA, commentators on the issue of same-sex 
marriage have used the presumptive aim of national unity to argue 
that interstate recognition of same-sex marriages is required by the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause. For example, Andy Koppelman argues 
that DOMA is unconstitutional because the "preeminent purpose of 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause is to promote uniformity of result 
across the nation," 1 ~ and the Act instead "permits bald invitations to 
forum-shopping";20 DOMA thus "corrodes" uniformity. 21 Likewise, 
Larry Kramer argues that the uniformity principle behind the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause means that a state may not constitutionally 
deny application of another state's laws on the ground of public 
policy: 
I 5. St'c, t'JJ., Larry Kramer, Samc-St'x Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the 
[htwllstitutionall'ublic Policy Exception, I 06 YALE L.J. 1965, 2006 ( 1997). See the discussion 
and a collection of authorities in Rosen, supra note 3, at 934-35. 
16. I collected the authorities arguing this point in an earlier work of mine. See 
Rensberger, supra note II, at 412 n.6; sec also Joseph William Singer, Same Sex Marriage, Full 
Faith aud Crt'dit, and the FJJasiou of Obligation, I STAN.]. Ctv. RTS. & Ctv. LIBERTIES l, 44-
45 (2005 ). 
17. Sec sources cited in Rensberger, supra note 11, at 412 n.6. 
I X. !'or a discussion of the case law on the application of the l'ull Faith and Credit 
Cbusc to judgments, sec i11ji·a notes 30-55 and accompanying text. 
19. Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of MarrialJe Act is 
Lhtcowtitutirmal, R:l IOWA L. REV. I, 22 ( 19')7). 
20. !d. at 23. 
21. !d. 
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With respect to full faith and credit in particular, the whole point 
was that states should not be free to dismiss or ignore the laws of 
sister states; the states were to be a community, with mutual 
obligations to respect each other's laws and judgments. The central 
object of the Clause was, in fact, to eliminate a state's prideful 
unwillingness to recognize other states' laws or judgments on the 
ground that these are inferior or unacceptable. If anything should 
be off-limits in such a system, it is the public policy doctrine.22 
These commentators do have support in the case law. The idea 
that full faith and credit exists to create a single nation out of discrete 
entities has been a part of the Supreme Court's understanding for 
decades. For example, the Court has stated that the "'full faith and 
credit clause is one of the provisions incorporated into the 
Constitution by its framers for the purpose of transforming an 
aggregation of independent, sovereign States into a nation. "'23 And 
in 1935, in the context of enforceability of another state's tax 
judgment, the Court stated: 
The very purpose of the full-faith and credit clause was to alter the 
status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, 
each free to ignore obligations created under the laws or by the 
judicial proceedings of the others, and to make them integral parts 
of a single nation throughout which a remedy upon a just 
obligation might be demanded as of right, irrespective of the state 
of its origin.24 
Again, in assessing the effect of full faith and credit on a sister-
state judgment in a workmen's compensation case, the Court spoke 
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause as a "nationally unifYing force. " 25 
The Court stated the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is 
to 
22. Kramer, supra note 15, at 1986. !:'or more recent works using unif(>rmity to argue 
for interstate recognition of same-sex marriages, sec Singer, supra note 16, at 49 ("[T]he hill 
Faith and Credit Clause was intended to knit us together as one nation."); and 1. Spencer 
Jenkins, 'Til Congress Do Us Part: The Marrialre Protection Act, Federal Court-StrippinJ:r, and 
Same-Sex Marriage, 40 NEW ENG. L. REv. 619, 657 (2005-2006) ("[l-'jull bith and credit 
mandates that marriages pcrtixmcd in one state should be honored as valid in all other st.1tes, 
in order to maintain a 'nationally unifYing ti>rce' of marriage laws." (quoting Magnolia 
Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430,439 (1943))). 
23. Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 234 ( 1998) (quoting Sherrer \'. 
Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343,355 (1948)). 
24. Milwaukee County\'. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (I '135 ). 
25. Magnolia Petroleum, 320 U.S. at 439. 
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establish throughout the tederal system the salutary principle of the 
common law that a litigation once pursued to judgment shall be as 
conclusive of the rights of the parties in every other court as in that 
where the judgment was rendered, so that a cause of action merged 
in a judgment in one state is likewise merged in every other. ... 
Because there is a full faith and credit clause a defendant may not a 
second time challenge the validity of the plaintiff's right which has 
ripened into a judgment and a plaintiff may not for his single cause 
of action secure a second or a greater recovery.26 
for reasons explained in the following section, an account of full 
faith and credit that rests solely on a policy of national unification is 
inadequate and indeed wrong. But to understand full faith and credit 
more adequately, one must tlrst examine how the Supreme Court 
has applied the Full Faith and Credit Clause. For now, it suffices to 
note that the Supreme Court's statements that full faith and credit 
exists to engender national unitlcation come in the context of the 
interstate enforceability of judgments. 
B. Understanding the Goal of Uniformity: 
Judgments and Choice of Law 
The Court has not been expansive in explaining what is good 
about national uniformity or which type of uniformity is essential to 
nationhood. One may imagine several reasons for promoting 
uniformity. I will attempt to unpack the full faith and credit goal of 
uniformity so that its underlying policies and premises can be 
examined and applied to same-sex marriage. 
1. The case law on uniformity and full faith and credit 
As noted above, the Court's statements about the unifYing 
purpose of full faith and credit are almost without exception given in 
the context of considering the effect of full faith and credit on sister-
state judgments.27 This observation may help to explain the 
26. I d. at 439-40. 
27. One exception to this is HulfhCJ v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 ( 1951). The Court there 
spoke of "the strong unit)•ing principle embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause looking 
toward maximum enti.l!-cement in each state of the obligations or rights created or recognized 
by the statutes of sister states." Id. at 612. At issue in HulJhes was not a sister-state judgment 
but an attempt to close the door of local courts to a cause of action arising under another 
state's law. 
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underlying goals of the uniformity policy. But before exploring that 
possibility, a small dose of basic full faith and credit law is needed. 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause has two operational modes, 
which fall temporally on either side of the first judgment in a 
dispute. In one mode, the question is the dfect of full f1ith and 
credit before a judgment has been reached as to a particular dispute. 
Before a judgment, the question is simply choice of law; or more 
precisely the question is a potential inability to choose law because of 
the limiting force of the Full faith and Credit Clause. In multistate 
disputes not yet reduced to a judgment, courts normally choose the 
applicable law by resorting to their own local choice of law rules. 
The full faith and credit issue in such cases is whether a particular 
choice of law is constrained by the Constitution such that the court 
must apply the law of a particular state or may not apply the law of a 
particular state. 
The Supreme Court has taken a minimalist approach on the 
effect of full faith and credit on choice of law. The constitutional test 
for whether a state may apply its own law requires only that the state 
have '"a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, 
creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary 
nor fundamentally unfair. "' 28 It is generally agreed that the Supreme 
Court has applied this test in a benign, even toothless, manner. 2" 
The other operational mode of full faith and credit occurs after a 
judgment has been reached. In this context, full faith and credit has 
been interpreted by the Court to act in a much more exacting 
manner than in the pre-judgment, choice of law mode. The Supreme 
Court has generally held that a state must give the same res judicata 
effect to a judgment as would the court that rendered it. As Justice 
Holmes put it, "'the judgment of a state court should have the same 
credit, validity, and effect in every other court in the United States, 
which it had in the state where it was pronounced. "' 30 In contrast to 
the choice of law context, full faith and credit is as to judgments 
much more exacting. The public policy of the state is, for example, 
entirely relevant-indeed, it is really the key question-in the choice 
28. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,818 (1985) (quoting Allstate Ins. 
Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302,312-13 (1981)). 
29. See James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Oricqim of Judicial Jurisdiction: 
Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169,241--42 & n.276 (2004). 
30. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 236 ( 1908) (quoting Hampton \'. McConnel, 16 
U.S. 234,235 (1818)). 
1712 
1703] Interstate Pluralism 
oflaw context. 31 But there is little room (if any) f(x a state to use its 
public policy to decline enf()rcement of a sister state's judgment. 
The general irrelevance of state policy to the question of 
enforcing a sister-state judgment is perhaps best illustrated by 
Fauntleroy v. Lwm. 32 The Supreme Court in Lum reversed a 
Mississippi decision that had declined to enf(xce an earlier Missouri 
judgment between the same parties. The dispute was between two 
residents of Mississippi who had contracted in Mississippi on a 
cotton finure. 33 Mississippi law made such contracts unenforceable 
and in bet criminalized them. 34 The Missouri courts, using transient 
jurisdiction, entered judgment for the plaintiff despite the apparent 
applicability of Mississippi's invalidating law. 3" The Court held, 
however, that Mississippi had to enforce the Missouri judgment, 
giving as a general rule for full faith and credit as to judgments that 
'"the judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity, 
and effect in every other court in the United States, which it had in 
h I · d "' 36 B h . d t e state w 1et-e tt was pronounce . · ecause t e JU gment was 
unassailable in Missouri, Mississippi had to enforce it despite the 
strong local policy against the result. 37 
Notwithstanding Lum and other cases of similar import,38 the 
Supreme Court has recognized a few exceptions to the requirement 
that a state enf(n-ce a sister-state judgment. The closest the Court has 
ever come to expressly adopting the view that local policy of the 
enf(n-cing state can excuse enforcement is Thomas v. Washington Gas 
31. Sec, CJJ., Allstate Ius., 449 U.S. at 319 (allowing the state to apply its own law 
because Plaintiffs residence in the state created "an interest in [Plaintitrs] recovery, an interest 
which the court below identified as ti.Iil compensation t(Jr 'resident accident victims' to keep 
them 'otrwclbre rolls' .md able 'to meet financial obligations'" (quoting Hague v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 2X9 N.W.2d 43,49 (Minn. 197X))). 
32. 210U.S.at237. 
33. !d. at 233-34. 
34. !d. at 234. 
35. !d. at 234. 
36. !d. at 236 (quoting Hampton v. McConnel, 16 U.S. 234, 235 (1818)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
37. !d. at 237 ("rvV]hether the ruling of the Missouri court upon that matter was right 
or wrong, there can be no question that the judgment was conclusive in Missouri on the 
validitY of the cause of action."). 
3X. Another good example of the Court's rigid application of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause is Yarborou.fJh P. Yarborou.fJh, 290 U.S. 202 (1933). In Yarborough, the Court held that 
South Carolina could not modi!)' a child support order to increase support to a resident minor 
because the order was a lump sum judgment that was not subject to modification in the state 
that rendered it. !d. at 212-13. 
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Light Co. 39 In Thomas, a plurality of the Court found that a prior 
workmen's compensation award by a Virginia administrative agency 
could be supplemented by an additional award in the District of 
Columbia,40 even though Virginia law provided that an award under 
its workmen's compensation system was exclusive of any other 
remedies. 41 Normally, full faith and credit requires that a state give 
the same res judicata effect to a sister-state judgment as would the 
courts of the state that rendered the judgmentY This is true despite 
whatever considerations of policy prevail in the second state. The 
Supreme Court has said, for example, that it is "aware of [no] 
considerations of local policy or law which could rightly be deemed 
to impair the force and effect which the full faith and credit clause 
and the Act of Congress require to be given to a judgment outside 
the state of its rendition. "43 
The Thomas plurality, however, allowed a second forum to enter 
a judgment that would have been barred by the res judicata law of 
the state that rendered the first judgment. It did so in part because in 
its analysis workmen's compensation commrssrons differ from 
courts,44 but also because "the substantial interests of the second 
State in these circumstances should not be overridden by another 
State through an unnecessarily aggressive application of the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause."45 Thus, Thomas appears to recognize an 
exception to the full faith and credit owed to judgments based on a 
conflict with the public policy of the forum. 
39. 448 U.S. 261 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
40. Id. at 286. 
41. Id. at 265 n.4. 
42. See Lum, 210 U.S. at 236; supra text accompanying note 30. 
43. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430,438 (1943). The Court in Thomas 
overruled Magnolia as to worker's compensation cases. 
44. See Thomas, 448 U.S. at 281-82 (plurality opinion). But see id. at 286-87 (White, 
J., concurring) (criticizing the plurality's analysis). 
45. Id. at 285 (plurality opinion). Tellingly, on this point the Court cites Justice Stone's 
dissent in Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202,213 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting). for a 
description of Yarborough, see supra note 38. Stone dissented because 
it would not seem open to serious question that every state has an interest in 
securing the maintenance and support of minor children residing within its own 
territory so complete and so vital to the pert(mllance of its functions as a 
government, that no other state could set limits upon it. 
Id. at 225. In short, Justice Stone asserted that the interests of the second t(mml might be so 
great as to outweigh the interest of interstate res judicata. 
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Thomas is but a plurality, albeit one that finds support in the 
Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws.46 Other cases hint at 
limited exceptions to the full faith and credit owed judgments. Full 
faith and credit, f()r example, does not require a forum state to honor 
a sister-state judgment that purports to transfer title to land within 
the forum. 47 Nor, at least according to dicta from the Supreme 
Court and lower court case law, must a forum honor an anti-suit 
injunction from another state.48 Likewise, a forum need not honor 
an injunction that prohibits a potential witness from testifYing in the 
f(xum's courts. 49 
On this last issue, in Baker v. General Motors Corp., the Supreme 
Court held that Missouri could subpoena a witness for litigation in 
its courts even though the witness had been enjoined by a Michigan 
court from testifYing against General Motors, the defendant in the 
Missouri proceeding.50 As the Court said, "[a] court may be guided 
by the forum State's 'public policy' in determining the law applicable 
to a controversy .... But our decisions support no roving 'public 
policy exception' to the full faith and credit due judgments." 51 As is 
often the case with Supreme Court generalities, it pays to mind the 
adjectives carefully. To be sure, the cases do not establish a "roving" 
public policy exception for full faith and credit in the context of 
judgments. But the adjective implies that there is a role tor public 
policy in judgments, albeit one that must be closely tethered, rather 
than allowed to "rove." Perhaps in an effort to avoid creating the 
appearance that it was recognizing a public policy exception, the 
Court was careful to place the focus on the impropriety of the 
Michigan judgment rather than on an exception to the enforcement 
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 103 (1971) ("A judgment 
rendered in one State of the United States need not be recognized or enforced in a sister State 
if such recognition or enlc>rcemcnt is not required by the national policy of full faith and credit 
because it would involve an improper interference with important interests of the sister 
State."). 
47. See fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1,13 (1909). 
48. Sec James v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 152 N.E.2d 858, 867 (Ill. 1958); sec also 
Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 236 ( 1998) (dictum). 
49. Sa Baker, 522 U.S. at 237. The Court stated that a state need not honor another 
state's judgment that would "control courts elsewhere by precluding them, in actions brought 
by strangers to the litigation, from determining lex themselves what witnesses arc 
competent to testifY and what evidence is relevant and admissible in their search t<>r the truth." 
Jd. at 238. 
50. ld. at 228-30, 240-41. 
51. Jd. at 233. 
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of a valid judgment. Thus, it said, "Michigan lacks authority to 
control courts elsewhere by precluding them, in actions brought by 
strangers to the Michigan litigation, from determining for themselves 
what witnesses are competent to testifY and what evidence is relevant 
and admissible in their search for the truth. " 52 
Even though the Court in Baker was careful to limit the scope of 
its holding by referring to a lack of power in the rendering court 
rather than an exception to enforcing an unqualifiedly proper sister-
state judgment,53 the decision is inexplicable without reference to a 
desire to allow Missouri to effectuate its policies. In explaining why 
"Michigan lacks authority" to afftxt the Missouri litigation, the 
Court referred to the other rights of states to determine "for 
themselves what witnesses are competent to testifY and what 
evidence is relevant and admissible in their search for the truth. " 54 
Although the Court framed the issue in terms of a lack of power in 
the rendering state, the reason it gave for the rendering state lacking 
authority was other states' prerogative to "determin[ e] for 
themselves" their law of evidence."5 This is a circumlocutory way of 
saying that a forum may decide evidence issues for itself. But the law 
of evidence in Missouri does not fall from the sky. It is the product 
and expression of the state's public policy. Thus, Baker ultimately 
supports a public policy exception while appearing to deny that one 
exists. 
2. Why uniformity matters more in the judgment context 
Because more full faith and credit is given to judgments than to 
choice of law, one might wonder whether the policy behind 
uniformity can be explained through this dichotomy. Indeed, the 
language from the Supreme Court ascribing the goal of uniformity 
to the Full Faith and Credit Clause appears in judgment, not choice 
of law, cases. 56 One can imagine several reasons why the goal of 
52. Id. at 238. 
53. "[T]he Michigan decree cannot determine evidentiary issues in a lawsuit brought by 
parties who were not subject to the jurisdiction of the Michigan court." Id. at 239. 
54. Id. at 238. 
55. Id. 
56. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text. To be sure, the 
Court in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt also said that the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
altered the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free 
to ignore rights and obligations created under the laws or established by the judicial 
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national unitlcation has special significance f(:>r full faith and credit 
relative to judgments. First, full faith and credit as to judgments has 
a narrower bite than it does as applied to choice of law. This may 
argue f()!· giving more teeth to that bite, because of its narrowness. 
Second, a greater investment (in judicial resources) has been made in 
the case of a sister-state judgment. One may imagine full faith and 
credit operating to protect that investment. Third, full faith and 
credit has a special practical importance in the context of interstate 
enforceability of money judgments. A lack of strong interstate 
enforceability in that context poses a threat to interstate commerce. 
First, a conflict of laws problem as to a judgment is of different 
magnitude than a choice of law problem. A forum that yields in its 
local policy in order to enforce a judgment of another state docs so 
on a one-time basis. It is only in the particular case and only for the 
parties bef()re the court that forum policy is abrogated. In Lum, t()r 
example, Mississippi could continue to enforce its policy against 
cotton futures contracts in all cases other than the one in which a 
contrary judgment had been reached. ' 7 In the context of judgments, 
the intrusion upon local policy is thus of limited effect. In contrast, 
when the problem is choice of law, requiring the forum to 
subordinate its policies to that of another state would affect a whole 
class of cases, persons, and transactions that are subject to the 
substantive rule in question. In particular, all transactions or disputes 
with the same connection to another state would have to be decided 
under that state's policy. Thus, requiring a state to subordinate its 
policy in choice of law to another state's policy results in a much 
greater denigration of local policy. 
Second, judgments are of course the result of adjudications, 
which require a signitlcant investment of resources, both public and 
private. One could sensibly conclude that after the investment of 
proceedings of the others, by making each an integral part of a single nation, in 
which rights judicially established in any part are given nation-wide application. 
320 U.S. 430, 439 ( 1943) (emphasis added). It thus appears to say that states must not only 
respect sister states' judgments, but also enforce their laws ("obligations"), which would 
ascribe the unifYing f()rce of full faith and credit to choice of law. However, this is dicta on the 
t:Kts of Magnolia Petroleum, which addressed the effect of a sister-state judgment. Moreover, 
the vcrv same sentence in which the Court said that states may not ignore the "obligations 
created under the laws" of other states, also limits that duty to situations in which "rights 
Judicially established in any part are given nation-wide application," id. (emphasis added), 
meaning that the Court's concern is indeed the res judicata wing offull faith and credit. 
57. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 238 (1908). See supra text accompanying note 
31. 
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resources made in a judicial determination of rights, the one-time 
interests of another state in upholding its substantive policy may be 
disregarded. In the choice of law context, in contrast, no investment 
in the decision of a particular outcome as between private parties has 
been made. All that has been done is a generalized act of lawmaking 
(by the legislature or by the judicial common law process). The costs 
of this lawmaking-in terms of an investment of legislative or judicial 
resources-are properly attributable to and may be spread out over 
all potential future cases. Generalized lawmaking is thus amortized 
over a vast number of future disputes, while a judgment must be 
paid for by the social benefit of resolving only the dispute of the 
parties before the court. Of course, a common law court making a 
new precedent is also deciding a particular case before it. So, to be 
more precise, in the case of judicial lawmaking, the investment of 
judicial resources is partly justified (or paid tor) by the need to 
resolve the individual litigants' case and partly justified by the 
application of the new rule announced to future cases. To put it 
extremely finely, the cost of that part of the opinion that consists of 
the reasoning and analysis that produces the new rule is spread out 
over all litigants, present and future; the part that consists of the 
application of the rule to the parties in question is spread out to only 
the present parties. Notably, this is exactly where full faith and credit 
draws its line. The resolution of the particular parties' dispute is 
entitled to strong full faith and credit. Other states must enforce that 
judgment. But the judicial creation of a new legal rule is not given 
much protection under full faith and credit. Thus, the greater 
investment in judgments serves to explain why they are given more 
full faith and credit than mere "laws" in the choice of law context. 
Third, the most concrete concern about a lack of national 
uniformity is found in the degree of interstate enforceability of 
money judgments. Without a strong Full Faith and Credit Clause for 
judgments, and money judgments in particular, commercial relations 
between persons located in different states would be problematic. 
Consider a proposed extension of credit between a New York lender 
and a California start-up business venture. One part of the lender's 
decision to extend credit is the ability to obtain a judgment and 
execute upon the California borrower's assets. Even assuming that 
the New York lender can obtain jurisdiction in the courts of his 
1718 
1703] Interstate Pluralism 
home state, "8 a New York judgment is of little utility unless it is 
enf(xceablc in a place in which the debtor has assets. However, full 
f1ith and credit as to judgments operates to assure the New York 
lender that his New York judgment will be enforced in California. 59 
Without such an assurance, the commerce of the United States 
would economically balkanize due to significantly increased 
transaction costs in all interstate business. The net effect would be 
the accidental or intentional erection of trade barriers between the 
states. It is no doubt for this reason that the Supreme Court has 
linked the Full Faith and Credit Clause with the Commerce Clause 
in stating that both have the purpose of national unification:60 
The full faith and credit clause like the commerce clause thus 
became a nationally unifYing force. It altered the status of the 
several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to 
ignore rights and obligations created under the laws or established 
by the judicial proceedings of the others, by making each an 
integral part of a single nation, in which rights judicially established 
in any part are given nation-wide application.61 
Outside the context of judgments-that is, when a dispute has 
not yet been reduced to a judgment and the question is simply 
choice of law-the concern for economic balkanization is not as 
great. Here, the Full Faith and Credit Clause allows for uncertainty 
as to which law applies to an interstate dispute. But the dichotomy in 
the Supreme Court cases between strong full faith and credit in the 
judgment context and weak full faith and '":redit in the choice of law 
context ret1ects the conclusion that choice of law uncertainty is not a 
fatal cost to interstate commerce. Our New York creditor may not be 
SX. This is not ~n unlikely ~ssumption, especially under modern notions of personal 
jurisdiction. Sa, c.._q., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzcwicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (upholding 
jurisdiction over a Michig~n franchisee in florida, the home of the franchisor). 
59. Sa, C.JJ., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 n.36 (1977) ("Once it has been 
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction that the detendant is a debtor of the plaintitl~ 
there would seem to be no unbirness in allowing an action to realize on that debt in a State 
where the defendant has propertv, whether or not that State would have jurisdiction to 
determine the existence of the debt as an original matter."). 
60. See, c.._q., Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 287-S8 ( 1978) (linking Extradition 
Clause together with Full faith and Credit Clause and Commerce Clause as all serving to 
further "important national objectives of a newly developing country striving to foster national 
unity .... In the administration of justice, no less than in trade and commerce, national unity 
was thought to be served by de-emphasizing state lines for certain purposes, without 
impinging on essential state autonomy"). 
61. Ma.tpwlia l'ctroleum, 320 U.S. 439. 
1719 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2008 
certain ex ante whether California or New York law will apply to an 
action it brings to collect on the loan, but unless one law or the 
other wholly bars recovery, he is faced merely with a less favorable 
outcome, rather than an entire loss of his capital. This risk may be 
accounted for in valuing the risk of the loan, as is the case with the 
many other risks of nonpayment. 
Finally, it is important to recognize that every full faith and credit 
case, whether with respect to judgments or simple choice of law, 
involves a conflict with sister-state law. In the choice of law context, 
the full faith and credit problem is which of two state laws may be 
applied, and the competition between two state laws is apparent. In 
the context of interstate recognition of judgments, it is a 
misconception to think of the problem as simply dealing with a 
judgment on the one hand and another state's duty, vel non, to 
enforce it on the other. Instead, the problem consists of choosing 
between a judgment and another state's law. In Lum,62 for example, 
the conflict was between Missouri's judgment enforcing a futures 
contract and Mississippi law that made such contracts illegal. The 
judgment won against the law of Mississippi. And that is the general 
lesson of full faith and credit in its two operational modes (as to 
judgments and as to choices of law): judgments almost always trump 
competing laws, but laws almost never trump other competing laws. 
II. THE LIMITS OF THE UNifORMITY POLICY AND THE 
COUNTERWEIGHT OF INTERSTATE PLURALISM 
We all should be at once suspicious of any legal argument that 
runs only in the direction of a particular result. 63 The analysis of full 
faith and credit laid out above that explains it as a function of 
creating national uniformity argues only for ever-increasing interstate 
recognition. It ofrers no counterweight to the virtues of interstate 
recognition. Is full faith and credit truly an area in which there is 
only one policy to consider? If so, it should be an easy subject to 
master. But full faith and credit is not an easy subject; nor is it true 
that if some national uniformity is good, then any increase in 
uniformity is better. There arc limits to the goal of national 
uniformity. These limits are the product of a policy that acts as a 
62. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text. 
63. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 937 ("Analysis considering only one pole in a dialectic is 
methodologically suspect."). 
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counterweight to national uniformity. This countervailing policy is 
what I shall call interstate pluralism. 
A thought experiment will illustrate the counterweight of 
interstate pluralism to the goal of uniformity. Suppose that law 
commentators have proposed the recognition of a new tort cause of 
action. Suppose, for example, that some have argued extensively for 
allowing grandparents to recover for loss of consortium in wrongful 
death cases. A case is adjudicated raising this issue in, let us say, 
Massachusetts involving Massachusetts parties and events. The 
Massachusetts Supreme Court decides to recognize the new tort 
cause of action. Thereafter, another suit on similar facts and raising 
the same legal issue is brought by a different plaintiff against a 
different defendant in another state, New York, involving New York 
parties and events. Can the second plaintiff' successfully demand that 
the Massachusetts court's ruling assures a win in the New York case? 
Or, more generally, what effect does the first case have on the 
second? 
Well, of course the standard, easy, and correct answer is that the 
first case has no effect on the second except for whatever persuasive 
value the New York court may accord the Massachusetts case as a 
precedent. Res judicata is inapplicable because the action is against a 
new defendant,64 and perhaps because the issue is purely one of 
law.65 More importantly for our purposes, full faith and credit does 
not apply: New York does not unconstitutionally deny full faith and 
credit to Massachusetts if it chooses not to adopt the Massachusetts 
tort cause of action. As explained above, the constitutional test for 
whether a state may apply its own law requires only that the state 
have "a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, 
creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary 
nor fundamentally unfair. " 66 New York has such contacts because we 
have posited New York parties and events. 
Note however that if full faith and credit were different and did 
require application of Massachusetts law, national uniformity would 
be enhanced. The usual arguments to ratchet up full faith and credit 
would apply: the states would be more tightly bound together, 
64. SeeHansberryv. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). 
65. See RESTATEME~T (SECOND) Of JUDGMENTS§ 28(2) ( 1980) (providing for limited 
issue preclusion when an issue is one oflaw). 
66. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate Ins. 
Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302,312-13 (1981 )). 
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commerce between states would be facilitated, and certainty would 
be enhanced. As is argued in the context of same-sex marriage, 
people--such as the grandparents and grandchildren-frequently 
travel from state to state or make a permanent relocation. Such 
movement would be facilitated by New York applying Massachusetts 
law. Yet these arguments, even an argument that the grandparents 
once lived in Massachusetts, are not sufficient to require other states 
to apply Massachusetts law. Why not? 
The thought experiment reveals that there arc considerations 
under full faith and credit other than promoting national uniformity. 
New York is not required to recognize Massachusetts law because to 
do so would be an intrusion upon its sovereign prerogatives. Without 
some limit to national uniformity, New York would be cheated of 
the chance to create and apply its own legal solution to the social 
problem of grandparents' familial loss. New York would lose the 
opportunity to discover, shape, and express its public policy on this 
matter. The uniformity that full faith and credit helps us attain comes 
at the cost of state autonomy and individualism. This should be 
obvious, but it is often overlooked. A group of things cannot be 
both uniform and varied at the same time. To the extent we unity, 
we also strip components' individuality. The key task f(x full faith 
and credit analysis, therefore, is to create the appropriate balance 
between the good of uniformity and the good of diversity. This 
diversity is what I call interstate pluralism. 
Under the Bull Faith and Credit Clause, then, the goal must not 
be just to create a single community-the United States-f(x that 
slights the states as distinct elements. Nor can it be simply to 
preserve the states' autonomy, for then there would be no whole of 
which the states can be a part. Instead, the vision must be of the 
nation as a community of communities.67 
A. Interstate Pluralism Defined 
Interstate pluralism is the feature of our federal system that 
rd1ccts the ability of each state to establish itself as a distinct 
community. It entails the ability to make and enforce choices on 
foundational matters such as fundamental ordering of commercial 
relations, family relations, property ownership, incidents, obligations, 
and aesthetic values. It is the ability of each state to regulate what 
67. l'or a Jiscussion of states as communities, see infra Part Il.D. 
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Justice Harlan termed "primary private activity"6x in the context of 
the Erie doctrine. 69 Interstate pluralism seeks to protect each state's 
ability to create and enf(:>rce these fundamental orderings and 
thereby define its society. 
For example, in a distinction reaching back to the founding of 
the United States, some states are "debtor states" and others are 
"creditor states." That is, some states have laws tending to favor 
individual debtors while others favor creditors. So fundamental was 
this policy choice that it is thought by some to have been the reason 
for the constitutional grant of diversity jurisdiction to the federal 
courts. 70 The differentiation between creditor and debtor states runs 
along an axis of the relative level of protection of creditors and of 
debtors. 71 As such, the dichotomy is reflective of both the economic 
history of a state as having predominantly lenders or borrowers and 
of current conceptions of minimum levels of social welfare. 
As to family structures, states ddine the participants in the family 
and their prerogatives through their laws on the rights of biological 
but unwed fathers in adoption,72 the role of grandparents in matters 
such as visitation, custody, adoption,73 and claims for loss of 
consortium/-! and the rights of unmarried cohabitants. 7s Family law 
thus operates to include and exclude individuals from a role in 
decisions about children. It grants or denies financial protection 
fi:om losses due to death, injury, or change in household 
composition. They collectively answer the immensely important 
question of what constitutes a "family." 
68. Sec Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 ( 1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
69. Eric R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
70. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federalism RePised, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 201, 210 (1982) 
(reviewing T. !-'REYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT & ERIE CASES I:-.: AMERICAN 
hDERALISM ( 1981) ). 
71. Sec Heneral~v G. Marcus Cole, The Federalist Co.rt of Bankruptcy Exemption Refi!rm, 
74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227,230-31 (2000) (describing the phenomenon of a person relocating 
to a state with more expansive exemptions trom creditor levies on the eve of bankruptcy). 
72. See lfL'1tt-rallv J etl-i-cy A. Parness, Participation of Unwed Riolo._qical Father.< in 
NrJJlbom Adoptiom: AchicPiiW Substatttil'e and Procedural Fairness, 5 J.L. & FAM. STLTD. 223 
( 2003) (discussing the recognition of parental rights t()r unwed biological parents). 
73. ScrJrem-rally Michelle Ognibene, A Comtitutional Analy.ris of Grandparents' Custody 
R~qhts, 72 U. CHI. L REV. 1473 (2005) (discussing· grandparents' interests in the custody 
context). 
74. Sec _qmcrallv Alisha M. Carlile, Note, Like Family: R(qhts of Nomnarried 
Co!Jabitatioual Partner.< in LoJJ ofCo1tsortium Action.r, 46 B.C. L. Rev. 391 (2005) (arguing 
th.lt unmarried cohabitants be allowed loss of consortium recovery). 
75. Sec id. 
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Property rules may seem arcane and unrelated to a state's 
fundamental ordering of persons and their relationships, but in fact 
they are profoundly expressive of a state's definition of its 
community. Property rights, for example, detlne the extent of an 
owner's theoretically autocratic right to exclude others from his 
property, thereby balancing the owner's rights against claims of 
access for the social good. 76 More specifically, states categorically 
limit an owner's right to exclude others under its laws prohibiting 
discrimination in housing and public accommodations. Property 
rules also limit an owner's right to control the disposition of his 
property upon his death. One example of this is the surviving 
spouse's elective share. Another example is the elimination of the 
owner's ability to control future ownership through generations, 
such as by abolishing the fee tail estate77 or by creating and applying 
the state's rule against perpetuities. These state property laws are far 
more than blind, dumb, and mute black-letter rules. Rather, they 
collectively answer one of the most profound questions a society can 
answer: what form of private property, if any, shall our citizens have? 
Within each state, these laws and others accumulate in their 
effect. In the aggregate they shape and define a state's culture. 
Culture, being a soft concept, is not easily capable of quantification 
or even precise description. But few would doubt that Kansas, 
California, and Maine each have a different feel to them, and this 
difference in feel is reflective of their different cultures. This healthy 
difference is interstate pluralism. 
B. Interstate Pluralism Policy Demonstrated 
In order to facilitate the interstate pluralism outlined above, the 
role of full faith and credit to enforce national unity---n)ntrary to the 
standard accoune8-is relatively narrow. To illustrate the point, I 
will modifY the thought experiment previously introduced. 7~ Suppose 
76. See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 36<} (N.J. l Y7l) (reversing a trespass conviction 
where access was sought to the landowner's propertv in order to provide legal advice and 
medical care to migrant farm workers). 
77. See Susanna L. Blumenthal, The Deviance of the Will: l'o/icirw the Bozmds of 
Testamentary Freedom in Nineteenth-Century America, IIY HARV. L. REV. YSY, Y6Y (2006) 
("The English law of inheritance became an easy target of criticism in revolutionan· Amcric.1, 
standing f(x an outmoded way of ordering social and political relations."). 
78. See mpra notes 4-26 and accompanying text. 
79. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanving text. 
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that all the parties and events in the second suit are, as in the first 
suit, local to Massachusetts. The second suit, however, is litigated in 
New York. With this change to the hypothetical, full faith and credit 
would now limit the freedom of the second state (New York) and 
require it to apply Massachusetts law.80 
But the reason full faith and credit limits the second state here 
has little to do with national uniformity. Rather, full faith and credit 
requires the second state to apply Massachusetts law because the 
matter is--upon these changed facts--so closely connected to 
Massachusetts that to allow another state to apply its law usurps 
Massachusetts' authority and prerogatives. As such, what full faith 
and credit is protecting is Massachusetts' right to its own identity. 
That is, in the context of choice of law, full faith and credit operates 
precisely not to unifY, but to allow space for political diversity among 
the states. 
Any attempt to promote uniformity through choice of law is 
ultimately a fool's errand. There is a reason that problems of this 
type arc called "choice of law." The choice oflaw enterprise is always 
undertaken against a backdrop of diversity, not uniformity. In any 
choice of law case, there are two or more competing laws on the 
issue in question. Whatever the outcome of the case, one will be 
applied and one will not. But the failure to apply one of the laws 
does not make that law disappear. The law will survive and be 
applied in future cases. The lack of uniformity between the 
competing laws will persist. 
The most that can be said for promoting uniformity in choice of 
law is that tor a particular case we might devise a choice of law rule; 
that the choice of law rule is adopted by all possible forums; and 
because the particular choice of law rule we adopt does not take as 
one of its inputs the identity of the forum, 81 the result in the 
80. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,818 (1985) (noting that to apply its 
law, a state must have '"a significant contact or signitlcant aggregation of contacts, creating 
state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor timdamentally untair'" 
(quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 ( 1981 ))). 
81. That is, the rule is "t(Jntm neutral." In contrast, some choice of law rules, 
particubrlv modern ones, arc not designed to he forum neutral. See Jeffrey L. Rensberger, 
Dmnntic Splits of Authority aud htterstMe Choice of Law, 29 GONZ. L. REv. 521, 535 ( 1993-
1994) (discussing Brainerd Currie's interest analysis scheme). Others tend to he biased toward 
the b\\' of the t(mun \\'hether designed that \\'ay or not. See Michael H. Gottesman, Draining 
the Dismal Su•amp: n1e Case jiw Federal Choice of LaJP Statutes, 80 GEo. L.J. I, 8 ( 1991 ); 
I.aura E. I.ittlc, Hainplitti1~q and Complexity iu Conflict of Laws: The Paradox of Formalism, 
37 U .C. DAVIS L. REV. 925, 945-46 & n.69 (2004) (collecting authorities critical of the 
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particular case will be the same regardless of where the suit 1s 
brought. This type of uniformity-the same outcome f(x a case 
regardless of forum-is to be sure a choice of law policy,H2 but the 
type of uniformity it achieves is far from the national uniformity that 
has incorrectly been said to underlie full faith and credit as to choice 
of law. Choice of law necessarily limits the uniformity achieved to 
assurances that a particular case under adjudication will come out the 
same as if it had been adjudicated in another forum. Indeed, the 
uniformity sought here is not between different states, but between a 
real case-the one before the court-and an entirely hypothetical 
case, one that we imagine between the same parties and concerning 
the same events in another jurisdiction. Such a case is necessarily 
hypothetical because, in fact, the case is not before another court and 
can never be once the matter is reduced to a judgment because of 
the strong effect of the Full Faith and Credit Clause as applied to 
judgments.83 
As we have seen, full faith and credit is strong in the context of 
judgments but weak when it comes to choice of law. This result 
reflects a policy of allowing each state, within broad limits, to 
promote its own forum polices. There are exceptional choice of law 
cases in which a state is not permitted to further its own policies, but 
in those cases the goal is not to make the two states alike, but rather 
to preserve the individuality of the other state and to allow f(x state-
to-state differentiation. Thus, in the choice of law aspect of full faith 
and credit, the goal is interstate pluralism. This is exactly the 
opposite of the goal of uniformity on the judgment side of full faith 
and credit. Within full faith and credit, we can thus concern 
ourselves with the balance between uniformity and interstate 
pluralism. 
better bw approach for its f(mun bias); Rensenbergcr, supra at 576-77 (discussing the "better 
law" approach to choice of law). 
82. See R.ESTATEME:--:T (SECOND) m CONfLICT OF LAWS§ 6(f) (ll!71) (listing as 
among the factors to be used in deciding choice of law cases the concerns of "certainty, 
predictability and uniformity of result"). 
83. See Rensberger, supra note 81, at 56l! (explaining the hypothetical nature of the 
concern f(Jr identity of outcome). 
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C. Interstate Pluralism Reflected in Areas Other Than 
Full Faith and Credit 
The foregoing demonstrates that the policy of interstate 
pluralism can be found in the structure of full faith and credit. 
Moving beyond full faith and credit, one can find evidence of this 
policy in other areas of the law. Indeed, interstate pluralism is deeply 
woven into the fabric of our federal structure. One tlnds protection 
of interstate pluralism in both the context of vertical federalism and 
horizontal federalism. That is, our federal structure has been ordered 
in such a way as to protect states both from the threat from above 
(an overreaching federal government) and the threat from abreast 
(peers, for example states that attempt to overreach). 
1. Protecting interstate pluralism in the context of vertical federalism 
Erie R.R. v. Tompkinf4 is, of course, one of the most obvious 
examples of the Supreme Court acting to protect interstate pluralism 
from a vertical threat. Erie rests directly on a foundation of 
protecting states from an over-powerful federal judiciary. Under 
Swift v. Tyson,85 federal courts in diversity were free to depart from 
the rule of law adopted by the state in which the court sat unless the 
matter was governed by a state statute.86 This had the effect of 
diminishing a state's ability to govern within its borders, as legal 
outcomes for in-state transactions differed depending upon whether 
the litigation was in state court or federal court. This problem was 
not appreciated at the time of Swift. Ironically, the vision of 
federalism underlying Swift was consonant with that of those today 
who call tor national uniformity through full faith and credit. It was 
believed in the Swift era that federal courts exercising diversity 
jurisdiction would, if given a tree hand to ignore state law, act as a 
magnetic north of reason, drawing to their rule of decision the 
previously wayward and scattered states and their common law rules. 
This f(Jllowed from the then-current conception of law as monolithic 
and objective, the "brooding omnipresence in the sky" that Holmes 
84. 304U.S.64(1938). 
85. 41 U.S. 1 ( 1842). 
86. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 71. 
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caricatured.87 But by the time of Eric, that conception was displaced 
by the realist and positivist understanding of the law as an expression 
of social and political policy. This tension between the pursuit of 
national uniformity and state autonomy was succinctly captured in 
Eric. While Swift attempted "to promote unif()rmity of law 
throughout the United States, the doctrine had prevented 
uniformity in the administration of the law of the State. "xx In 
reversing the course taken under Swift, the Court in Eric shifted the 
balance away from national uniformity and toward interstate 
pluralism precisely to protect states' abilities to define themselves 
politically. Our federal structure "recognizes and preserves the 
autonomy and independence of the States. ,x\1 Thus, except f()r 
instances in which the constitution specifically removes state 
autonomy, "[a ]ny interference with [state legislative or judicial 
action] ... is an invasion of the authority of the State and, to that 
extent, a denial of its independence. "90 
Modern cases construing the Eric doctrine continue to protect 
states from federal intrusion. In Hanna 11. Plurncr,91 the Court 
appeared to be steering the course back toward the more ti·equent 
application of federal law. It held that a cont1ict between a federal 
rule of procedure or a federal statute and state law is not subject to 
an Erie analysis. Instead, under Hanna, validly enacted federal 
statutes and rules of procedure trump absolutely cont1icting state 
law.92 This is true, it seems from Hanna's language, regardless of 
how much the federal law might intrude upon state prerogatives. But 
the impulse to protect state autonomy from overreaching federal 
87. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The 
common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some 
sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified."). 
88. Erie, 304 U.S. at 75. 
89. Id. at 78 (quoting Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893) 
(Field, J., dissenting)). 
90. Id. at 79. 
91. 380 U.S. 460,469-74 (1965). 
92. Id. at 471. Under Hanna, a federal court in diversity is bound to apply a valid and 
controlling Federal Rule of Civil Procedure over contlicting state law: 
When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules . . . the court has been 
instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory 
Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the 
Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor 
constitutional restrictions. 
Id. at 471 (citing Sib bach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13-15 ( 1941) ). 
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power refused to go away. In cases subsequent to Hanna, the Court 
has created an informal rule of construction: when a federal rule of 
civil procedure could be read to control over a state policy that seems 
substantive, the Court has read the federal rule narrowly, to avoid its 
application under Hanna.<t' In Gasperini v. Center for Humanities) 
bzc.,"J4 the Court summarized the hard rule of Hanna that favors 
federal Rules of Civil Procedure and explained how that rule is 
softened by solicitousness t()f state interests: 
It is settled that if the Rule in point is consonant with the Rules 
Enabling Act ... and the Constitution, the federal Rule applies 
regardless of contrary state law. See Hanna v. Plumer . ... Federal 
courts have interpreted the federal Rules, however, with sensitivity 
to important state interests and regulatory policics.95 
Thus, based on Erie and subsequent cases, federal statutes (and 
Rules of Procedure) are constrained in their operations so as to avoid 
interfering with state prerogatives. 
2. ProtectinJJ interstate pluralism in the context of horizontal 
federalism 
The other threat to state pluralism comes from sister states, 
which by their assertion of power may undermine other states. This 
threat may come in the t(mn of an assertion of judicial jurisdiction 
over events or persons to which the aggressor state lacks an 
appropriate connection. The due process limitation on state court 
jurisdiction reflects this concern. Although one might expect that a 
due process objection to a state's assertion of jurisdiction over a 
defendant would be based on injury to the individual defendant, the 
early understanding of personal jurisdiction was that a state 
exercising inappropriate jurisdiction was violating the rights of other 
states. As the Court said in Pennoyer v. Neff 
The several States are of equal dignity and authority, and the 
independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all 
others. And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, 
93. See Gasperini v. Ctr. t(Jr Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415,437 n.22 (1996) ("[The 
Court] 'has continued ... to interpret the federal rules to avoid conflict with important state 
regulatory policies."' (quoting R. fALLON, D. MELTZER & D. SHAPIRO, HART &'\/D 
WECHSLER'S THE fEDERAL COURTS A:-.JD THE fEDERAL SYSTEM 729-730 (4th ed. 1996))). 
94. !d. at 415. 
95. !d. at 427 n.7. 
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that the laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory, 
except so far as is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal 
established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as 
to subject either persons or property to its decisions.96 
The modern approach to due process and jurisdiction not 
surprisingly has shifted the focus to the question of fairness to the 
defendant.')7 But, interestingly, the old horizontal federalism strand 
of Pennoyer refuses to die. The modern minimum contacts test looks 
not only to the defendant's contacts with the state, but also to a 
series of factors that go to the question of the reasonableness of 
jurisdiction.Y8 Among these factors is the "forum State's interest in 
adjudicating the dispute. "99 Making personal jurisdiction turn in part 
on the existence of the forum state's interest is the modern 
descendant of the sovereignty strand of Pennoyer. Indeed, the Court 
has been quite explicit in this: the minimum contacts requirement of 
course "protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a 
distant or inconvenient forum," but it also "ensure[ s] that the States, 
through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on 
them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system." 100 A 
state lacking a sufil.cient forum interest but nonetheless asserting 
jurisdiction intrudes upon the other states that do have such an 
interest. 
A state may also intrude upon another state's prerogatives by an 
overly aggressive application of its law. Protection against this lies in 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which precludes states from 
applying their law if they lack an interest in doing so. 101 In addition, 
the due process clause also protects states from abuse by another 
state in the application of the other state's law. In BMW of North 
America, Inc. v. Gore, 102 the Court held that a punitive damages 
96. Pennoycr v. Nett~ 95 U.S. 714, 722-23 ( 1877). 
97. Sec 1nt'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 317 ( 1945) (holding that due proce" 
asks, inter alia, whether there arc "such contacts of the corporation with the state of the ti>rum 
as make it reasonable ... to require the corporation to dctend the particular suit which is 
brought there. An 'estimate of the inconveniences' which would result to the corporation . 
is relevant in this connection" (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 f.2d 139, 141 (2d 
Cir. 1930))). 
98. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 ( 1980). 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 292. 
101. See supra notes 28 & 79 and accompanying text. 
102. 517 U.S. 559,568-74 (1996). 
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award of $4,000,000 for failing to disclose presale repairs of a new 
car violated the due process clause because of its excessive size. The 
plaintiff attempted to justifY the award by arguing that the defendant 
had a nationwide policy and that an award of that size was necessary 
to induce the defendant to change that policy .103 The Court rejected 
that argument as an intrusion upon the autonomy of other states. 
The tl:>rum state could act against the defendant for local conduct, 
but assessing punitive damages for conduct that occurred in another 
state would be to allow the forum to set the policy of that other 
state: 
[ B ]y attempting to alter BMW's nationwide policy, Alabama would 
be infringing on the policy choices of other States. To avoid such 
encroachment, the economic penalties that a State such as Alabama 
inflicts on those who transgress its laws ... must be supported by 
the State's interest in protecting its own consumers and its own 
economy. Alabama may insist that BMW adhere to a particular 
disclosure policy in that State. Alabama does not have the power, 
however, to punish BMW for conduct that was lawful where it 
occurred and that had no impact on Alabama or its residents. Nor 
may Alabama impose sanctions on BMW in order to deter conduct 
that is lawful in other jurisdictions. 104 
3. Protecting interstate pluralism in the context of constitutional 
£nterpretation and application 
Interstate pluralism has also helped to form the contours of 
individual constitutional rights. In this context, the threat to 
interstate pluralism is organic. It comes not from a sister state or 
fi·om a branch of the federal government, but directly from the 
Constitution-or at least from a proposed interpretation of the 
Constitution. Because the proposed interpretation would injure 
interstate pluralism, it is rejected. The Constitution is of course the 
charter of federalism, but in this context, one input into determining 
the constitutional rule is interstate pluralism. 
In Miller v. California, tos the Supreme Court set out the test for 
obscene material that is outside the protection of the First 
Amendment. Material is obscene if "'the average person, applying 
103. See id. at 572. 
104. I d. at 572-73. 
105. 413 U.S. 15,23-24 (1973). 
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contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken 
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest." 106 By incorporating 
"community standards" into the test, the Court explicitly allowed for 
diversity within the United States of what is obscene. As the Court 
explained, although a "National Constitution" requires legal 
standards that "do not vary," the factual question of what is 
"prurient" will necessarily vary from community to community 
because "our Nation is simply too big and too diverse for this Court 
to reasonably expect that such standards could be articulated for all 
[fifty] States in a single formulation. " 107 The Court found: 
It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First 
Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi 
accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or 
New York City .... People in different States vary in their tastes 
and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by the 
absolutism ofimposed uniformity. 108 
Miller is a response to concerns of federalism. 109 The Court starts 
with an assumption-which so far as I know is empirically untested 
but certainly more than plausible-that people in different states 
have significantly different attitudes toward sexually explicit 
material.llo When such a disagreement exists, a uniform national 
standard runs the risk of either forcing the most pornography-
tolerant states to forego locally acceptable material in order to satisfY 
the sensibilities of the most easily offended states or, on the other 
hand, of forcing the most sensitive states to lower (or raise) their 
standards to that of the most tolerant state. It is for this reason that a 
106. Id. at 24 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229,230 ( 1972)). 
107. Id. at 30. 
108. Id. at 32-33. 
109. See Andrew Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 
1635, 1655 (2005). Koppelman writes that Miller's "solution is consistent with the idea of 
federalism as one response to deep moral disagreement: Different regions can hold different 
moral views, and no one of these views can be forced upon the nation as a whole." Id. 
Ultimately, however, Koppelman rejects Miller's appeal to federalism: "But, of course, there is 
another possible response to moral disagreement: the idea of the sovereign individual, who 
cannot be bullied out of his views even by an entire community." I d. 
llO. Rudyard Kipling captures the divergence of community conceptions of propriety in 
the following lines: 
And the wildest dreams of Kew are the facts of Khatmandhu, 
And the crimes of Clapham chaste in Martaban. 
Rudyard Kipling, In the Neolithic Age, available at http:/ jwww.poetryloverspage.com/ 
poets/kipling/in_neolithic_age.html. 
1732 
1703] Interstate Pluralism 
healthy concern f(:>r interstate pluralism calls for an interpretation of 
the Constitution that allows states to have breathing room so as to 
be able to define their culture. 
In other areas of constitutional law, the Court has similarly 
crafted protections of constitutional rights to vary based on 
differences among the states. The Constitution protects property 
rights in the Due Process and Takings clauses. 111 In interpreting 
these provisions, the Court has long made the content of state law a 
predicate tor the constitutional right: One must have a property 
interest to fall under the Constitution's protection, and the question 
of whether there is "property" or not turns upon state law. 112 The 
result is much like that which obtains under Miller. There is a unitary 
standard of constitutional law (prurient interest under Miller, 
property under the due process and takings clauses), but the 
application of this standard varies from state to state as the 
underlying state law changes. The case law on takings and due 
process avoids federalizing state definitions of property, thereby 
reserving this role f(x the states. 
D. The Benefits of Interstate Pluralism 
Pluralism is often conceptualized on the basis of the individual. 
That is, in discussing pluralism or diversity, people often speak of 
differences from one individual to another. A "diverse student 
body," a "diverse community," a "diverse society" all rest on this 
conception. I will refer to this conception as "house-to-house 
pluralism." House-to-house pluralism is satisfied only if each 
household on each street is potentially different than the one next 
door. One house may have Caucasian residents, another, Hispanic. 
Across the street it is possible that a Presbyterian family lives next 
door to a Jewish family. Some houses may have married occupants, 
some single, and some contain unmarried co-habitants. And in this 
model, total diversity is not properly attained unless on every street 
111. See U.S. Co::-.:ST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that "property" shall not be taken 
without "due process"); U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that "property" shall not be taken 
without compensation). 
112. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976) ("[Property interests are] 'created and 
their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stern trom an 
independent source such as state law rules or understandings."' (quoting Bd. of Regents v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564,577 (1972))). 
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in every state in the United States, one of these houses may be 
occupied by a married same-sex couple. 
But there is another pathway to diversity, one that paradoxically 
requires some homogeneity. This type of pluralism depends upon 
the presence of diverse communities. Each community within itself 
must have a commonality, otherwise it would not be a community in 
any sense. But because of the presence of multiple and ditlcring 
communities, the individual acquires an ability to choose his or her 
community and to achieve goals within that community which 
would otherwise be impossible or diflicult to obtain while acting 
alone. This type of pluralism I will call community pluralism.m 
Interstate pluralism is a type of community pluralism, one in which 
the relevant scale of the community is the state. 114 
Civic organizations of various types give ready examples of 
community pluralism. The Sierra Club, for example, is not 
comprised of a distribution of all types of persons that mirrors the 
general population. There are no anti-environmentalists in the Sierra 
Club. But we do not think of the Sierra Club as exclusionary or 
limiting of people as they try to express themselves. In fact, the 
contrary is true. Organizations like the Sierra Club f:Kilitate the 
expression of individuality, as like-minded people work together for a 
common cause. Others may find their fulfillment in the National 
Rifle Association, or the Rotary Club, or the community choir. But 
113. For a very insightful discussion of these concepts, see Heather K. Gerken, Second-
Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099 (2005 ). Gerken defines first-order diversity along 
the lines of my discussion of "house-to-house" pluralism. Likewise, her concept of "second-
order diversity" accords with this Article's definition of community pluralism. Sec id. at II 02 
("Second-order diversity involves variation among decisionmaking bodies, not within them."). 
Gerken's work, however, focuses on facilitating the participation of electoral minorities rather 
than, as this Article does, on realization of the autonomous individual. See id. at 1104. There 
is, however, significant overlap between her thesis and mine, in that one of the benefits she sees 
to second-order diversity is that it allows for a fuller and more varied view of the ditkrcnt 
segments in society, which comes rather close to the benefits of interstate pluralism I describe 
in the text: 
!d. 
If every decisionmaking body mirrored the population, as with tirst-ordcr diversitv, 
we would expect the decisions rendered roughly to mirror the preferences of the 
median voter. By avoiding the push to the middle in everv case, hcterogcncit\' 
among decisionmaking bodies reveals the views of the full democratic spectrum. 
Second-order diversity not only makes electoral minorities visible, it docs so in .1 
manner that showcases division and dissent within groups, prm·iding .1 kaleidoscope 
view of group difference. 
114. For a discussion of the question of the appropriate scale of the communitv, i.e. 
whether it should be the state or some other unit, sec i~tfra note 136. 
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tor these organizations to allow an outlet for self-expression and 
individual attainment, they must first, ironically, be allowed to 
exclude in order to establish themselves as communities. 
It is these considerations that have led the Supreme Court to 
recognize and protect associational rights. In NAACP v. Button,115 
the Court struck down, on First Amendment grounds, a state's 
attempt to restrict an organization-the NAACP-from providing 
litigation support for cases in which it had a policy interest. The 
Court recognized that "there is no longer any doubt that the First 
and ~ourteenth Amendments protect certain forms of orderly group 
activity." 116 This type of group activity is essential to effectuating 
individual autonomy: 
Our f(xm of government is built on the premise that every citizen 
shall have the right to engage in political expression and 
association . . . . Exercise of these basic freedoms in America has 
traditionally been through the media of political associations. Any 
interference with the freedom of a party is simultaneously an 
interference with the freedom of its adherents. All political ideas 
cannot and should not be channeled into the programs of our two 
major parties. History has amply proved the virtue of political 
activity by minority, dissident groups .... " 117 
The same concern f()r allowing a community the autonomy to 
exclude in order to fulfill the aspirations of its individual members 
led the Court in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale to allow the Boy 
Scouts to expel a homosexual scoutmaster, despite state anti-
discrimination law that would have forbidden this. 118 The "right to 
associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, 
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends" is "implicit in 
the right to engage in activities protected by the First 
Amendment." 119 To be meaningful, "[f]reedom of association ... 
plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate. " 120 The successful 
argument f(x the Boy Scouts in Dale was that the inclusion of this 
particular person would undermine their group expressive activities. 
115. 371 U.S.415,444~45(1963). 
116. Id. at 430. 
117. !d. at 431 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250~51 (1957) 
( plur.1lin· opinion)). 
llR. Boy Scouts of Am.\'. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655, 659 (2000). 
119. !d. at 647 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 46R U.S. 609,622 (1984)). 
120. Id. at 64R (quoting RobcrtJ, 46R U.S. at 623). 
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The "forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes 
the group's freedom of expressive association if the presence of that 
person affects in a significant way the group's ability to advocate 
public or private viewpoints. " 121 
Dale is the paradigm case for understanding the distinction 
between house-to-house pluralism and community pluralism. The 
argument for inclusion of the gay scoutmaster was based on house-
to-house pluralism. Each community must be equally open, it is 
argued, to all types of persons, regardless of their characteristics. 122 
The argument for the Boy Scouts was based on community 
pluralism. Different organizations exist and each seeks to fulfill the 
unique goals of its members. Without an ability to differentiate, to 
exclude, it is impossible to have a community. And it is the 
community that functions to enable the individual. One may 
disagree where the line between house-to-house and community 
pluralism should be drawn. One may argue that in Dale the Court 
went too far in favor of communities over the individual. But the 
important point is that both conceptions of pluralism exist and are 
valued in our federal system. One cannot account for pluralism 
without accounting for the idea of community pluralism. 
Dale and like cases arise in the context of private organizations 
engaging in expressive activity. The organization's exclusion of an 
individual is held to be protected from governmental attempts to 
force inclusion. But the importance of community pluralism runs 
beyond lofty First Amendment concerns. Wholly apart from 
constitutionally protected activities, community pluralism is a basic 
organizing principle of our society. Educational institutions, even 
public ones, are inherently discriminatory and exclusionary. The 
student body of the University of Michigan, for example, is not 
reflective of a bell curve of all college students in Michigan or 
nationally. Some are excluded and go to other schools, including 
other public schools, such as Wayne State or Central Michigan. The 
institution is crafting a community by choosing whom to admit. The 
basis of inclusion or exclusion may be SAT scores, high school 
grades, geographic origin, athletic ability, personal achievement, 
121. !d. 
122. See id. at 663 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("New Jersey 'prides itself on judging each 
individual by his or her merits' and on being 'in the vanguard in the tight to eradicate the 
cancer of unlawful discrimination of all types from our society."' (quoting Peper v. Princeton 
Univ. Bd. ofTrs., 389 A.2d 465,478 (N.J. 1978))). 
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race, 123 and many other factors. But whatever the criteria, the 
resulting educational community is designed to better fulfill the 
needs of its students than would a community that is a simple cross-
section of the entire pool of applicants. "The freedom of a university 
to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of 
its student body. " 124 
Zoning regulations likewise seek to differentiate in order to fulfill 
the individual. The whole idea of zoning is that it is proper for 
communities not to be diverse on a house-to-house basis. High rise 
apartments are not to be placed next to single family residences. 
Commercial uses are separated from residential. In the context of 
zoning and urban development, the Supreme Court has explicitly 
recognized that it is a proper aim of government to facilitate 
restricted communities. In Berman v. Parker, 125 the Supreme Court 
upheld a broad urban renewal program that required condemnation 
of both squalid buildings and others which though neither unhealthy 
nor dangerous were in the same blighted area. 126 The Court 
envisioned a broad governmental power to shape communities based 
on aesthetic values: 
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values 
it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as 
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine 
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious 
as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the 
present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made 
determinations that take into account a wide variety ofvalues. It is 
not for us to reappraise them. 127 
Likewise, in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, the Court upheld a 
governmental land-use restriction that permitted only single-family 
residential use. 128 The arguments against the ordinance echo the 
123. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
124. Id. at 329 (quoting Regents of U. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) 
(plurality opinion)). 
125. 348U.S.26(1954). 
126. Id. at 34. 
127. Id. at 33 (citation omitted). 
128. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I, 2 (1974). The ordinance dct!ned a 
tamily as "one or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking 
together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants. A number of persons 
but not exceeding two ( 2) living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though 
not related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family." I d. 
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claims of house-to-house pluralism. The ordinance was said to be 
invalid, inter alia, because "it bars people who are uncongenial to 
the present residents," because "social homogeneity is not a 
legitimate interest of government," and because it was "antithetical 
to the Nation's experience, ideology, and self-perception as an open, 
egalitarian, and integrated society. " 129 Writing for the Court, Justice 
Douglas disagreed with the premise that a government lacks a 
legitimate interest in shaping a community: 
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles 
restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land -use project addressed 
to family needs. This goal is a permissible one .... The police 
power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy 
places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth 
values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the 
area a sanctuary for people. 130 
Boraas is cut from the same cloth as Dale. The action in each 
case-by a local government in Boraas and by a private association in 
Dale-excluded certain persons in an attempt to create a 
community. Both exclusions did indeed cut against the grain of 
house-to-house pluralism. But in each, the Court upheld the 
competing claims of the community, recognizing that without 
exclusion, there is no community, and without community, the 
ability of individuals to realize their aspirations is limited. 
Interstate pluralism has other values beyond fulfilling the 
individual. Speaking in the context of federalist structure of joint 
sovereigns, the Court in Gregory v. Ashcroft identified several of these 
benefits, J3J two of which are particularly relevant here. first, having 
multiple states with sovereign power to det1ne themselves "assures a 
decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse 
needs of a heterogeneous society." 132 The heterogeneity of the 
societies in our states-a matter I shall seek to demonstrate 
129. Id. at 7. 
130. /d.at9. 
131. Gregory\'. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,458 (1991) ("[lntcrstc\tc pluralism[ clssurcs cl 
decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogenous 
society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows f(>r 
more innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes government more 
responsive by putting the States in competition t(,r a mobile citizemy." (internal ciutions 
omitted)). 
132. Id. 
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bclow 1''-calls tor an equally heterogeneous mixture of states in 
order to respond to the particularized needs of the people. Second, a 
robustly federal structure "makes government more responsive by 
putting the states in competition for a mobile citizenry." 134 Because 
interstate pluralism allows for state-to-state differentiation, m it 
encourages individuals to relocate to take advantage of a particular 
social policy, be it low taxes, high employment, a high level of social 
services, or personal safety. And after individuals have chosen, the 
"competition" that the Court recognizes gives feedback to the 
government in a very tangible way on the wisdom and success of a 
chosen social policy. 136 
133. See infra Part III. 
134. Gn~qorv, SOl U.S. at 45R. 
135. On these two federalism policies-responsiveness to differing needs and interstate 
competition--sec John 0. McGinnis, ReJJiJJincf! TocqueJJille's America: The Rehnqui.rt Court's 
Juri.,prudma o(Social Discrmrv, 90 CAL. L. REV. 4R5, 509-10 (2002). 
!d. 
Federalism creates a marketplace in which state governments must compete, 
much like private associations. By placing state governments in competition with 
one .mother, it f(,rces them to be efficient in addressing externalities like pollution or 
criminal \'iolence within their jurisdictions. As with other forms of spontaneous 
order, states produce goods (in this case, public goods) to address the problems 
within their jurisdiction in a manner that dliciently responds to the preferences of 
their members (in this case, the citizens of their state). Furthermore, because of the 
spontaneous ordering of competing states, they will readily copy the successful 
innovations of other states. Here, that means creating a "laboratory of democracy" 
where the succcssti.tl experiments of yesterday become the effective public policy of 
tomorrow. Second, like different associations, different states provide diflcrent 
political niches f(>r a diverse people, responding to different preferences with 
ditlcrent goods. Inhabitants of San Francisco simply have different preferences and 
needs from those in Dubuque, and uniti.)rm rules failing to take account of this 
diversity will leave them alienated ti-orn their government. 
136. For an interesting proposal that local governments-not states-should be allowed 
to regulate marriage, and in particular to grant or not grant same-sex marriages, see Richard C. 
Schragger, Citin as Constitutional Actor.<: 1he Case ~(Same-Sex Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147 
( 2005 ). Many of the benefits that this Article proposes f()[ a tederalist approach to marriage are 
made by Schragger at the local government level: 
The very idea of decentralizing regulatory authority is to permit local majorities to 
e1uct pre!Crenccs that broader or more difFuse maJonties might reject. 
Decentralizing the regulation of marriage eligibility docs not appear to put any 
unrepresented minorities at risk. In f'Kt, it allows a group that normally falls within 
that categorv-gays and lesbians--to obtain a more favorable rule in a smaller 
jurisdiction . 
. . . . If it is true that localities compete f(>r a mobile citizenry, then it makes sense to 
permit loc.1litics to diftcrcntiatc themselves by regulating in areas that are of true 
public concern as long as the spillover cltects arc minimal. Marriage eligibility is a 
strong signal of the values of a particular community; there is no rc.1son that 
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Ill. THE DIMEl'\SION OF INTERSTATE PLURALISM: HOW MUCH 
ALIKE ARE WE? 
In deciding how to adjudicate disputes that touch upon several 
different states, it is important to balance the desire to create a 
sufficiently uniform structure so that we truly have a nation with a 
concern for preserving appropriate spheres of autonomy to each 
state. As shown above, courts engage in this balancing in a \Vide 
variety of contexts-personal jurisdiction, choice of law, interstate 
enforcement of judgments, enforcement of constitutional norms, 
and the law applied by the federal courts. The end result is a federal 
structure that is neither too amorphous and heterogeneous 
(otherwise, we would not have a single nation) nor so narrow and 
homogenous that there is insufficient diversity among the states. 
The ultimate question is how wide is the river of interstate 
pluralism? Where is the mainstream, and how do we find what lies 
outside the mainstream? If one accepts that a divergence between the 
states is necessary and desirable for our federal structure, the 
question remains as to how much divergence we arc to allow. Our 
federal structure presumes a community of communities. The 
communities-the states-must be given sufficient space f()r 
divergence in order to be definable as distinct communities. But if 
they drift too far apart, the overall community-the nation-
becomes too diffuse. 
The question as to the degree of pluralism among the states is 
twofold. One might simply wonder, as a descriptive matter, how 
different the states of the United States really arc in cultural, legal, 
and social terms. One might concede that our federal structure 
legally allows for state idiosyncrasies while maintaining that at present 
few such idiosyncrasies actually exist. The other question is about 
legal norms, and, in particular, the Constitution. There must be a 
mainstream to the river; the limitations imposed upon the states by 
localities should not be able to compete t(>r citizens on that basis. The ach·amage, if 
the competitive model is correct, is that more individuals will tind governments that 
fulfill their preferences . 
. . . [L]ocal determinations of marriage eligibility arc responsive to the values of 
community selt~ddinition and association; smaller-scale institutions arc better suited 
to expressing the kinds of communal norms implicated by nurriagc eligibilitv 
determinations. 
!d. at 166 (citations omitted). Although I agree with Schraggcr on the bcndits of allowing 
divergent views of marriage, I would put the scale of decision on what constitutes a marriage 
where it has always been, on the state. 
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the Constitution (and by Congress acting under the authority that 
the Constitution gives it) ensure that the mainstream remains intact. 
No state may exceed those limits. The degree of latitude given by the 
Constitution to the states defines in law the dimensions of our 
pluralism. The question then is how intrusive is the Constitution 
(and congressional power) upon choices that states might otherwise 
make. 
As to these issues of divergence and convergence, some have 
argued in the context of same-sex marriage that states do not really 
differ that much from each other and that a state should not be 
allowed to decline to recognize a sister-state marriage (or any other 
sister-state law) on the ground that it offends local public policy. 
There are two prongs to this argument. First, it is asserted as a 
factual matter that we have a shared national culture, 137 that among 
the states our "basic values are widely shared. " 138 The differences 
that do exist arc merely "the stuff of late-night TV jokes and friendly 
sports rivalries. " 139 Second, apart from these voluntarily shared 
values, the "federal Constitution ... takes a number of contentious 
problems off the table for individual states and screens out laws 
inconsistent with widely shared national values." 140 Under this 
argument, there is little room for the traditional public policy 
exception to choice of law, under which a forum will refuse to apply 
the law otherwise designated by its choice of law rule because it is 
repugnant to public policy .141 Public policy must have a narrow 
scope because "among states of the United States, very few laws that 
are also constitutional can fairly be characterized as violating 
'ftmdamental principles of justicc"' 142 (which is the usual standard for 
invoking the public policy exception to the application of another 
1.37. See Kramer, .rupra note 15, at 1989 ("The states of the United States, in contrast, 
share what is, t(Jr practical purposes, a single culture."). 
138. !d. 
139. !d. 
140. !d. 
141. Sa, C.Jf., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONfLICT OF LAWS§ 90 ( 1971) ("No action 
will be entertained on a t(m:ign cause of action the ent(Jrcement of which is contrary to the 
strong public policy of the tiJrum."); id. § 283(2) ("A marriage which satisfies the 
requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as 
nlid unless it violates the strong public policy of another state which had the most significant 
relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage."). 
142. Kramer, mprtl note 15, at 197.3 (quoting Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 
198,202 (N.Y. 1918)). 
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state's laws). The more general point of those who take this view is 
that interstate pluralism is not very important because it docs not 
exist in fact and cannot legally exist under the limitations of the 
Constitution. 
A. Interstate Pluralism and the Maximalist Constitution 
Taking the second point first, the argument that the 
"Constitution ... screens out laws inconsistent with widely shared 
national values" 143 begs an enormous question about the scope of 
the Constitution's constraints upon state freedom of action. Many 
have debated the proper role of the Supreme Court in interpreting 
the Constitution, and I do not presuppose to offer the final word on 
that subject here, but a few points on this question are especially 
relevant in the context of interstate pluralism. 
One might imagine a maximalist constitution, one that is broad 
in scope, imposing many limitations on governmental action. 
Suppose, for example, a rational basis test for constitutionality that 
not only has teeth, but fangs. Under this hyper-rational basis 
scrutiny, there is always just one rational approach to any problem. 
Any state that deviates from that rational answer fails the rational 
basis test. State laws would then be at once very uniform. In fact, 
over time the discerned rationality would become an all-
comprehensive code for all facets of the law. 
What I have just described would serve as a rough description, a 
caricature, of what was wrong with the Lochner era 144 of Supreme 
Court decisions. It is generally agreed that the Court erred in those 
days by having too narrow a conception of the permissible range of 
state choices. Today, we agree with Holmes that the Fourteenth 
Amendment "docs not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social 
Statics." 145 But at the same time, we still have a healthy, indeed 
vigorous, substantive due process doctrine that does limit state 
choices. I am not suggesting that we have now or arc in danger of 
soon entering a neo-Lochner era. My point instead is more modest. 
One cannot blithely say that the "Constitution ... screens out laws 
inconsistent with widely shared national values" 146 without at least 
143. Id. at 1989. 
144. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
145. Id. at 75 (Holmes,]., dissenting). 
146. Kramer, supra note 15, at 1989. 
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acknowledging the ghost of Lochner. How broadly one defines our 
"widely shared national values" is key. The broader the national 
values arc, the less autonomous and diverse are the states. In 
particular, it is perilous to assert that states do not much differ 
because they arc constitutionally forced to be the same in all respects 
that are significant. Such a view seems to reflect an assumption that 
indeed the Constitution does provide only a single permissible 
answer to all policy questions, leaving to the states only "the stuff of 
late-night TV jokes and friendly sports rivalries. " 147 
B. How the States Differ: An Empirical Snapshot 
As noted, another argument against interstate pluralism as a 
value is that it does not exist in fact. That is, we have a shared 
national culture and only insignificant regional or state differences. 
But this is of course an empirical argument. In this section, I set out 
to show that there are in fact very significant differences among the 
states on a wide variety of social and cultural matters. 
Interstate pluralism is both the result and product of differing 
legal choices made by the states. It is no doubt true that local values 
and sentiments affect the shape of a state's laws. But it is also true 
that state laws act as the shaper of a culture. A state that chooses to 
grant grandparents a voice in adoption cases, 148 for example, makes 
that choice based on the inputs from its social system. But once that 
choice is made, the legal inclusion of the grandparent changes the 
dynamic of the family in that state and the expectations of family 
actors. Likewise, abortion rates may be higher in states that have 
chosen to publicly fund abortions. 149 One might conclude from this 
phenomenon that law shapes society. But the existence of a law, in 
this case public funding for abortions, is reflective of the culture and 
values of the state that has made that legal choice. In looking for 
data to measure cultural divergence among the states, it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to separate out the cause and effect between social 
institutions and legal institutions. Nor is it a simple thing to trace 
back from a particular cultural difference to a particular legal choice 
that is related to that difference. For these reasons, I shall not 
147. Id. 
148. Sec supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
149. ~or the dau, which suggests that public funding of abortions does increase the rate 
of abortions, see inf'ra note 171 and accompanying text. 
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attempt to show that State A has one law, State B has a ditkrent law, 
and that this difference in law produces X result in cultural 
differentiation. Instead, it is enough to demonstrate that whatever 
shared national culture we have, we also have deep and abiding 
cultural differences among the states. 
1. Marriage) divorce) and births 
Because this Article discusses same-sex marriage, I will begin by 
looking at some of the differences in families. Figure 1 shows the 
rate of marriages and divorces per 1000 of population for 2004. 1" 0 
As to marriages, the data is based on the number of marriages 
performed (or in some cases, on the issuance of a license), not on the 
residence of the celebrants. For this reason, Nevada and Hawaii 
should be set aside; their rate is no doubt inf1ated by out of state 
couples coming to the state for a tourist's wedding. 
Figure 1: Marriages and divorces per 1000 population, 2004 
State Marriages Divorces State Marriages Divorces 
Nev. 62.5 6.4 Colo. 7.4 4.4 
Haw. 22.9 no data N.M. 7.4 4.6 
Ark. 13.4 6.1 N.C. 7.3 4.2 
Tenn. 11.4 4.9 Mo. 7.1 3.8 
Idaho 10.7 5.0 Ncb. 7.1 3.4 
Utah 9.8 4.1 Kan. 7.0 3.3 
Ala. 9.4 5.0 N.D. 7.0 3.1 
Vt. 9.4 3.9 Iowa 6.9 2.8 
Wyo. 9.4 5.3 Md. 6.9 3.2 
Fla. 9.0 4.8 N.Y. 6.8 3.0 
Ky. 8.8 4.9 Ariz. 6.6 4.3 
Alaska 8.5 4.3 Ohio 6.6 3.6 
Me. 8.5 4.3 Mass. 6.5 2.2 
S.D. 8.4 3.1 Okla. 6.5 4.9 
Va. 8.3 3.9 Wash. 6.5 4.3 
S.C. 8.2 3.2 Cal. 6.3 no data 
La. 8.1 no data Wis. 6.2 3.1 
150. Derived from U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2007, 
Table 119, available at http:/ /www.census.gov /prod/2006pubs/07statab/vitstat.pdf. 
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Figure 1 continued 
State 
Or. 
N.H. 
Tex. 
Ind. 
Ga. 
Marriages Divorces State Marriages Divorces 
R.I. 
Mont. 
W.Va. 
R.1 
R.O 
7.9 
7.8 
7.7 
7.6 
7.5 
7.5 
4.1 
3.9 
3.6 
no data 
no data 
3.0 
3.8 
5.0 
Del. 6.1 3.7 
Ill. 6.1 2.6 
Mich. 6.1 3.4 
Miss. 6.1 4.5 
Minn. 6.0 2.8 
Pa. 5.9 3.0 
Conn. 5.R 3.1 
N.]. 5.8 3.0 
D.C. 4.5 1.9 
Setting aside Nevada and Hawaii, the other states at the top of 
the list-such as Arkansas, Tennessee, Idaho, and Utah-show a 
marriage rate more than double that of the states at the bottom. One 
factor tending to drive a marriage rate higher is the age of the 
population. Younger people arc more likely to become married than 
older people, many of which arc already married. Figure 2 
demonstrates the lower rate of eligibility for marriage of older 
populations. 1s1 So, all other things being equal, states with a younger 
population would tend to have a higher marriage rate. 
Figure 2: Percent of Population Married 
by Gender and Age, 2005 
~~~ ·······-····-···-· ···--····----·-·-·--·--M-a·l~--
.. ,,.,,.,,,.,,, . .,. ,.,,,,,,.,,,,, .. ,,,_ 
~~~ :~~~~/~~/-,....,,-,<-/-,:-/-,',_,"",L:;"""'"··"''"'"··'''-.. ,_, .. ,_,_.,_, .. ,_,.,._.,.,_.,._ ..._, ..,_····----=F=-c-m-a-=-~--"'-.... ""':::---'\._-'\-<; 
~~~ ~,;e:.~ .. ,'_/_· _____________________ ~ 
0% 
151. Derived from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U:-.!ITED 
STATES: 2007, tbl.55, available at http:/ jwww.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/07statab/ 
pop.pdf. 
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But not all other things are equal. It is true that many of the 
states with the lowest marriage rates also have the lowest percentage 
of their population in the 20-29 age group in the 2000 Census. 1" 2 
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Wisconsin had the third, 
sixth, eighth, and eleventh lowest percentages of their populations 
between ages 20 and 29. 153 Because these states also all fall into the 
bottom ten on marriage rates (Figure l ), they tend to confirm the 
hypothesis that marriage rates are simply a function of the age of the 
population. But other states do not flt this mold. Mississippi has the 
ninth highest percentage of its population in the 20-29 age group in 
the 2000 Census, and yet it has sixth lowest marriage rate. Clearly, 
marriage as an institution is not as popular in Mississippi as it is in 
other states. Likewise, the District of Columbia has the single lowest 
marriage rate in Figure l. But in the 2000 Census, it had the highest 
percentage of 20-29 year olds (18.3% of its population was in that 
age band). 154 One may argue that the District is a special case 
because many younger adults are there temporarily from other states 
while working for the federal government or at the national 
headquarters of private organizations. These people are more likely 
to have emotional bonds to persons from their state of origin, and 
when and if they marry it will be "back home." But assuming that is 
true, the presence of a large number of young single people who are 
not looking for a local marriage partner would give a distinctive cast 
to the District. In any event and whatever the case with the District 
of Columbia, it is clear that other factors beyond age drive marriage 
rates. What they are, I will not venture to try to demonstrate. But 
the tact remains that people in different states behave difterently 
toward the institution of marriage. 
Another way of getting at the relative importance attached to 
marriage by people in different states is to look at the rate of births 
to unmarried women. Figure 3 gives this data for 2003, expressed as 
152. for a discussion of the states population distribution by age, sec inji·a notes 210--14 
and accompanying text. 
153. Derived fi·om U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE SiNGLE YEAR Of AGF AND SEX 
POPUlATION ESTIMATES: APRIL I, 2000 TO }ULY 1, 2006 - RESIDENT, al'ailab!e at 
http:/ /www.census.gov/popest/ datasets.html (downloaded data from http:/ /www.ccnsus 
.gov / popest/ states/ asrh/ tllcs/SC_EST2006 _AGES EX_RES .csv). 
154. Id. 
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a percentage of all births in the state/ 55 and provides the marriage 
rate rank from figure 1. 156 At first glance, this data tends to reinforce 
the marriage rate data. Some of those states with a lower marriage 
rate show up near the top of the list of the states with the highest 
rates of births to single women. The District of Columbia ( 53.6% of 
births to unmarried women), Mississippi ( 47.0% of births to 
unmarried women), and Delaware ( 41.9% of births to unmarried 
women), are examples of such states. But other states show a 
ditlerent pattern. In some, there is a low rate of marriage, but also a 
low rate of births to unmarried women. Minnesota, which ranks fifth 
from the bottom in unmarried births (27.7%), is also the forty-
seventh ranked state in marriage rate. Likewise, Washington ranks 
eighth from the bottom in unmarried births ( 28.8% ), but thirty-
eighth (in the three way tie) in marriage rates. And New Jersey ranks 
ninth from the bottom in unmarried births (29.3%), but is tied for 
forty-ninth in marriage rates. In such states, unmarried women are 
not choosing to have a child outside of marriage, but choosing not 
to have a child until married. This reflects not a rejection of 
marriage, but a delay of it. 
Figure 3: Percentage of Births to Unmarried Women, 2003 
State 
D.C. 
N.M. 
La. 
Miss. 
Del. 
Ariz. 
S.C. 
fla. 
Nev. 
Ga. 
Ark. 
%Births to 
Unmarried 
Women 
53.6 
48.4 
47.5 
47.0 
41.9 
41.5 
41.1 
39.9 
39.1 
38.1 
38.0 
Marriage 
Rate Rank 
51 
26 
18 
46 
43 
36 
16 
10 
22 
3 
State 
Tex. 
S.D. 
Pa. 
Ky. 
Cal. 
Haw. 
Me. 
Wyo. 
Mont. 
Or. 
Kan. 
%Births to 
Unmarried 
Women 
34.3 
34.2 
33.9 
33.8 
33.5 
33.5 
33.5 
32.6 
32.2 
31.7 
31.6 
Marriage 
Rate Rank 
20 
14 
48 
11 
41 
2 
12 
9 
25 
17 
31 
155. Derived from U.S. CE~SUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 01' THE UNITED 
STATES: 2007, 68 tbl.85 (2007), available at http:/ /www.census.gov/compendia/statab/ 
2007/ 
156. Sec .rupra tig.l. 
1747 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2008 
Figure 3 continued 
State %Births to Marriage State %Births to Marriage 
Unmarried Rate Rank Unmarried Rate Rank 
Women Women 
Tenn. 37.2 4 Va. 30.4 15 
Ind. 37.1 21 Wis. 30.4 42 
Okla. 37.1 39 Conn. 30.0 50 
N.Y. 36.5 35 Vt. 30.0 8 
Ohio 36.2 37 Iowa 29.9 33 
R.I. 35.8 23 Neb. 29.7 29 
Mo. 35.6 30 N.J. 29.3 49 
Ill. 35.3 45 Wash. 28.8 40 
N.C. 35.3 28 N.D. 28.5 32 
Ala. 35.0 7 Mass. 27.8 38 
Md. 34.8 34 Minn. 27.7 47 
Alaska 34.6 13 Colo. 26.7 27 
Mich. 34.6 44 N.H. 24.8 19 
W.Va. 34.6 24 Idaho 22.3 5 
Utah 17.2 6 
Finally, one may look directly at the birthrates in relation to the 
population of women in that state to examine the importance of 
marriage. Figure 4 157 ranks the states by the number of births per 
1000 women aged 15-44. This is expressed as the "fertility rate." 
Figure 4: Birth Rates per 1,000 Women 
Aged 15-44, 2004 
State Fertility Rate State Fertility Rate 
Utah 92.3 N.J. 64.2 
Ariz. 79.5 Fla. 64.1 
Idaho 77.3 Del. 63.8 
Tex. 77.3 Iowa 63.8 
Alaska 74.4 Ky. 63.6 
Haw. 74.0 S.C. 63.6 
Neb. 72.6 Tenn. 63.4 
Nev. 72.6 N.D. 63.2 
157. Derived from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 155, at 65 tbl.80. 
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Figure 4 continued 
State Fertility Rate State Fertility Rate 
S.D. 72.4 Mont. 62.7 
N.M. 71.9 Ohio 62.7 
Cal. 70.4 Ala. 62.4 
Okla. 70.3 Md. 62.3 
Ga. 70.I Or. 61.8 
Kan. 69.8 Wash. 61.7 
Colo. 68.8 Mich. 6I.4 
Ark. 68.3 N.Y. 60.7 
Miss. 68.3 Wis. 60.7 
Ind. 67.0 Conn. 58.8 
Ill. 66.7 W.Va. 58.3 
La. 66.7 D.C. 58.2 
Wyo. 66.5 Pa. 58.0 
N.C. 66.0 Mass. 56.5 
Va. 65.0 R.I. 55.0 
Minn. 64.5 N.H. 53.4 
Mo. 64.3 Me. 52.4 
Vt. 52.I 
Figure 4 allows us to put a picture together. In the District of 
Columbia, fewer people get married (Figure 1 ). Also, relatively few 
(seventh from the lowest fertility rate in Figure 4) women are giving 
birth. But an unusually large number of the births are to women that 
are unmarried (Figure 3). In Utah, on the other hand, many births 
occur (Figure 4 )-in fact, Utah has the highest fertility rate in the 
nation. And many more of the mothers are married. Utah also has 
the lowest rate of births to unmarried mothers in the nation (Figure 
3 ). This is also consistent with Utah having the sixth highest 
marriage rate-fourth highest if one discounts Nevada and Hawaii as 
tourist wedding destinations-as Figure 1 shows. New Mexico, on 
the other hand, has both a high fertility rate (tenth highest in Figure 
4 at 71.9%) and the second highest rate of births to unmarried 
women in the nation ( 48.4% of all births in Figure 3). 
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Before leaving data related to the family, abortion rates arc worth 
examining. Figure 5158 gives the rates of abortions per l 000 women 
aged 15 to 44 in each state. 
Figure 5: Abortions per 1,000 Women 
Aged 15 to 44, 2000 
State Rate State Rate 
D.C. 68.1 N.M. 14.7 
N.Y. 39.1 Ala. 14.3 
N.J. 36.3 Pa. 14.3 
Nev. 32.2 Minn. 13.5 
Fla. 31.9 Mont. 13.5 
Del. 31.3 La. 13.0 
Cal. 31.2 Vt. 12.7 
Md. 29.0 Alaska 11.7 
R.I. 24.1 Neb. 11.6 
Or. 23.5 N.H. 11.2 
Ill. 23.2 Okla. 10.1 
Haw. 22.1 Me. 9.9 
Mich. 21.6 N.D. 9.9 
Kan. 21.4 Ark. 9.8 
Mass. 21.4 Iowa 9.8 
Conn. 21.1 Wis. 9.6 
N.C. 21.0 Ind. 9.4 
Wash. 20.3 S.C. 9.3 
Tex. 18.8 Idaho 7.0 
Va. 18.1 W.Va. 6.8 
Ga. 16.9 Mo. 6.6 
Ariz. 16.5 Utah 6.6 
Ohio 16.5 Miss. 5.9 
Colo. 15.9 S.D. 5.5 
Tenn. 15.2 Ky. 5.3 
Wyo. 0.9 
One notable feature of Figure 5 is the astonishingly high rate of 
abortions in the District of Columbia. This serves to explain 
158. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT Of THE UNITED STATES: 2006, 
76 tbl.95 (2006), available at http:/ /www.census.gov/cornpendia/statab/2006/ 
2006edition.html. 
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somewhat its low fertility rate (sixth from the lowest fertility rate in 
Figure 4 ). And put alongside its low marriage rate (lowest in the 
nation in Figure 1 ), one begins to see that marriage is less popular in 
the District of Columbia than elsewhere, and is not seen as 
particularly relevant to the question of procreative acts (both as to 
births and as to as abortions). In Mississippi, as in the District, 
marriage rates are low (sixth from the lowest rate in Figure 1 ), and 
the abortion rate is fourth lowest in the country, 159 but the rate of 
births to unmarried women is fourth highest.160 In Mississippi, as in 
the District of Columbia, procreation outside of marriage is not rare, 
but the outcome of extramarital procreation in Mississippi is much 
more likely to end in a live birth. In Utah a third pattern is found. 
U tab has the fifth lowest abortion rate at 6.6 abortions per l ,000 
women aged 15-44. 161 As noted above, it also has the lowest rate of 
births to unmarried women at 17.2% of all births/62 but the very 
highest birth rate. 163 Utah also has the sixth highest marriage rate, 
f(mrth highest if one discounts Nevada and Hawaii. 164 Putting all this 
together, in Utah, procreative acts are much more likely to occur in 
marriage and are much more likely to result in a live birth. Thus, in 
Utah, women are getting married and having children. In 
Mississippi, they are having children, but not getting married. In the 
District of Columbia, they are not getting married and are having 
abortions. 
Finally, one may wonder whether the differences in abortion 
rates in Figure 5 arc, in part, the result of legal rules. Because the 
Supreme Court has recognized a right to abortion, we have a 
relatively uniform law on abortion access. 165 The differences are in 
public funding 166 and parental conscnt. 167 As of 2004, seventeen 
159. See Jttjlra tig.5. 
160. Sec mpra tig.3. 
161. Sec Jttjlra tig.5. 
162. SecJupratig.3. 
163. Sec Jttj!ra tig.4. 
164. Sec Jttjlra fig. I. 
165. Sa, c,_q., Pbnned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,846 (1992) (citing 
Roc v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-65 ( 1973) (women have a right to abortion bef()re viabilitiy 
of the tCtm without undue state interference; states may restrict abortions "after fetal viability" 
with exceptions when the woman's lite or health is in danger; all states have an interest in 
protecting the health of both the woman and ICtus). 
166. Sec American Civil Liberties Union, Public Funding for Abortion, July 21, 2004, 
http://www .aclu.org/reproductivcrights/ abortion/16393rcs20040721 .html. 
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states provide public funding for abortion. 168 Four have done so by 
legislation. 169 In the other thirteen states, public funding resulted 
from state supreme courts interpreting their state constitutions. 170 
Figure 6 lists the states that provide public funding for abortion, 171 
their abortion rate, 172 and where that state ranks. 173 States in bold are 
those that legislatively chose public funding. 
Figure 6: States with Public Abortion 
Funding, Rates, and Ranks 
State Abortion Rate Ranking 
N.Y. 39.1 2 
N.J. 36.3 3 
Cal. 31.2 7 
Md. 29.0 8 
Or. 23.5 10 
Ill. 23.2 11 
Haw. 22.1 12 
Mass. 21.4 15 
Conn. 21.1 16 
Wash. 20.3 18 
Ariz. 16.5 22 
N.M. 14.7 26 
Minn. 13.5 29 
Mont. 13.5 30 
Vt. 12.7 32 
Alaska 11.7 33 
W.Va. 6.8 45 
From Figure 6, it would indeed appear that the decision to 
publicly fund abortions is linked to the abortion rate. As to cause and 
effect, one must be more careful. Public funding, once decided 
upon, may cause an increase in abortion rates as the service becomes 
167. See Lauren Treadwell, Note, Injiwmal Closing of the Bypas1·: Minors' Petitions to 
Bypass Parental Coment jiJr Abortion in an Age of Increasing Judicial Recusals, 58 HASTIN(;S 
L.J. 869, 872-73 (2007). 
168. See American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 166. 
169. !d. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. See mpra tig.5. 
173. Id. 
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more economically attainable by a wider array of the population. But 
it is also possible that the social factors that drove a state to adopt 
public funding are also responsible for the higher rates. That is, 
abortion (or choice) is more popular in some states, and as a result of 
that shared social policy, the state chooses to fund abortions and 
women choose to have them. The analysis is complicated by the fact 
that thirteen states have public funding not as a result of a legislative 
choice but by judicial decision. In those states, it is harder to 
correlate the existence of public funding with public sentiment. Still, 
the judicial process is hardly immune from public opinion, and in 
many states, the judiciary is selected, at least in part, through an 
elective process. In the end, one can say that people's conduct, their 
state laws, and the public sentiment and values are likely aligned. All 
of which makes public funding of abortion a nice example of the 
interstate pluralism. State culture and values are reflected in laws and 
behavior, and state laws at the same time help to shape and form 
behavior. 
2. Suicide rates and mental health 
States differ widely in their suicide rates. New Mexico, for 
example, has three times as many suicides relative to its population as 
does New Y ark. 174 Figure 7 ranks the states from high to low on the 
number of suicides per 100,000 of population. 175 
Figure 7: Suicides per 100,000 Resident Population, 2001 
State Suicide Rate State Suicide Rate 
N.M. 19.8 Vt. 11.7 
Mont. 19.3 Ala. 11.5 
Nev. 18.4 Miss. 11.5 
Wyo. 16.8 S.C. 11.5 
Colo. 16.3 Ga. 1l.l 
Alaska 16.1 Haw. 1l.l 
Idaho 15.9 Va. 1l.l 
W.Va. 15.9 La. 11.0 
Okla. 14.8 Neb. 10.9 
Ariz. 14.5 Kan. 10.8 
174. U.S. CENSUS RUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT Of THE UNITED STATES: 2004-05, 
83 tbl.l 06 (2005 ), available at http:/ /wW\v.ccnsus.gov /prod/www /statistical-abstract-
2001_2005.html. 
175. ld. 
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Figure 7 continued 
Suicide Suicide Rate Suicide Suicide Suicide Rate 
Rate Rate Rate 
Or. 14.5 Ohio 10.7 
Ark. 14.2 Mich. 10.5 
Fla. 14.1 Iowa 10.4 
Utah 14.1 Pa. 10.4 
S.D. 13.8 Tex. 10.4 
Del. 13.6 Minn. 9.6 
XH. 13.3 Ill. 9.1 
Mo. 12.9 Md. 8.4 
Me. 12.5 R.I. 8.3 
KD. 12.4 Cal. 8.2 
Tenn. 12.4 Conn. 8.2 
Ky. 12.2 D.C. 7.0 
N.C. 12.1 N.J. 6.9 
Wash. 11.9 Mass. 6.7 
Wis. 11.8 N.Y. 6.6 
Ind. 11.7 
Is the difference in suicide rates a function of the ethnic 
composition of the state population? Different ethnic groups have 
different suicide rates. 176 A number of the states near the top of the 
list are western states, which may be skewed toward higher Hispanic 
and Native American populations. Indeed, Figure 8 177 shows some 
coincidence between some of the top suicide states and the 
percentage of Native American and Hispanic and Latino population: 
Figure 8: Percentage of Population (2005) by Native American/Native 
Alaskan and Hispanic-Latino and Rank of Suicide Rate 
State Native American, Hispanic, Latino% Suicide Rate 
Native Alaskan % Rank 
N.M. 10.19% 43.42% 
Mont. 6.46% 2.44% 2 
Nev. 1.42% 23.54% 3 
Wyo. 2.38% 6.73% 4 
176. See infra fig.9. 
177. Derived trom U.S. C:E~SUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTl'"o\CT Or THE ll:--iiTED 
STATES: 2007, supra note 155, at 26 tbl.23. 
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State 
Alaska 
Okla. 
Ariz. 
S.D. 
N.D. 
Wash. 
Figure 8 continued 
Native American, Hispanic, Latino % 
Native Alaskan% 
I5.99')(, 5.09% 
8.14% 6.60% 
5.05% 28.50% 
8.76% 2.07% 
5.30% 1.60% 
I.66% 8.77% 
Interstate Pluralism 
Suicide Rate 
Rank 
6 
9 
10 
I5 
I9 
24 
But such a hypothesis is belied by the fact that suicide is highly 
prevalent among white men. The suicide rate by race and ethnicity is 
shown in Figure 9 .I 78 
Figure 9: Suicides per 100,000 by Ethnicity and 
Gender, 2004 
Male Female 
White, non-Hispanic 2I.O 5.4 
White 17~ 19.6 5.0 
American Indian, Alaska Native 18.7 5.9 
Hispanic 9.8 2.0 
Black 9.6 1.8 
Asian, Pacific Islander 8.4 3.5 
While the suicide rate fix Native Americans is near that ofWhites, it 
does not clearly exceed that of Whites, and so the higher incidence 
of suicides in western states docs not appear to be chiefly a function 
of diH-erential rates among ethnic subgroups. Indeed, while Montana 
ranks second in the suicide rate at 19.3 per 100,000, its population is 
88.99% white,Iso which IS near Minnesota's 86.32% white 
17X. Derived ti·om U.S. CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH, Ul';!TED STATES, 
2006, 230-32 tbl.46, lll'lliltlblc at http:/ /www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus06.pdt; sec also 
U.S. CE~SUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 01' THE UNITED STATES: 2007, mpra note 
154, at 90 tbl.ll6. It should be noted that "[ d ]eath rates for the American Indian or Alaska 
Native and Asian or Pacific Islander populations arc known to be underestimated." U.S. 
CENTER !'OR HEALTH STATISTICS, supra, at 247 tbl.46 n.5. 
179. !:'or data reporting purposes, the "federal government considers race and Hispanic 
origin to be two separate and distinct concepts. Thus Hispanics may be of any race." U.S. 
C!·STER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, mpra note 17X, at 519 app. II. For this reason, there are 
two sep.1r.1tc categories for "White," which includes Hispanics, and "VVhitc, non- Hispanic." 
1 XO. Stc infi·a tig.l3. 
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population. 181 However, Minnesota's suicide rate is on the low side 
at 9.6. 182 It would thus appear that factors other than ethnicity drive 
the differences in suicide rates. 
One factor may be the level of state expenditures on mental 
health. Figure 10183 shows the average of expenditures per capita for 
mental health by state agencies f(x the years 1993, 1997, and 2001. 
The data is suggestive of a correspondence between the high 
spending states and those with lower suicide rates. 
Figure 10: Mental Health Expenditures (per capita) 
Average ofYears 1993, 1997, 2001 
State $per Capita State $per Capita 
D.C. 350 Kan. 56 
N.Y. 140 Colo. 54 
Haw. 110 S.D. 54 
Conn. 103 Ohio 53 
Vt. 99 Mo. 52 
N.H. 96 Va. 51 
Pa. 96 Wis. 50 
Mass. 93 Ill. 50 
Md. 89 Ala. 49 
Me. 88 Wyo. 49 
Minn. 87 Ind. 48 
Mich. 84 Ga. 47 
Mont. 84 Nev. 45 
Alaska 82 Tenn. 43 
Wash. 78 La. 42 
N.J. 76 Ncb. 41 
Or. 75 Okla. 39 
Del. 74 Iowa 38 
Ariz. 72 Fla. 37 
R.I. 71 Ky. 36 
Cal. 67 Tex. 36 
S.C. 65 Idaho 34 
181. See id. 
182. See supra tlg.7. 
183. Derived trom U.S. CE~TER !'OR HEALTH STATISTICS, supra note 178, ,lt 413 
tbl.l43. The expenditures for mental health are "[s]tate mental health agency per capita 
expenditures tor mental health services." !d. The services are "for mental illness, excluding 
mental retardation and substance abuse." Id. at 414. 
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Figure 10 continued 
State $per Capita State $per Capita 
N.C. 63 Ark. 29 
Miss. 61 N.M. 29 
N.D. 57 Utah 29 
W.Va. 24 
Figure 11 184 shows the apparent relationship. It separates out the six 
states with the lowest suicide rate. Of these six states, three rank in 
the top five in mental health expenditures per capita, four rank in the 
top ten, and all are in the top twenty-one. 
Figure 11: Suicide Rates and Mental Health Expenditures 
State Suicide Rate Mental Health Expenditure Rank 
N.Y. 6.6 2 
Mass. 6.7 8 
N.J. 6.9 16 
D.C. 7.0 
Cal. 8.2 21 
Conn. 8.2 4 
In fact, the correlation coeHicient between suicide rates and mental 
health expenditures is relatively strong at -0.42. (This coeHicient is 
negative because suicide rates trend down as expenditures 
increase ). 185 For comparison purposes, the Law School Admission 
Test has a correlation coeHicient to first year grades in law school of 
about 0.40. 186 
Figure 12187 shows the correlation between suicide rates and 
mental health expenditures graphically. Each point shown represents 
ll'l4. Sec supra notes 174, IX3. 
I R5. A correlation codlicicnt of 0 means there is no correlation. A correlation coefficient 
of 1.0 or -1.0 indicates a pcrtect linear correlation. 
IX6. Sec LISA ANTHONY STILWELL ET AL., PREDICTIVE VALIDIIT OF THE LSAT: A 
NATIONAL SUM/viARY 01' THE 2001-2002 CORRELATION STUDIES 5 tbl.2 (2003 ), available at 
http:/ /www.lsacnet.org/Research/Predictive-Validity-of the- LSAT-National-Summary-of-
thc-200 I %962002-Correbtion-Studics.pdf. The authors report a correlation coefficient of .40 
and .39 t(>r the \'cars 200 I and 2002 respectively. I d. 
IX7. Derived !rom the sources listed .rupra, notes 174, 183. For presentation purposes, 
the data t(>r the District of Columbia is excluded. The correlation coefficient noted in the text 
includes the data t(>r the District. 
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a single state's suicide rate (vertical, or Y axis) and that same state's 
per capita expenditures on mental health (horizontal, or X axis). It 
shows a general trend in which a state's suicide rate declines as its 
mental health expenditures increase. 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
0 
Figure 12: Suicide Rate and Mental Health Expenditures 
(with Linear Regression) 
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It bears emphasis that discovering a correlation such as this docs 
not demonstrate causation. Instead, it merely shows that two 
variables tend to move together. It may be that lower suicide rates 
are caused by higher mental health expenditures. But it could be the 
case that there is some other factor-such as a greater social concern 
for and awareness of mental disease-that is the true causal agent 
that drives both a lower suicide rate and a higher spending rate on 
mental health. Whatever the causal relationship, the fact remains that 
mental health, both in terms of expenditures and outcomes, remains 
a striking instance of state-to-state differentiation. 
States make very fundamental as well as very different choices in 
generating and spending revenue. Some states choose to spend more 
on mental health; others choose to spend less. The reasons f(x the 
choice may be varied. Some states choose to spend their revenue 
elsewhere, others desire to tax at a lower rate and have less revenue 
to spend, and still others spend less because their revenues arc low, 
not because of a low tax rate, but because of a low tax base from 
which to generate revenue. But whatever the reasons for the choice 
of the fiscal and social policy, the empirical evidence is clear that this 
choice has real-world consequences for mental health. 
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3. Ethnicity and religion 
The discussion of suicide rates introduced the topic of the ethnic 
composition of a state's population. The states vary widely as to their 
ethnic composition. Figure 13 188 ranks the states by ethnic diversity. 
It shows the percentage of a state's population attributable to 
diHerent ethnic groups. The last column, which is used to rank the 
states, notes the size of the largest single ethnic group. The state 
having the smallest dominant ethnic group ranks as the most diverse. 
State 
Haw. 
N.M. 
Cal. 
Tex. 
D.C. 
Md. 
Ga. 
Miss. 
r\ev. 
Ariz. 
N.Y. 
La. 
Fla. 
N.J. 
S.C. 
Ill. 
Alaska 
Va. 
N.C. 
Ala. 
Del. 
Colo. 
Okla. 
Conn. 
Figure 13: Composition of State Populations by Ethnicity, 2005 
Black 
2.32% 
2.42% 
6.74% 
11.69% 
56.99% 
29.29% 
29.76% 
36.95% 
7.74% 
3.64% 
17.38% 
33.10% 
15.74% 
14.47% 
29.25% 
15.10% 
3.66% 
19.88% 
21.76% 
26.39% 
20.67% 
4.09% 
7.74% 
10.09% 
Native 
Am. 
0.35% 
10.19% 
1.17% 
0.68% 
0.34% 
0.32% 
0.30% 
0.45% 
1.42% 
5.05% 
0.54% 
0.59% 
0.43% 
0.31% 
0.37% 
0.31% 
15.99% 
0.31% 
1.29% 
0.49% 
0.40% 
1.12% 
8.14% 
0.34% 
Asian 
41.50% 
1.27% 
12.24% 
3.26% 
3.09% 
4.77% 
2.69% 
0.74% 
5.72% 
2.23% 
6.66% 
1.38% 
2.09% 
7.22% 
1.08% 
4.06% 
4.57% 
4.57% 
1.79% 
0.83% 
2.67% 
2.57% 
1.54% 
3.20% 
Haw./ 
Pac. 
Islander 
8.95% 
0.13% 
0.42% 
0.11% 
0.07% 
0.06% 
0.08% 
0.03% 
0.53% 
0.19% 
0.09% 
0.03% 
0.08% 
0.08% 
0.05% 
0.06% 
0.57% 
0.08% 
0.07% 
0.04% 
0.06% 
0.14% 
0.09% 
0.08% 
Hisp. 
or 
Latino 
7.99% 
43.42% 
35.21% 
35.13% 
8.59% 
5.70% 
7.13% 
1.74% 
23.54% 
28.50% 
16.11% 
2.84% 
19.49% 
15.23% 
3.29% 
14.31% 
5.09% 
5.98% 
6.37% 
2.30% 
6.03% 
19.46% 
6.60% 
10.89% 
Non-
Hispanic 
White 
23.48% 
43.14% 
43.81% 
49.18% 
31.11% 
59.16% 
59.65% 
59.73% 
60.03% 
60.43% 
60.85% 
61.59% 
62.13% 
63.21% 
65.49% 
65.76% 
66.47% 
68.24% 
68.28% 
69.32% 
69.58% 
72.09% 
72.53% 
75.39% 
Largest 
Single 
Group 
41.50% 
43.42% 
43.81% 
49.18% 
56.99% 
59.16% 
59.65% 
59.73% 
60.03% 
60.43% 
60.85% 
61.59% 
62.13% 
63.21% 
65.49% 
65.76% 
66.47% 
68.24% 
68.28% 
69.32% 
69.58% 
72.09% 
72.53% 
75.39% 
188. Derived from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U~ITED 
STATES: 2007, Iupra note 155, at 26 tbl.23. 
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State 
Ark. 
Wash. 
Tenn. 
Mich. 
R.I. 
Mass. 
Or. 
Kan. 
Pa. 
Mo. 
Ohio 
Utah 
Ind. 
Neb. 
Wis. 
Minn. 
S.D. 
Idaho 
Wyo. 
Ky. 
Mont. 
N.D. 
Iowa 
N.H. 
W.Va. 
Vt. 
Me. 
Black 
15.72% 
3.52% 
16.81% 
14.34% 
6.18% 
6.86% 
1.80% 
5.88% 
10.61% 
ll.51% 
11.94% 
0.96% 
8.85% 
4.30% 
5.98% 
4.26% 
0.83% 
0.59% 
0.88% 
7.51% 
0.38% 
0.77% 
2.33% 
0.97% 
3.20% 
0.63% 
0.75% 
Native 
Am. 
0.70% 
1.66% 
0.28% 
0.59% 
0.60% 
0.29% 
1.37% 
0.94% 
0.18% 
0.44% 
0.22% 
1.33% 
0.27% 
0.95% 
0.94% 
1.17% 
8.76% 
1.40% 
2.38% 
0.20% 
6.46% 
5.30% 
0.33% 
0.24% 
0.18% 
0.35% 
0.55% 
Figure 13 continued 
Asian 
0.97% 
6.39% 
1.24% 
2.23% 
2.70% 
4.72% 
3.45% 
2.10% 
2.22% 
1.33% 
1.43% 
1.88% 
1.20% 
1.55% 
1.95% 
3.44% 
0.67% 
1.02% 
0.63% 
0.91% 
0.52% 
0.65% 
1.45% 
1.75% 
0.56% 
1.02% 
0.82% 
Haw./ 
Pac. 
Islander 
0.09% 
0.47% 
0.05% 
0.04% 
0.12% 
0.08% 
0.27% 
0.07% 
0.05% 
0.07% 
0.03% 
0.72% 
0.05% 
0.07% 
0.04% 
0.05% 
0.04% 
O.ll% 
0.07% 
0.05% 
0.05% 
0.04% 
0.04% 
0.04% 
0.02% 
0.03% 
0.03% 
Hisp. 
or 
Latino 
4.71% 
8.77% 
3.03')(, 
3.81% 
10.72% 
7.91% 
9.88% 
8.32% 
4.07% 
2.68% 
2.27% 
10.86% 
4.54% 
7.09% 
4.45% 
3.64% 
2.07% 
9.09% 
6.73% 
1.96% 
2.44% 
1.60% 
3.67% 
2.22% 
0.85% 
1.09% 
0.99% 
Non-
Hispanic 
White 
76.97% 
77.06% 
77.89% 
77.90% 
80.00% 
80.32% 
81.58% 
81.59% 
82.56% 
82.94% 
83.13% 
83.55% 
84.33% 
85.39% 
85.97% 
86.33% 
86.78% 
86.97% 
88.59% 
88.60% 
88.99% 
90.84% 
91.52% 
94.08% 
94.42% 
95.93% 
96.04% 
[2008 
Largest 
Single 
Group 
76.97% 
77.06% 
77.89% 
77.90% 
80.00% 
80.32% 
81.58% 
81.59% 
82.56% 
82.94% 
83.13% 
83.55% 
84.33% 
85.39% 
85.97% 
86.33% 
86.78% 
86.97% 
88.59% 
88.60% 
88.99% 
90.84% 
91.52% 
94.08% 
94.42% 
95.93% 
96.04% 
One would expect states with different ethnic compositions to 
have different cultures. Cinco de Mayo, for example, would 
presumably mean little in states like West Virginia or Maine, which 
have Hispanic/Latino populations of 0.85% and 0.99% respectively. 
In Texas, on the other hand, Cinco de Mayo ts presumably 
significant-in Texas 35.13% of the population is Hispanic/Latino. 
But beyond culturally sourced holidays, it would be surprising if 
differences in state ethnic composition did not have some effect on 
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the outlook, social expectations, and political values-that is, the 
culture-of the states. Indeed, in Grutter v. Bollinger/ 89 the Supreme 
Court accepted that diversity in higher education "promotes cross-
racial understanding, helps to break down racial stereotypes, and 
enables [students] to better understand persons of different races ... 
. [ C]lassroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more 
enlightening and interesting when the students have the greatest 
possible variety ofbackgrounds." 190 The same is no doubt true of the 
political discourse in a racially diverse state. More concretely, in 
Presidential voting, African-Americans have long voted all but 
exclusively for the Democratic candidate. Figure 14 shows the 
percentages (based on survey data) for White and Mrican-American 
voters since 1976 who voted for the Democratic Party candidate. 191 
100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
Figure 14: Voters for Democratic Candidate for 
President by Race, 197 6-2004 
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189. 539 U.S. 306(2003). 
190. I d. at 330 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 849-50 (E.D. Mich. 
2001) (internal quotations omitted). 
191. Derived from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: 2007, supra note 155, at 241 tbl.387. That table has the data for the 2000 and 2004 
elections. The entire time series, from which fig.l4 is derived, is available by downloading the 
MS Excel tile at http:/ /v.'Ww.census.gov /compendia/statab/elections for tbl.387. The data 
excludes votes for third party candidates. Id. It is based on survey samples. Id. 
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The point to be drawn from Figures 13 and 14 is that there is 
wide fluctuation among the states in ethnic composition and that it 
would be foolish to pretend that a state's ethnic composition has no 
effect on its political and legal culture. The point is perhaps best 
made graphically, as Figure 15 192 will show. The question to ask is 
whether anyone would expect the following states not to have 
significant differences. 
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Figure 15: Ethnic Distributions, Selected States 
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Religion also plays a part in shaping a state's culture. The states 
vary significantly in the religious identiflcation of their population. 
The six most common religious self.identifl.cations nationally, as of 
2001, are shown in Figure 16. 193 
192. Derived from U.S. CE~SUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 01' THE U:-i!TED 
STATES: 2007, supra note 155, at 26 tbl.23. 
193. See BARRY A. KOSMIN ET AL., AMERICA:\ RELIGIOUS IDENTII'ICATION SURVEY 
2001, at I 1-12 ( 200 I), available at http:/ jwww. trincoll.edu/N R/rdonlyrcs/ AH :EI-'5 3A-
8DAB-4CD9-A892-5453E336D35D/O/NEWAR1Sreviscdl2190 I b.pdf. The survey did not 
include Alaska and Hawaii. 
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Figure 16: Self-Identification in Religious Groups, 2001 
National (2001) Number %of Pop. 
Catholic 50,873,000 24.5 
Baptist 33,830,000 16.3 
Methodist/Wesleyan 14,150,000 6.8 
Christian-no denomination supplied 14,190,000 6.8 
Lutheran 9,580,000 4.6 
Presbyterian 5,596,000 2.7 
No Religion 27,486,000 13.2 
These identifications differentiate at the state level. Figure 17194 
ranks the states in order of religious homogeneity, ordering them by 
the percentage size of each state's largest religious group. 
Figure 17: Religious Composition of States, 2001 
(as percentage of population) 
Christian 
No State Cath. Bapt. Non- Meth. Luth. Pres b. Rei. High 
Denom. 
Utah 6 2 2 l l 57 (LDS) 17 57 
Miss. 5 55 4 9 2 7 55 
R.I. 51 6 4 l 15 51 
Mass. 44 4 3 2 l 16 44 
S.C. 7 43 6 14 2 5 7 43 
N.M. 40 10 5 2 2 4 18 40 
Tenn. 6 39 7 10 2 3 9 39 
N.Y. 38 7 4 6 2 2 13 38 
N.C. 10 38 6 9 2 3 10 38 
Vt. 38 3 4 6 22 38 
Ala. 13 37 6 9 2 3 6 37 
Ark. 7 37 5 9 l 2 13 37 
Ga. 8 37 7 ll 2 3 12 37 
N.J. 37 8 4 6 3 4 15 37 
La. 28 35 4 4 l 9 35 
N.H. 35 6 s 3 l l 17 35 
N.D. 30 6 2 7 35 3 35 
ll.}4. Id. at. 40-43. A blank entry indicates a figure ofkss than 0.5%. 
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Figure 17 continued 
Chtistian 
No State Cath. Bapt. Non- Meth. Luth. Pres b. Rel. High Den om. 
Ky. 14 33 8 5 2 13 33 
Cal. 32 7 ll 2 2 3 19 32 
Conn. 32 10 7 4 4 1 12 32 
Okla. 7 30 9 11 2 3 14 30 
Va. 14 30 7 7 2 3 12 30 
W.Va. 8 30 7 15 1 3 13 30 
Ariz. 29 8 10 5 4 2 17 29 
Ill. 29 ll 7 6 7 3 15 29 
Tex. 28 21 7 8 3 2 11 28 
Wis. 28 6 5 7 22 2 14 28 
D.C. 27 19 6 5 13 27 
Neb. 27 8 4 10 15 4 9 27 
Pa. 27 9 6 9 8 5 12 27 
S.D. 25 4 4 13 27 4 8 27 
Fla. 26 18 5 6 3 4 12 26 
Minn. 25 5 7 4 24 2 14 25 
Wash. 20 6 ll 4 6 3 25 25 
Me. 24 15 8 9 3 1 16 24 
Nev. 24 15 9 5 3 1 20 24 
Colo. 23 8 9 5 5 3 21 23 
Iowa 23 5 5 13 16 3 13 23 
Mich. 23 14 5 9 4 1 15 23 
Md. 22 17 6 10 5 2 13 22 
Mo. 19 22 8 7 4 2 15 22 
Mont. 22 5 9 7 14 4 17 22 
Or. 14 5 13 4 5 3 21 21 
Del. 9 19 3 20 4 3 17 20 
Ind. 20 14 10 9 6 2 16 20 
Kan. 20 13 9 13 4 3 15 20 
Wyo. 18 9 9 5 9 4 20 20 
Idaho 15 9 9 9 3 3 19 19 
Ohio 19 14 6 10 5 4 15 19 
With this data, while some characteristics cross state boundaries, 
one also sees some clear regional differences. For example, a swath of 
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states in the northeast is heavily Catholic. Figure 18 195 shows the top 
ten Catholic states, seven of which fall in the northeast. 
Figure 18: Leading Catholic States 
(as percentage of population) 
State Cath. Bapt. Christian, Meth. Luth. Pres b. No Rei. 
Non-
Denom. 
R.I. 51 6 4 1 1 15 
Mass. 44 4 3 2 1 16 
KM. 40 10 5 2 2 4 18 
l'\.Y. 38 7 4 6 2 2 13 
Vt. 38 3 4 6 22 
N.J. 37 8 4 6 3 4 15 
N.H. 35 6 5 3 1 17 
Conn. 32 10 7 4 4 1 12 
Cal. 32 7 11 2 2 3 19 
N.D. 30 6 2 7 35 3 
In contrast, as Figure 19 196 shows, the states with the highest self-
identification of Baptists fall almost entirely in the South. 
Figure 19: Leading Baptist States 
(as percentage of population) 
State Bapt. Cath. Christian, Meth. Luth. Pres b. No 
Non- Rei. 
Denom. 
Miss. 55 5 4 9 2 7 
S.C. 43 7 6 14 2 5 7 
Tenn. 39 6 7 10 2 3 9 
!'\.C. 38 10 6 9 2 3 lO 
Ala. 37 13 6 9 2 3 6 
Ark. 37 7 5 9 2 13 
Ga. 37 8 7 ll 2 3 12 
La. 35 28 4 4 1 9 
Ky. 33 14 8 5 2 1 13 
Va. 30 14 7 7 2 3 12 
W.Va. 30 8 7 15 1 3 13 
Okla. 30 7 9 ll 2 3 14 
195. Id. 
196. Id. 
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Likewise, Lutherans (:::<igure 20 197 ) are highly concentrated along the 
North-Central tier of states. 
Figure 20: Leading Lutheran States 
(as percentage of population) 
State Luth. Cath. Bapt. No Rei. 
Christian, 
Non-Denom. 
Meth. Pres b. 
N.D. 35 30 6 3 2 7 
S.D. 27 25 4 8 4 13 4 
Minn. 24 25 5 14 7 4 2 
Wis. 22 28 6 14 5 7 2 
Iowa 16 23 5 13 5 13 3 
Neb. 15 27 8 9 4 10 4 
Mont. 14 22 5 17 9 7 4 
Finally, the states with the highest level of a "no religion" self-
identification (Figure 21 198 ) are rather scattered, but tend to be 
Western (eleven of the top fourteen). 
Figure 21: Leading "No Religion" States 
No 
Christian, 
State 
Rei. Cath. Bapt. 
Non- Meth. Luth. Pres b. 
Denom. 
Wash. 25 20 6 ll 4 6 3 
Vt. 22 38 3 4 6 
Colo. 21 23 8 9 5 s 3 
Or. 21 14 5 13 4 s 3 
Nev. 20 24 15 9 s 3 
Wyo. 20 18 9 9 s 9 4 
Idaho 19 15 9 9 9 3 3 
Cal. 19 32 7 ll 2 2 3 
N.M. 18 40 10 s 2 2 4 
Ariz. 17 29 8 10 5 4 2 
Del. 17 9 19 3 20 4 3 
Mont. 17 22 5 9 7 14 4 
N.H. 17 35 6 5 3 1 
Utah 17 6 2 2 S7 (LDS) 
197. I d. 
198. I d. 
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One must be careful in attaching too great a signiflcance to 
religious self-identiflcation. The survey from which this data is drawn 
asked respondents to self-identify their religion; it did not seek to 
limit membership in a religion by the respondent's intensity of 
conviction, level of observance, or orthodoxy of belief. 199 This may 
account for some of the surprises that result when one compares the 
religious identification data to other state variables. One might 
expect, for example, that the leading Catholic states would be those 
with lower abortion rates because of the Catholic teaching on 
abortion. In fact, the opposite is true. The abortion rate tends to rise 
as the percentage of Catholic self-identiflcation goes up. 20° Figure 
22 201 shows the scatter-plot of states by percentage of population 
that is Catholic and the corresponding abortion rate. There is 
actually a positive correlation coefficient of about 0. 32 between 
abortion rates and the percentage of the state's population that self-
identities as Catholic, a fairly high level of covariance. The 
correlation goes up to .37 if one excludes the District of Columbia, 
whose abortion rate (68.1 per 1,000 women aged 15-44?02 seems 
to be an outlier (the next highest state is New York at 39.1).203 
!d. 
199. !d. at 6. The Survey addresses the subjective nature of the self-identification sought: 
Moreover, the self-description of respondents was not based on whether established 
religious bodies, institutions, churches, mosques or synagogues considered them to 
be members. Quite the contrary, the survey sought to determine whether the 
respondents themselves regarded themselves as adherents of a religious community. 
Subjective rather than objective standards of religious identification were tapped by 
the survey. 
200. Sec i1tfm fig.22. 
201. Derived ti·om KOSM!N ET AL., supra note 193, at 40-43; U.S. CENSUS BCREAU, 
SL\TISTlCAI. ABSTKACT Or THE UNITED STATES: 2006, mpra note 158 at 76 tbl.95. 
202. Sec mpra tig.S. 
203. Sec id. 
1767 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 
"' 
80 
70 
60 
~50 
§ 40 
·~ 30 
~ 20 
10 
0 
0 
Figure 22: Abortion Rates and Catholic Self-Identification 
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One finds another surprise as to births to unmarried mothers. 
There is a positive correlation of 0.51 between the percentage of the 
population self-identifying as Baptists204 and the percentage of births 
that are to unmarried mothers. 205 Figure 23 shows the correlation: 
Figure 23: Unmarried Births and Baptist 
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Figures 22 and 23 are good illustrations that correlation does not 
show causation. That is, two characteristics can move together 
without one of them having caused the other. In this instance, it 
seems highly unlikely that a state has a higher abortion rate because a 
larger percentage of its population self-identifies as Catholic; nor 
does it seem likely that more people self-identify as Catholic because 
204. See supra fig.l7. 
205. See supra tig.3. 
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of a higher abortion rate in that state. Likewise, it is counterintuitive 
to suppose that more women give birth outside of marriage because 
they self-identifY as Baptists.206 Instead, it is likely that some other 
variable accounts tor the correlation between Catholic self-
identification and abortion rates. 
One possible explanation is found by examining the correlation 
between abortion rates and political self-identification. Figure 24207 is 
a scatter-plot that correlates abortion rates to the percentage of votes 
cast for the Democratic nominee for President in 2000 and 2004.208 
The correlation coefficient for these two variables is a strikingly high 
0.77 (it is still .63 if one excludes the District of Columbia's high 
abortion rate as an outlier). Each point on the plot represents a given 
state and shows the state's abortion rate (abortions per 1000 women 
aged 15-44 in the year 2000) and the average percentage of votes 
cast for the Democratic nominee for President in 2000 and 2004. 
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Abortion Rate 
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206. One possible explanation for higher out-ofwcdlock births in states with strong 
Baptist identification is the presence in those states of a lower abortion rate. But such a 
connection is not clear from the data. Figure 5 shows abortion rates by states. Several of the 
strongly Baptist states (North Carolina and Tennessee) are in the top half of the states ranked 
by abortion rate. 
207. Derived from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: 2007, supra note 155, at 243 tbl.389; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 
OF THE UNITED STATES: 2006, supra note 158, at 76 tbl.95. 
201!. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2007, 
supra note 155, at 243 tbl.3R9. I have averaged the percent of votes cast for the Democratic 
nominee f(Jr the elections of2000 and 2004. 
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Figure 25209 shows the converse: a negative correlation between the 
percentage of votes cast for the Republican nominee in 2000 and 
2004 and the abortion rate. The correlation here is .76; it declines to 
.63 if one excludes the District of Columbia as an outlier. 
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One interpretation of these correlations is that political aHiliation 
explains behavior more powerfully than does religious affiliation. 
That is, people as a whole will choose to follow their political beliefs 
over the doctrine of their religion when the two conflict. Another 
interpretation is that actual voting is a clearer marker of political 
affiliation than self-identification is of religious affiliation. Put 
diftcrently, many will casually self-identifY with a religion regardless 
of adherence to or agreement with that religion's tenets. Voting, in 
contrast, requires eftort and is more likely to identifY the voter's 
agreement with a political party's platform. 
4. Characteristics of the population: age distribution) population 
growth) and immigration 
States differ in the age of their population. Figure 26210 compares 
the age distribution, in ten-year segments, of the United States as a 
whole with the age distributions of Utah, which has a relatively 
209. Derived fi-om id. and U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAl. ABSTRACT Of' THE 
UNITED STATES: 2006, mpra note 158, at 76 tbl.95. 
210. Derived from U.S. Census Bureau, State SinJ1le Year of AJ7C and Sex Population 
Estimates: April 1, 2000 to Julv 1, 2005-Rcsident, http:/ /www.ccnsus.gov/popcst/ 
statcs/asrh/tilcs/SC_EST2005_AGESEX_RES.csv All data is based on the 2000 Ccnsus, not 
the later population estimates. 
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young population, and Florida and West Virginia, both of which 
have more of their population distributed toward the older 
segments. The United States as a whole has a fairly evenly distributed 
population in each segment up to age forty-nine, ranging from 
13.63% (ages twenty to twenty-nine) to 15.36% (ages thirty to 
thirty-nine) of the total population. Utah, on the other hand, is in 
the midst of a growth spurt. Each age segment through twenty to 
twenty-nine constitutes over 18% of the population. In the 
aggregate, those under age thirty in Utah comprise roughly 54% of 
its population. For the United States as a whole, the same age 
groups represent only about 42% of the population. At the other end 
of the spectrum, about 27% of the United States' population is fifty 
years old or older. In Utah, individuals fifty years or older comprise 
only about 20% of the population. 
Figure 26: Age Distribution, Selected States, 2000 Census 
(percentage of total population) 
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Florida and West Virginia are skewed in the opposite direction. 
In both states, roughly one third of the population is age fifty or 
above. And the population under age forty in both states is around 
38%, as compared to Utah's 54%. The two oldest segments (ages 
seventy and above), are only a little over 6% of Utah's population. 
The corresponding number in Florida is 13%. In West Virginia it is 
11%. 
How might these differences in age distribution affect these 
states? In states with older populations, health care, health insurance, 
pension protection, estate planning and taxation are paramount 
issues. In states with younger populations, job creation and 
education, particularly primary education, are at the forefront of 
public discourse. Again, because the states arc different in 
fundamental ways, they will have fundamentally different priorities in 
their values and goals. 
Before leaving population studies, two other dimensions of state 
differentiation, dealing with immigration, should be noted. First, 
states are growing in population at different rates. Different rates of 
growth are produced by differences in birth and death rates, state-to-
state immigration and emigration, and international immigration. 
Second, wholly apart from population growth, some states absorb 
more international immigrants than others. The following figures 
address these issues. Figure 27m ranks the states by percentage of 
population growth from the 1990 to the 2000. 
Figure 27: State Population Growth, 1990-2000 
State Pop.2000 
%Growth 
State Pop.2000 %Growth from 1990 from 1990 
Nev. 1,998,257 66.3 Ind. 6,080,485 9.7 
Ariz. 5,130,632 40.0 Ky. 4,041,769 9.7 
Colo. 4,301,261 30.6 Wis. 5,363,675 9.6 
Utah 2,233,169 29.6 Mo. 5,595,211 9.3 
Idaho 1,293,953 28.5 Haw. 1,211,537 9.3 
Ga. 8,186,453 26.4 Wyo. 493,782 8.9 
211. Derived from U.S. Census Bureau, RankinH Tables .fiJr States: Population iu 2000 
and Population Chan;_~re from 1990 to 2000 (l'HC- T-2), Table 3: State . .- Ranked by Percent 
Population ChanHe: 1990 to 2000, August 26, 2008, http:/ jwww.census.gov/population/ 
www / ccn2000 / phc-r2 .hrml. 
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Figure 27 continued 
State Pop.2000 
%Growth 
State Pop.2000 
%Growth 
from 1990 from 1990 
Fla. 15,982,378 23.5 N.J. 8,414,350 8.9 
Tex. 20,851,820 22.8 Ill. 12,419,293 8.6 
N.C. 8,049,313 21.4 Kan. 2,688,418 8.5 
Wash. 5,894,121 21.1 S.D. 754,844 8.5 
Or. 3,421,399 20.4 Neb. 1,711,263 8.4 
N.M. 1,819,046 20.1 Vt. 608,827 8.2 
Del. 783,600 17.6 Mich. 9,938,444 6.9 
Tenn. 5,689,283 16.7 La. 4,468,976 5.9 
S.C. 4,012,012 15.1 Mass. 6,349,097 5.5 
Va. 7,078,515 14.4 N.Y. 18,976,457 5.5 
Alaska 626,932 14.0 Iowa 2,926,324 5.4 
Cal. 33,871,648 13.8 Ohio 11,353,140 4.7 
Ark. 2,673,400 13.7 R.I. 1,048,319 4.5 
Mont. 902,195 12.9 Me. 1,274,923 3.8 
Minn. 4,919,479 12.4 Conn. 3,405,565 3.6 
N.H. I ,235,786 11.4 Pa. 12,281,054 3.4 
Md. 5,296,486 10.8 W.Va. 1,808,344 0.8 
Miss. 2,844,658 10.5 N.D. 642,200 0.5 
Ala. 4,447,100 10.1 D.C. 572,059 -5.7 
Okla. 3,450,654 9.7 USA 13.2 
Figure 27 reveals that states in the west and southwest in particular 
are growing very rapidly. Of the top twelve growth states (including 
New Mexico), nine are in the west or southwest. In contrast, some 
states' growth has been almost entirely static. The scale of the 
differences in state growth is best represented visually. Figure 28 
plots the difference between each state's percentage growth of 
population from 1990 to 2000 and the percentage rate of growth of 
the United States. Thus, the highest growth occurred in Nevada, 
which grew at a 66.3% rate compared to the U.S. average of 
13.2%.212 
212. Id. 
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Figure 28: State Percentage Growth versus 
U.S. Percentage Growth, 1990-2000 
(0.0 represents U.S. Growth rate (13.2%)) 
With respect to immigration growth, there are two diHcrent 
kinds of immigration: international and "internal" (from one state to 
another). Figure 29213 shows the imbalanced impact of international 
immigration upon the states. From 2000 to 2006, California, New 
York, the District of Columbia, New Jersey, Nevada, Arizona, and 
Florida, each absorbed 40 or more international immigrants for each 
1000 state residents as of 2000. In states like Mississippi, Maine, 
West Virginia, and Montana, in contrast, international immigration 
is negligible (less than 5 immigrants per 1000 residents). 
Figure 29: Net International Migration from 2000 to 2006 
(Rate per 1,000 of Population of 2000 Census) 
State Net Int'l Rate per State Net Int'l Rate per 
Migration 1,000 Pop. Migration 1,000 Pop. 
Cal. 1,724,790 51 Mich. 151,435 15 
N.Y. 820,388 43 Ncb. 26,224 15 
D.C. 24,795 43 Idaho 17,266 13 
N.J. 357,111 42 Iowa 36,142 12 
Nev. 80,482 40 Okla. 41,665 12 
213. Derived from U.S. Census Bureau, CumulatiPe Estimates of the Components of' 
Population Change for the United StateJ~ Regions and States: April I, 2000 to July 1, 2007 
(NST-EST2007-04), Dec. 26,2007, http:/ /www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-comp-
chg.html. Numbers f(,r the 2000 Census were used to calculate the rate of immigration per 
1,000 state residents as of2000. For the state-by-state census totals, sec U.S. Census Bureau, 
Table I, States Ranked by l'opulatiou: 2000, Aug. 26, 2008, http;/ jwww.census.gm/ 
population/www /cen2000/ phc-t2.html, tbl.l. 
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State 
Ariz. 
fla. 
Tex. 
Ill. 
Mass. 
Colo. 
Ga. 
Conn. 
Utah 
Wash. 
Haw. 
Or. 
Md. 
R.I. 
N.C. 
Va. 
Minn. 
N.M. 
Kan. 
Del. 
Figure 29 continued 
Net Int'l Rate per 
Migration 1,000 Pop. 
204,661 40 
642,188 40 
801,576 38 
402,257 32 
200,155 32 
133,930 31 
228,415 28 
92,635 27 
60,944 27 
157,950 27 
31,092 26 
88,976 26 
129,730 
23,086 
180,986 
151,748 
86,925 
32,967 
44,847 
13,394 
24 
22 
22 
21 
18 
18 
17 
17 
State 
Ind. 
Wis. 
N.H. 
Pa. 
Ark. 
Tenn. 
S.C. 
Vt. 
Mo. 
Ohio 
Ky. 
Alaska 
Ala. 
N.D. 
S.D. 
La. 
Wyo. 
Miss. 
Me. 
W.Va. 
Mont. 
Interstate Pluralism 
Net Int'l Rate per 
Migration 1,000 Pop. 
68,935 11 
56,557 11 
13,718 11 
126,007 10 
26,467 10 
59,385 10 
40,168 10 
5,295 9 
50,450 9 
92,101 8 
30,889 8 
4,654 7 
30,537 
3,664 
4,333 
22,244 
2,323 
10,896 
5,616 
4,419 
2,092 
7 
6 
6 
5 
5 
4 
4 
2 
2 
Internal immigration IS a measure of the extent to which a 
particular state is an importer or exporter of people. As to internal 
migration, figure 30 shows the migration rate for each state.214 
Some large states, such as New York and California, export a high 
number of residents that other states absorb. At the other end of the 
spectrum are the western growth states, such as Nevada and Arizona, 
and also florida, which attract retirees. The immigration numbers-
both internal (Figure 30) and international (Figure 29 )-illustrate 
why Nevada and Arizona lead the way in overall population growth 
(Figure 27). They lead the states in incoming immigration, both 
internal and international. 
214. See sources cited supra note 213. 
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Figure 30: Net Internal Migration from 2000 to 2006 
(Rate per 1,000 of Population of 2000 Census) 
State Net Rate per State Net Rate per 
Internal 1,000 Internal 1,000 
Migration Population Migration Population 
D.C. -60,644 -106 Vt. 2,822 5 
La. -330,492 -74 W.Va. 12,772 7 
N.Y. -1,242,869 -65 Mo. 37,638 7 
Mass. -289,967 -46 Wyo. 4,611 9 
Ill. -473,713 -38 Ala. 42,641 10 
N.J. -277,900 -33 Ky. 44,188 ll 
N.D. -21,149 -33 N.M. 22,887 13 
Cal. -950,592 -28 Va. 124,544 18 
Mich. -239,349 -24 Colo. 80,057 19 
Kan. -65,589 -24 Ark. 55,141 21 
Ohio -237,819 -21 Wash. 129,809 22 
Ncb. -31,457 -18 Tex. 451,910 22 
R.I. -18,742 -18 Mont. 24,944 28 
Conn. -53,125 -16 Tenn. 160,166 28 
Iowa -41,489 -14 Me. 36,792 29 
Miss. -25,280 -9 Or. 108,748 32 
Utah -17,709 -8 N.H. 40,531 33 
Haw. -9,275 -8 S.C. 167,070 42 
Minn. -26,574 -5 Del. 33,419 43 
Alaska -3,436 -5 N.C. 347,005 43 
Ind. -17,818 -3 Ga. 378,258 46 
Pa. -27,718 -2 Idaho 83,870 65 
Md. -13,017 -2 Fla. I ,221,540 76 
Okla. -4,799 -1 Ariz. 541,283 106 
S.D. 470 1 Nev. 318,182 159 
Wis. 9,224 2 
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5. Wealth and education 
Some states are wealthier than others. One way to measure state 
wealth is personal income per capita. Figure 31 215 shows the range of 
wealth distributions between states. 
Figure 31: Personal Income per Capita, 2003 
State 2003 State 2003 
D.C. $48,446 Fla. $30,098 
Conn. $42,972 Mo. $29,464 
N.J. $39,577 Kan. $29,438 
Mass. $39,504 Me. $29,164 
Md. $37,446 Tex. $29,074 
N.Y. $36,112 Ga. $29,000 
N.H. $35,140 N.D. $28,922 
Colo. $34,561 S.D. $28,856 
Del. $34,199 Ind. $28,838 
Minn. $34,031 Or. $28,734 
Va. $33,730 Tenn. $28,641 
Cal. $33,415 Iowa $28,340 
Wash. $33,254 N.C. $28,071 
Alaska $33,213 Ariz. $27,232 
Ill. $32,965 Okla. $26,719 
Wyo. $32,433 Ky. $26,575 
R.I. $32,038 Ala. $26,505 
Pa. $31,9ll La. $26,312 
Nev. $31,910 S.C. $26,144 
Mich. $31)78 Idaho $25,902 
Vt. $30,888 Utah $25,407 
Wis. $30,685 Mont. $25,406 
Haw. $30,441 N.M. $24,995 
Ncb. $30,179 W.Va. $24,542 
Ohio $30,129 Ark. $24,384 
Miss. $23,466 
215. Derived from U.S. Census Bureau, State and Metropolitan Area Data Book: 2006 at 
58, tbi.A-43, available at http:/ /www.census.gov/compendiajsmadb/TableA-43.pdf. 
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figure 32 better shows the degree of variance between the states. 
It plots the difference between the United States' personal income 
per capita ($31,472) and that of each state. The result visually shows 
how far the highest income states vary from the lowest. 216 
20JJOO 
I i',OOO 
I 0,000 
5,000 
0 
-5,000 
l 0,000 
Figure ~2: State Variance &om 
U.S. Personal lttcome per <.:<tpita (2()0~) 
(U.S. per capita= 0) 
Levels of educational attainment also fluctuate widely. Figure 
33217 shows the percentage of residents in each state who have 
graduated from high school and the percentage of those who have 
obtained at least a bachelor's degree. The states are ranked in 
ascending order by the percentage with at least a bachelor's degree. 
State 
W.Va. 
Ark. 
Ky. 
La. 
Figure 33: Educational Attainment by State: 
Percent of Adults Attaining Degrees, 2005 
High School Bachelor's State High School 
Graduate or Degree or 
More More 
82.4 15.1 
81.4 17.5 
78.9 19.0 
80.2 19.7 
Pa. 
Idaho 
Ga. 
N.M. 
Graduate or 
More 
86.3 
89.1 
85.7 
81.0 
216. Id. 
Bachelor's 
Degree or 
More 
25.8 
25.9 
26.9 
27.2 
217. Derived trom U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United Sttlte.r: 2007, at 
145, tbl.218 available at http:/ jwww.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/07statab/cduc.pdf. The 
percentages are of the population 25 years and older. 
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Figure 33 continued 
State High School Bachelor's State High School Bachelor's 
Graduate or Degree or Graduate or Degree or 
More More More More 
Ala. 80.9 19.8 N.D. 90.0 27.2 
Tenn. 81.8 21.6 Ariz. 85.7 27.9 
Miss. 79.9 21.9 Alaska 91.7 28.7 
Wyo. 90.9 22.0 Or. 88.7 29.1 
Ind. 87.2 22.5 R.I. 84.0 29.2 
Ohio 87.9 22.9 Ill. 87.3 29.5 
Nev. 86.6 23.5 Utah 92.7 29.8 
Okla. 85.2 24.0 N.Y. 85.6 30.3 
S.C. 83.0 24.2 Cal. 80.3 30.4 
Me. 87.2 24.2 Kan. 91.4 30.4 
Iowa 89.9 24.5 Haw. 87.3 30.6 
Mich. 88.5 24.6 Va. 86.1 30.7 
Mo. 85.4 24.9 Wash. 91.5 30.9 
S.D. 88.5 25.1 N.H. 91.9 32.8 
Neb. 89.7 25.1 Minn. 92.7 34.3 
Wis. 90.5 25.1 Vt. 90.0 34.4 
Tex. 78.2 25.4 Colo. 89.2 35.4 
N.C. 84.0 25.4 Md. 87.0 36.3 
Mont. 92.1 25.4 N.J. 87.0 36.3 
Fla. 86.8 25.5 Mass. 87.5 36.8 
Del. 86.8 25.6 Conn. 90.0 36.9 
D.C. 84.0 46.7 
One somewhat surprising feature of Figure 33 is that a few states 
rank relatively low in high school graduation but quite high in the 
percentage having at least a bachelor's degree. In such states, there 
appears to be a greater have versus have-not effect: a relatively large 
number of residents have not finished high school, but another 
relatively large group has at least a bachelor's degree. California is 
perhaps the most striking example. It is the thirteenth highest in 
percentage of residents with bachelor's degrees ( 30.4% ), but is a 
lowly forty-seventh in percentage having graduated from high school 
(80.3). Likewise, in the District of Columbia, a whopping 46.7% of 
its residents have at least a bachelor's degree (the highest rate in the 
nation), but only 84% (which makes it the thirty-eighth ranked 
nationally) have a high school diploma. Also falling into this group 
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are Maryland and New Jersey. Both states-their numbers are 
identical-rank twenty-sixth in high school graduation but fourth in 
percentage having a bachelor's degree or higher. 
Other states are flatter in educational attainment. Many of the 
weaker states in educational attainment rank low in both high school 
and bachelor's degrees. Kentucky is fiftieth in high school graduation 
percentage and forty-ninth in bachelor's degree percentage. 
Louisiana ranks forty-eighth in both. Toward the middle of the 
rankings, Florida ranks twenty-eighth in both categories. Among 
those at the top, Oregon ranks seventeenth and nineteenth and the 
state ofWashington ranks sixth and tenth. 
6. Intoxicants of choice 
States also differ in some of the social pathologies. Figure 34218 
shows the current users of illicit drugs as a percentage of the state 
population; it also shows the prevalence of binge drinking. The data 
is based on a survey.219 One might object that data on drug and 
alcohol abuse that is dependent upon self-reporting is unreliable 
because some percentage of the population will lie about drug use, 
binge drinking, or both. But this is not so much an objection to the 
data as it is a question about what the data represents. Either all 
persons in all states have the same rate of false denial on the survey 
or the rate of false denials varies from state to state. Either possibility 
reveals something interesting. If the rate of false denial is uniform 
nationally, then the survey gives accurate information on the relative 
rate of drug usage and binge drinking among the states. If deception 
is not uniform nationally, then that reveals something about 
differences in the attitude towards drug usage and binge drinking 
from state to state. And so, a state with a higher reported prevalence 
of drug usage or binge drinking, either does in fact have a higher 
prevalence or the social stigma attached to such behavior in that state 
is lower. 
218. I d. "Current users are those persons 12 years old and over who used drugs at least 
once within month prior to this study." Id. Illicit drugs are defined to include 
"marijuana/hashish, cocaine (including crack), heroin, hallucinogens, inhalants, or 
prescription-type psychotherapeutics used nonmedically." Id. at 129. Binge drinking "is 
defined as drinking five or more drinks on the same occasion (i.e., at the same time or within a 
couple of hours of each other) on at least 1 day in the past 30 days." I d. 
219. Id. 
1780 
1703] Interstate Pluralism 
Figure 34: Percentage of Population Using Illicit Drugs and Binge 
Drinking 
State Percent, Alcohol State Percent, Alcohol 
Illicit Binge Illicit Binge 
Drugs Drinking Drugs Drinking 
Alaska 11.8 21.5 Wyo. 7.9 25.5 
N.M. 11.2 23.0 Fla. 7.8 21.2 
R.I. 10.8 27.7 Pa. 7.8 24.7 
Vt. 10.4 23.7 Wis. 7.8 31.0 
Colo. 10.2 24.7 La. 7.7 24.5 
Mass. 10.2 28.4 Ill. 7.6 26.0 
N.H. 9.9 25.4 S.C. 7.6 21.2 
Mont. 9.7 27.7 Ark. 7.5 20.7 
D.C. 9.6 24.9 N.D. 7.5 31.8 
Or. 9.5 20.1 Ind. 7.4 21.7 
Me. 9.3 21.5 Minn. 7.4 26.0 
N.Y. 9.1 23.4 W.Va. 7.4 19.3 
Mich. 9.0 24.5 N.C. 7.2 19.2 
Cal. 8.9 20.6 Va. 7.2 22.2 
~cv. 8.7 21.3 Md. 7.0 19.7 
Del. 8.6 22.8 S.D. 7.0 28.6 
Ky. 8.6 20.1 Tex. 7.0 23.6 
Conn. 8.5 24.3 Ala. 6.9 19.1 
Wash. 8.5 21.5 Idaho 6.9 21.3 
Okla. 8.4 20.7 Neb. 6.9 26.5 
Ariz. 8.3 24.1 N.J. 6.9 20.5 
Mo. 8.1 25.1 Utah 6.9 15.0 
(;a. 8.0 21.5 Tenn. 6.8 15.2 
Haw. 8.0 22.8 Kan. 6.7 24.3 
Ohio 7.9 23.6 Iowa 6.5 28.4 
Miss. 5.8 19.9 
Interestingly, no obvious commonalities exist among those states 
grouped either near the top or near the bottom of the list. States 
with higher percentages of drug use are rich and poor,220 western 
and eastern, sparsely populated and thickly settled. Some states with 
220. For the personal income per capita by state, see supra fig.3l. Massachusetts is 
among the highest states in personal income per capita; New Mexico is among the lowest. 
Both are near the top in drug usage. 
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relatively high high-school graduation rates, such as Alaska and 
Vermont,221 have among the highest drug usage rates. And some 
states with among the lowest high school graduation rates, such as 
Mississippi, Tennessee, and Texas,222 have among the lowest rates of 
illicit drug usc. Differences in drug laws between the states no doubt 
play a role. In Alaska, no criminal sanction applies to possession of 
one ounce or less of marijuana.223 Amounts up to tour ounces arc 
subject only to a misdemeanor punishable by ninety days 
incarceration and subject to a $1000 fine. 224 In Texas, which has a 
lower drug usage figure, possession of two ounces or less is 
punishable by 180 days incarceration and a $2000 fine. 225 Possession 
from two to four ounces increases the punishment to one year 
incarceration and a $4000 fine. 226 But stiffer or laxer drug laws do 
not fully explain the differences. Mississippi, whose drug laws more 
closely resemble Alaska than Texas, has the lowest rate of illicit drug 
usc. In Mississippi, possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana 
draws no jail time and only a $100 to $250 fine. 227 
But even more fundamentally, even if differences in drug usage 
are driven by differences in state laws, one must ask why those drug 
laws are different. If we have a uniform shared national culture, one 
would not expect significant differentiation on such matters. But in 
fact there is a wide degree of variety among the states in drug usage 
and drug policy. The key point is that different states have chosen to 
treat drug usage differently. It is more popular in some states de 
facto. It is more tolerated in some states de jure. These differences 
among the states exemplify interstate pluralism. 
The picture gets even more interesting when one compares the 
relative rankings in drug usage to alcohol binge drinking. figure 
221. See supra fig.33 for the percentages of the state population age 25 and above who 
have graduated from high school. 1n Alaska, 91.7% of the population age 25 and abm·e arc 
high schools graduates, ranking fifth among the states. In Vermont, the percentage is 90'%, 
which puts Vermont in a tic tor the tenth highest rate among the states. Those st.ltes rank first 
and fourth, respectively, in illicit drug use. 
222. Id. Mississippi has a 79.9% high school graduation rate, ranking t(>rty·ninth among 
the states. Tennessee ranks f(xty·third with 81.8%. Texas ranks last among the states with only 
78.2% of its population having a high school diploma. 
223. See NORML, State By State Laws, http:/ /www.norml.org/indcx.dill> 
Group_ID~4516 (collecting and summarizing state marijuana laws). 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
226. !d. 
227. Id. 
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35 22x ranks the states in order of drug usage, from the state of 
highest usage (Alaska) to the lowest (Mississippi); it also shows each 
state's binge drinking rank. Comparing a state's drug usage ranking 
to its binge drinking ranking produces a matrix of state-to-state 
intoxication preferences. 
State 
Alaska 
N.M. 
R.I. 
Vt. 
Colo. 
Mass. 
:-.!.H. 
Mont. 
D.C. 
Or. 
Me. 
N.Y. 
Mich. 
Cal. 
Nc\'. 
Ky. 
Del. 
Conn. 
Wash. 
Okla. 
Ariz. 
Mo. 
Ga. 
Haw. 
Ohio 
Figure 35: Illicit Drug Usage vs. Binge Drinking 
Illicit Drug 
Use Rank 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
I I 
12 
13 
14 
IS 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Binge 
Drinking 
Rank 
31 
26 
7 
22 
15 
5 
12 
6 
14 
44 
34 
25 
18 
41 
35 
43 
28 
20 
32 
39 
21 
13 
33 
27 
23 
State Illicit Drug 
Use Rank 
Wyo. 26 
Pa. 27 
Wis. 28 
Fla. 29 
La. 30 
S.C. 31 
Ill. 32 
Ark. 33 
N.D. 34 
Ind. 35 
Minn. 36 
W.Va. 37 
Va. 38 
N.C. 39 
Md. 40 
Tex. 41 
S.D. 42 
Idaho 43 
Ala. 44 
Utah 45 
N.J. 46 
Neb. 47 
Tenn. 48 
Kan. 49 
Iowa 50 
Miss. 51 
Binge 
Drinking 
Rank 
11 
16 
2 
38 
17 
37 
10 
40 
30 
9 
47 
29 
48 
46 
24 
3 
36 
49 
51 
42 
8 
so 
19 
4 
45 
221l. Deriv~:d trom U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2007, at 
129, tbl.1 Y5, apailable at http:/ /www.ccnsus.gov /prod/2006pubs/07statab/health.pdf. For 
details on this data, sec supra note 218. 
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Some states rank low in both drug usage and binge drinking, 
reflecting a disinclination to intoxication in any form. Tennessee, for 
example, ranks forty-eighth in drug usage and fiftieth in binge 
drinking. Similarly, Idaho ranks forty-third and thirty-sixth. At the 
other end of the spectrum, some states rank very high in both 
categories, reflecting a relatively stronger preference for intoxication 
regardless of form. Three states may be given as examples: Rhode 
Island, ranking third and seventh in drug usage and binge drinking; 
Massachusetts, ranking sixth and fifth; and Montana, ranking eighth 
and sixth. In contrast to states that have similar ranks tor illicit drug 
use and binge drinking, data from other states reveal a tendency to 
favor one category of intoxicant over another. The data for Alaska 
and Oregon show a preference for illicit drugs over alcohol relative 
to other states. 229 Alaska ranks at the top for illicit drug usage, but 
only thirty-first in binge drinking. Likewise Oregon ranks tenth in 
drug usage but forty-fourth in binge drinking. Other states, in 
converse, have a low ranking in drug usage and a high ranking in 
binge drinking. The states that jump out as saying no to drugs, but 
yes to alcohol are Wisconsin (twenty-eighth in drugs, but second in 
binge drinking), Iowa (fiftieth and fourth), and North and South 
Dakota (thirty-fourth and first; and forty-second and third, 
respectively). 
We are now able to see a fairly sharp differentiation among the 
states. Some rank high in both drug usage and binge drinking. Some 
rank low in both. Some rank high in one category of intoxicant, but 
low in the other. The drug and alcohol laws in these states may play 
a role in shaping their usage patterns, but it is also true that those 
laws are shaped by social expectations and mores. The law is both a 
determinant and by-product of culture. Law and culture have a 
mutually causal relationship. A state may crack down on drugs, for 
example, and thereby reform its culture. But the "state" does not 
decide itself to do this. People within the state have input into the 
laws of the state, and so the decision to crack down-the law-is 
driven by the people of the state and their culture. But once enacted, 
the law then engages the coercive power of government to control 
behavior and shape society and culture. 
229. The preference is relative. In every state, binge drinking is more prevalent than illicit 
drug usc. Thus, in states such as Alaska and Oregon, which rank high on drug usage but low 
on binge drinking, the "drug preference" I reter to is only in relation to other states. 
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7. Follow the money: employment data and charitable giving 
Using a number of measures, one can determine how people in 
different states choose to spend their disposable income. The Bureau 
of Labor Statistics tracks employment in thousands of job 
classifications. 230 The following data is based on annual employee 
counts by industry and by state downloaded from the Bureau's Web 
site. 231 I have taken data from the years 2000 to 2005 tor each state, 
averaged them, and computed the totals against that state's 
populations as of the 2000 Census to derive the number of people 
employed in certain industries on a per capita basis. 
Individuals tend to spend their disposable income in a variety of 
ways depending on where they live. For example, residents of 
Vermont and North Dakota use their income to support more 
employees of diet centers (per capita) than do residents of Alaska or 
Washington, D.C. Figure 36232 shows the number of employees in 
diet and weight reducing centers per 100,000 of population by state. 
Figure 36: Diet and Weight Reduction Center Employees 
per 100,000 of Population 
State Per 100,000 pop. State Per 100,000 pop. 
Vt. 21.91 N.C. 10.64 
N.D. 20.90 Nev. 10.60 
N.H. 16.32 S.D. 10.60 
Kan. 16.09 Mo. 10.58 
Mich. 16.07 Wash. 10.54 
230. The classification system is the North American Industry Classification System. For a 
listing of the industry sectors, see U.S. Census Bureau, North American Industry Classification 
System 2007, http:/ /www.ccnsus.gov/cpcd/naics07 /indcx.html. 
231. The data is available at http:/ /www.bls.gov/data/home.htm as a flat tile from the 
FTP server. The downloaded files were then loaded into a database for analysis. 
232. For the source of this data, see supra note 231 and accompanying text. The North 
American Industry Classification System definition of this industry is as follows: 
This U.S. industrv comprises establishments primarily engaged in providing 
nonmedical services to assist clients in attaining or maintaining a desired weight. 
The sale of weight reduction products, such as food supplements, may be an integral 
component of the program. These services typically include individual or group 
counseling, menu and exercise planning, and weight and body measurement 
monitoring. 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 NAICS Definitions, http:/ /www.ccnsus.gov/epcd/naics02/ 
dcf/ND81219l.HTM (industry code 812191 ). 
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Figure 36 continued 
State Per 100,000 pop. State Per 100,000 pop. 
Idaho 15.90 Ky. 10.43 
Mont. 15.54 Conn. 10.42 
W.Va. 15.14 S.C. 10.40 
Neb. 15.07 Va. 9.94 
Pa. 14.73 Ark. 9.69 
Iowa 14.61 Cal. 8.52 
N.J. 14.11 Ala. 8.28 
Tenn. 13.77 N.M. 8..9 
Utah 13.75 Miss. 8.06 
Ohio 13.20 Tex. 7.90 
Mass. 13.09 R.I. 7.67 
Wis. 12.84 La. 7.06 
Minn. 12.66 Okla. 6.93 
Ind. 12.10 Ill. 6.73 
N.Y. 1!.97 Ga. 4.94 
Or. 11.65 Del. 4.26 
Colo. 11.47 Wyo. 3.36 
Ha. 10.77 Alaska 2.97 
Md. 10.72 D.C. !.OX 
Ariz. 10.68 
By way of contrast, Figure 37233 shows the number of people 
employed in drinking establishments by state on a per capita basis. 
233. !:'or the source of this data, sec Jupra note 231 .md accompanying text. The North 
American Industry Classification System definition of this industry is as tc>llows: "This industry 
comprises establishments known as hars, taverns, nightcluhs, or drinking places primarily 
engaged in preparing and serving alcoholic beverages tc>r immediate consumption. These 
establishments may also provide limited fc)(>d services." U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 NAICS 
Definitions, http:/ jwww.ccnsus.gov/epcd/naics02/dcf/ND72241 O.HTM (industrv code 
722410). 
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Figure 37: Drinking Establishment Employees 
per 100,000 of Population 
State Per 100,000 pop. State Per 100,000 pop. 
Mont. 540.29 La. 142.36 
S.D. 395.60 Tex. 135.57 
Wis. 385.22 Mo. 135.06 
Nev. 376.20 N.J. 133.80 
N.D. 361.39 Ariz. 130.54 
Minn. 354.18 Wash. 125.51 
Wyo. 331.20 Utah 124.55 
Ncb. 317.15 W.Va. 122.61 
Alaska 313.88 Md. 118.98 ! I 
Iowa 271.43 Del. 107.48 ·~ 
'I:. 
R.I. 251.13 Fla. 104.68 I 
N.M. 236.49 N.Y. 99.00 
Mich. 229.27 S.C. 91.51 
Colo. 204.66 Me. 78.33 
D.C. 197.15 Conn. 77.35 
Idaho 189.50 Cal. 74.74 
Ohio 184.42 N.C. 69.29 
Ill. 175.75 Ky. 65.45 
Ind. 172.98 Ga. 57.74 
Or. 167.82 Okla. 57.60 
Pa. 166.74 Tenn. 45.03 
Kan. 160.35 Ala. 39.94 
Vt. 150.89 Ark. 38.91 
Haw. 144.90 Miss. 26.28 I 
Mass. 142.98 N.H. 16.17 I I ,, 
Perhaps not surprisingly, these numbers correspond to the binge f: i, 
drinking rankings of each state. Setting aside Nevada as a tourist I I' state, the top ten states of employment for drinking establishments ~: 
are all, with the exception of Alaska, within the top eleven states for 
binge drinking. 234 
234. Su supra tig.35. 
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Figure 38: Drinking Establishment & Binge Drinking Ranks 
State Drinking Establishment Rank Binge Drinking Rank 
Mont. 1 6 
S.D. 2 3 
Wis. 3 2 
N.D. 4 l 
Minn. 5 9 
Wyo. 6 11 
Ncb. 7 8 
Alaska 8 31 
Iowa 9 4 
R.I. 10 7 
Another differentiation detectable among the states is the way in 
which the elderly are cared for. The choices range from living at 
home independently, to living with their adult children or other 
relatives, to living in a residential care institution. These choices arc 
reflective of different family attitudes and needs in different states. 
Figure 39 shows the number of employees per 100,000 of 
population engaged in residential elder care. 23" These numbers are 
obviously closely connected to the relative age of the state 
235. For the sources of this data, see supra note 231. I have combined the emplm·ment 
figures for two categories here. North American Industry Classification Svstcm definitions 
623311 (Continuing Care Retirement Communities) and 623312 (Homes f(lr the Elderly). 
They provide, respectively, 
This U.S. industry comprises establishments primarily engaged in prmiding a range 
of residential and personal care services with on-site nursing care bcilities f(lr (I) the 
elderly and other persons who are unable to fully care f(lr themselves and/or (2) the 
elderly and other persons who do not desire to live independently. l ndividuals live in 
a variety of residential settings with meals, housekeeping, social, leisure, and other 
services available to assist residents in daily living. Assisted-living bcilities with on-
site nursing care EKilitics are included in this industrv. 
This U.S. industry comprises establishments primarily engaged in providing 
residential and personal care services (i.e., without on-site nursing care bcilitics) tilr 
( 1) the elderly or other persons who are unable to fully can: f(lr themselves and/or 
(2) the elderly or other persons who do not desire to live indcpcndcntlv. The care 
typically includes room, board, supervision, and assistance in daily living, such as 
housekeeping services. 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 NAICS Definitions, http:/ jwww.census.gov/epcdjmics02/ 
def/ND6233ll.HTM (industry code 623311 ); U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 l'iAICS 
Definitions, http:/ /www.ccnsus.gov/epcdjnaics02/def/ND623312.HTM (industry code 
623312). 
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population, but they also show residential housing patterns for the 
elderly. 
Figure 39: Residential Elder Care Employees 
per 100,000 of Population 
State Per 100,000 pop. State Per 100,000 pop. 
Or. 407.96 N.H. 172.87 
D.C. 373.77 Colo. 168.28 
Del. 371.04 Conn. 166.40 
Me. 366.32 Mont. 164.13 
Iowa 347.48 Okla. 160.51 
Wash. 345.93 Mo. 160.15 
Pa. 339.60 R.I. 158.47 
Ncb. 337.92 W.Va. 154.37 
Kan. 320.11 Tenn. 147.57 
N.C. 320.06 Cal. 146.51 
Wis. 306.74 Miss. 145.14 
Va. 285.52 Ill. 142.17 
Md. 259.94 Tex. 134.97 
S.D. 259.33 La. 122.45 
N.D. 259.17 Utah 122.11 
Idaho 247.21 N.M. 121.42 
Fla. 234.67 Ala. 112.67 
Mich. 226.05 Ga. 109.10 
Ohio 225.37 N.Y. 108.01 
Ariz. 224.72 Nev. 96.34 
S.C. 215.25 Haw. 90.84 
Vt. 210.60 Ky. 83.08 
Minn. 188.84 Ark. 72.85 
Mass. 185.55 Alaska 63.23 
Ind. 183.03 Wyo. 44.52 
N.J. 181.16 
Figure 40 turns to an entirely different matter: How much do 
people spend on pets? It ranks the states by the number of people 
employed in pet and pet supply stores per 100,000 of population. 236 
236. See supra note 231. 
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Figure 40: Pet and Pet Care Employees 
per 100,000 of Population 
State Per 100,000 pop. State Per 100,000 pop. 
Ariz. 57.76 Mo. 26.18 
N.H. 57.47 Me. 25.60 
Md. 44.04 Mont. 25.03 
Del. 43.35 Ga. 24.26 
Colo. 42.43 Neb. 24.22 
R.I. 36.15 Vt. 24.09 
Minn. 36.01 S.D. 23.34 
Ohio 35.69 Tex. 23.33 
Conn. 34.53 N.Y. 22.94 
Nev. 34.42 Idaho 22.53 
Wash. 34.04 N.D. 22.11 
Cal. 33.89 N.M. 21.09 
Pa. 31.30 N.C. 20.75 
Fla. 31.07 Haw. 19.85 
Va. 30.96 Tenn. 19.37 
Mass. 30.61 Iowa 19.23 
Or. 30.42 S.C. 18.56 
N.J. 30.16 Ky. 16.36 
Mich. 29.48 La. 14.54 
Alaska 29.11 Ala. 13.88 
Ind. 28.45 Okla. 13.63 
Wis. 27.67 W.Va. 13.27 
Utah 27.20 Ark. 9.56 
Kan. 27.16 Miss. 6.98 
Ill. 26.61 Wyo. 6.85 
D.C. 5.10 
The states near the top of this list are geographically dispersed. But 
those near the bottom are clustered in the south-South Carolina, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Alabama, West Virginia, Arkansas, and 
Mississippi are all in the bottom ten. Again, this speaks to the level of 
disposable income in these states (they tend to be poorer) and also 
to the spending choices those people make. States with more pet 
care workers per capita reflect a higher incidence of either pet 
ownership or investment in pets. Assuming that state residents have 
finite resources, they then spend less on other priorities. This in turn 
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reflects on the nature of the culture of the state-animals as pets are 
more highly valued than in other states. 
Finally, using data that the Internal Revenue Service collects, one 
can assess the relative level of charitable giving among the states. The 
data is less than perfect because the charitable contributions of those 
taxpayers who do not file an itemized return cannot be captured. 
The rates of filing itemized returns, moreover, vary from state to 
state. Because of this, a state with a lower rate of itemized returns 
may have an understated rate of charitable giving. Figure 41 presents 
the data. The states are ranked by the average contribution as a 
percentage of the average adjusted gross income. 237 Expressing the 
contributions in relation to adjusted gross income has the effect of 
controlling for differences in personal income between the states.238 
Figure 41: Charitable Contribution Estimates by State, 2004 
State %of Average State %of Average 
Itemized Contribution Itemized Contribution 
Returns as Percent of Returns as Percent of 
Average AGI Average AGI 
Utah 40.14% 5.17% Del. 36.40% 2.27% 
D.C. 42.33% 3.72% Mo. 31.02% 2.26% 
Ga. 39.00% 3.24% Ky. 30.53% 2.26% 
Ala. 29.90% 3.08% Ill. 36.20% 2.25% 
Md. 49.45% 3.08% Wash. 36.74% 2.23% 
S.C. 32.44% 3.07% Tex. 25.33% 2.21% 
Okla. 29.49% 3.04% Conn. 44.27% 2.21% 
N.C. 36.03% 2.91% Mont. 30.48% 2.11% 
237. The tormula is as tallows: The total number of tax returns tor each state is 
calculated. Total returns are then divided into the total charitable contribution dollars to 
produce an average charitable contribution per return. Total returns are also divided into total 
state adjusted gross income, which produces an average adjusted gross income per return. The 
average contribution per return is then divided by the average adjusted gross income per return 
to tind the average charitable contribution as a percentage of average adjusted gross income. 
Thus, (AGI/R) + (C/R) =Average Contribution as Percent of Average AGI, where AGI is 
the total adjusted gross income of the state, R is the total number of returns of the state, and C 
is the total dollars in charitable contributions of the state. 
238. Derived trorn National Center for Charitable Statistics, Profiles of Individual 
Charitable Contributions by State (2004) at 3 (Table: Data on Individual Giving by State, 
2004 ), available at http:/ /nccsdataweb.urban.org/kbfiles/680/CharGiv_04.pdf. The 
National Center for Charitable Statistics bases its data on the Internal Revenue Service's 
Historical Table 2 in the Statistics of Income Bulletin. See http:/ /www.irs.gov/taxstats/ 
articlc/O,id= l71535,00.htrnl. 
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Figure 41 continued 
State %of Average State %of Average 
Itemized Contribution Itemized Contribution 
Returns as Percent of Returns as Percent of 
Average AGI Average AGI 
Idaho 34.89% 2.85% N.J. 44.89% 2.09'){, 
N.Y. 38.58% 2.84% Ind. 30.22% 2.08% 
Ark. 24.21% 2.76% Mass. 41.05% 2.04% 
Miss. 22.94% 2.69% Pa. 31.75% 2.04% 
Tenn. 25.21% 2.64% Ohio 34.09% 2.03% 
Wyo. 21.77% 2.62% La. 21.46% 2.02% 
Or. 41.50% 2.49% Iowa 31.58% 2.00% 
Cal. 39.59% 2.48% Haw. 33.27% 2.00% 
Minn. 41.66% 2.46% Wis. 38.10% 1.93% 
Va. 40.42% 2.43% N.M. 26.73% 1.84% 
Colo. 42.13% 2.43% R.I. 37.50% 1.82% 
Kan. 30.75% 2.41% S.D. 18.40% 1.77% 
Mich. 36.72% 2.41% Alaska 24.63% 1.66% 
Nev. 37.04% 2.38% Me. 30.88% 1.60% 
Neb. 30.45% 2.38% N.H. 35.63% 1.56% 
Ariz. 37.97% 2.33% Vt. 29.88% 1.56% 
Fla. 31.57% 2.28% N.D. 18.40% 1.46% 
W.Va. 17.46% 1.37% 
8. Assessing the empirical snapshot 
This snapshot of the states shows what many would assume 
intuitively-in culture, conditions, and social values, the states are 
fundamentally different from one another. Some of the differences, 
such as abortion and suicide rates, correlate fairly well with legal 
policy differences in those states. Other differences, such as ethnicity, 
personal income, age distribution, international immigration rates, 
and religious identification, are harder to correlate with specific legal 
rules or policies. The range of such differences is such that it is all 
but impossible to imagine that they have no effect on the state's 
culture or its legal choices. It is safe to say that it is demonstrably not 
true that the states differ little, that they are united by a shared 
national culture, and that our differences amount to no more than 
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"the stufT of late-night TV jokes. " 239 The sum of the variations 
between states-variations in ethnicity, religion, wealth, mental 
health, educational attainment, charitable giving, age distribution-
operate to create within them different cultures and communities. 
Given the pluralism among the states, conflict of law problems 
should be addressed with sensitivity to protecting this variety. 
By way of summary, I otTer here some capsules-caricatures, 
really-of several states to summarize the degree and magnitude of 
some of the divergences. 
If you live in Montana, your neighbors likely are white240 and are 
almost certainly not international immigrants. 241 Although they are 
more likely than in many states to be Lutherans, there is only a 
tcmrteen percent chance that they arc. 242 They almost certainly have a 
high school degrce/"'3 but arc likely poorer than citizens of other 
states. 244 They tend to go to bars,245 binge drink, take illicit drugs/46 
go to diet centers/47 and then commit suicide.248 
If you move to Mississippi, your neighbors are probably 
unmarried,24\) but have children250 (the mother did not have an 
abortion). 251 Unlike Montanans, there is a good chance they are 
African-American,252 Baptists/53 neither binge drink nor take illicit 
239. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
240. Montana ha' the seventh highest percentage of Whites in its population at 88.99%. 
See supra note 188 and accompanying text (fig.l3 ). 
241. Montana has the lowest rate of international immigration. See supra fig.29. 
242. Montana has the seventh highest percentage of Lutherans, although they represent 
only 14% ofthc population. See supra tig.20. 
243. Montana has the third highest percentage of its population with a high school 
degree (92.1% ). See supra t1g.33. 
244. Montana ranks fifth from the bottom in personal income per capita. See supra fig.3l. 
245. Montana employs the highest number of workers, per capita, in drinking 
establishments. See supra fig.37. 
246. Montana ranks sixth in binge drinking and eighth in use of illicit drugs. See supra 
tig.35. 
247. Montana ranks seventh in employees per capita working in diet centers. See supra 
fig.36. 
248. Montana ranks second in suicide rate. See supra tig.7. 
249. Mississippi has the sixth lowest marriage rate in the nation. See supra fig.l. 
250. Mississippi ranks fourth in births to unmarried mothers. See supra fig.3. It also has 
the seventeenth highest fertility rate. See supra fig.4. 
251. The abortion rate in Mississippi is the fourth lowest nationally. See supra fig.S. 
252. Mississippi ranks second to the District of Columbia in the percentage of African-
Americans in its population. See supra fig.l3. 
1793 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2008 
drugs/54 and do not frequent bars. 255 Their chances of being high 
school graduates are among the lowest in the nation/56 and they arc 
likely poor. 257 They likely give to charities/58 but spend little money 
on whatever pets they have. 259 
If you move to New York, the chance of your neighbor having 
had an abortion goes up dramatically260 and the chances of your 
neighbor having a live birth goes down. 261 Your neighbors are 
ethnically diverse/62 but tend toward Catholicism.263 They may well 
be international immigrants264 and may soon move out of the 
state. 265 They give about the same amount of their adjusted gross 
income to charities as do your former Mississippi neighbors/66 but 
because they are likely to have more personal income, 267 they give 
more in dollar terms. Their grandmother is less likely to live in a 
nursing home in the state/68 and they most likely will not commit 
suicide. 269 
253. Baptists are 55% of the Mississippi population. See supra tig.l7. This gives 
Mississippi the highest percentage of Baptists nationally. See supra fig.l9. 
254. Mississippi ranks fifty-first in illicit drug usc and forty-titth in binge drinking. Sa 
supra tig.35. 
255. On a per capita basis, Mississippi ranks second trom the lowest in employees of 
drinking establishments. See supra tig.37. 
256. The percentage of the adult population having a high school degree is 79.9%, the 
third lowest nationally. See supra tig.33. 
257. The personal income per capita in Mississippi is the lowest in the nation. See supra 
tig.31. 
258. Despite the poverty in Mississippi, citizens of that state give the twelfth highest to 
charities, as measured by the amount given per return as a percentage of the adjusted gross 
income per return. See supra fig.4l. 
259. Mississippi ranks third from the lowest in employees in the pet care industry on a per 
capita basis. See supra tig.40. 
260. New York has the second highest abortion rate in the nation. See supra fig.5. 
261. New York has the eleventh lowest fertility rate. See supra tig.4. 
262. The largest single ethnic group in New York, Whites, constitutes only 60.85% of the 
population, making it the eleventh most diverse state. Sec supra tig.l3. 
263. New York is the fourth most Catholic state (38%). See supra tig.l8. 
264. New York has the second highest rate of international immigration (per capita) 
among states. See supra tig.29. 
265. New York in recent years experienced the third highest loss of population due to 
internal migration. See supra tig.30. 
266. New York ranks tenth nationally at 2.84% of adjusted gross income. Mississippi gives 
at a rate of2.69%. See supra fig.41. 
267. Personal income per capita in New York ranks sixth highest. See supra tig.31. 
268. Employees per capita in residential elder care in New York is the seventh lowest 
nationally. See supra tig.39. 
269. New York's suicide rate is the lowest in the nation. See supra tig.7. 
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If you move to Utah, your neighbors are likely to be married,270 
Mormon,271 and have several kids272-none of which were born to 
them before marriage. 273 In fact, there are many kids running around 
your neighborhood. 274 Your neighbors give a significant amount to 
charity.275 Although almost everyone is a high school graduate/76 
they do not necessarily have a lot of money. 277 State agencies spend 
little on mental health,278 perhaps because the state needs to spend 
the money on primary education. One of your neighbor's parents 
may have committed suicide. 279 You rarely see a drunk on the 
street. 280 
IV. CRAFTING CHOICE OF LAW FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE TO 
ACCOMMODATE INTERSTATE PLURALISM 
Having identified interstate federalism as a policy, seen how it is 
deeply embedded in our legal structure, and observed its footprint in 
state demographics, it remains to be discussed how this policy 
intersects with same-sex marriage. 
A. Interstate Pluralism and the Constitutional Right to Same-Sex 
Marriage 
First, it should be obvious that, subject to one amplification, the 
argument for interstate pluralism applying to same-sex marriage 
survives only so long as there is not a recognized constitutional right 
270. Utah has the sixth highest marriage rate. It is the fourth highest if one discounts 
Nevada and Hawaii as states with an unusual number of transient weddings. See supra fig.l. 
271. Utah is the most homogenous state in religious identification. Fifty-seven percent of 
its population self-identifies as Mormon. See supra fig.l7. 
272. Utah has the nation's highest fertility rate. See supra fig.4. 
273. Utah has the lowest rate of births to unmarried women. See supra fig.3. 
274. Utah has the nation's youngest population. As of the 2000 census, 36.32% of its 
population was under age 20. See supra tig.26. 
275. Utah is first in the nation in giving, as measured by the average contributions per 
return as a percentage of the average adjusted gross income. See supra fig.4l. 
276. Utah and Minnesota are tied for first in high school graduation rate at 92.7%. See 
supra fig.33. 
277. Utah ranks sixth lowest in personal income per capita. This is no doubt partly a 
function of a high percentage of the population not having entered the workforce. See supra 
tig.3l. 
27!l. Utah is tied t(Jr the second to lowest in mental health expenditures per capita. See 
supra fig.lO. 
279. Utah's suicide rate is t(mrtcenth highest. See supra fig.7. 
280. Utah ranks lowest in binge drinking. See supra tig.35. 
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to same-sex marriage. This Article addresses a choice of law problem, 
and no choice of law problem exists when there is uniform law. The 
surest way to uniformity is to constitutionalize an area of the law. 
Finding that only one result is constitutionally permissible is the 
"nuclear bomb" of uniformity,281 far more efficacious in lining up 
state law than any model act, uniform law, or even public opinion. 
More fundamentally, interstate pluralism necessarily fails when a 
state's attempt to individualize itself violates the Constitution. A 
state may not seek to define its community in a manner that excludes 
based on race or religion, for example. In the case of such a 
discriminatory state law, no one-at least no responsible person-
would rise to defend the state's autonomy as a justification for 
excluding minorities. Therefore, if the Supreme Court determines 
that there is a right to same-sex marriage under the U.S. 
Constitution, the concerns raised here about interstate pluralism 
become irrelevant. 
However, there remains an important amplification to this point. 
As noted above/82 concern for protecting interstate pluralism has on 
occasion shaped the interpretation of the scope of underlying 
constitutional rights. The analysis put forth here has little to say 
about whether there should be a constitutional right to same-sex 
marriage. Nevertheless, a fair implication of the analysis is that the 
Supreme Court should consider the effect that recognizing the right 
would have on interstate pluralism. Similarly, the proposed federal 
marriage amendment, which would constitutionalize the legitimacy 
of only traditional marriages, is equally objectionable as a matter of 
federalism. 283 As is the case with a Supreme Court decision requiring 
states to accept same-sex marriage, an amendment to the 
Constitution that forbade such marriages would impinge on the 
values of interstate pluralism and impoverish the choices available to 
individuals. 
In the end, this issue resolves itself into whether the pluralism 
paradigm for same-sex marriage is house-to-house pluralism or state-
281. Cf Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 787 (2001) (describing the dormant Commerce Clause as a 
potential nuclear bomb of state regulation of the internet) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
282. See cases cited supra notes 105-12, 123-36 and accompanying text. 
283. On the proposed federal marriage amendment, see generally Teresa Stanton Collett, 
Restoring Democratic Self-Governance Through the Federal Marriage Amendment, 2 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 95 (2004); Lynn D. Wardle, Tyranny, Federalism, and the Federal MarrialJC 
Amendment, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMI~ISM 221 (2005). 
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to-state pluralism.284 Is it enough to protect the interests of same-sex 
couples that they are allowed to marry and be recognized as married 
in some states, or instead is it necessary that they be marriageable 
and recognized as wed in all? The former option preserves the role of 
the states to detine and regulate marriage, while giving some options 
to same-sex couples in those states that either grant same-sex 
marriages or recognize those granted elsewhere. The main argument 
in this Article is that as a matter of choice of law-until such time as 
a constitutional right to same-sex marriage may be recognized-the 
better conception is community or state-to-state pluralism. Whether 
the concerns of interstate pluralism are weighty enough to also be 
decisive in the context of substantive due process or equal 
protection, I shall not assay. 285 
As to the choice of law problems of same-sex marriage, it is 
inadequate to dismiss arguments against recognition of sister-state 
same-sex marriages as reactionary and discriminatory. As things 
currently stand, there is no constitutional right to same-sex marriage 
and so it is incoherent to describe a state's application of its own 
valid law against out-of-state same-sex marriages as invidious. More 
practically, the choice of law problems of same-sex marriage now 
exist. They do not disappear by predicting-even if it is an accurate 
prediction-that one day there will be a Loving v. Virginia286 for 
same-sex marriage. Stating that one day everyone will have a right to 
same-sex marriage in every state neither solves the issue nor makes 
the present choice of law problems disappear. 
An alternative exists to a top-down resolution of the same-sex 
marriage issue by the Supreme Court or Congress. The other 
pathway to uniformity and away from choice of law problems is 
voluntary coalescence of the states. That is, over time, each state may 
come to the same conclusion as to same-sex marriage and so both 
the constitutional and choice of law issues will disappear. In 
analyzing choice of law problems, it is often forgotten that there are 
284. See supra notes 113-36 and accompanying text. 
285. See generally, Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 2081, 
2113 ( 2005) (arguing against recognizing a right to same-sex marriage because of "strong 
prudential reasons for federal courts to hesitate in the context of same-sex marriage, not least 
because the issue of same-sex marriage is under intense discussion at the local, state, and 
national levels"). 
286. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that miscegenation statutes adopted by Virginia to 
prevent marriages between persons solely on basis of racial classification violate equal 
protection and due process clauses of Fourteenth Amendment). 
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very few legal issues that permanently divide the states. Many issues 
at one time did, but over time there is a tendency toward coalescence 
and away from individualism. The robust interstate pluralism 
described in this Article should not be overstated. It has existed, it 
now exists, and it will continue to exist. But while the degree of 
differentiation among the states may be more or less constant, it 
does not follow that the subject matter of the differences is 
immutable. At one time, the states were divided on matters such as 
the rule of non-recovery by a gratuitous guest for his automotive 
host's negligent driving,287 whether a tort plaintiff's negligence 
resulted in a total bar to or a mere reduction of recovery ,2xx whether 
one could recover for emotional distress absent a physical intrusion 
upon one's person/89 and whether privity of contract was required 
for recovery against a manufacturer of consumer goods. 290 These 
matters no longer concern us; the law is basically the same in all 
states. But new vectors of divergence have arisen to take their place. 
Same-sex marriage is merely the current rock that we are rolling, like 
Sisyphus, up the hill of federalism. The enterprise of choice of law is 
best understood not as an effort to solve intractable and permanent 
problems of difference, but instead as an interim solution to transient 
differences that seeks to accommodate the interests of the states and 
of the parties until such time as uniformity is achieved. 
This process has played out previously in the context of 
marriage's legal sibling, divorce. In the 1950s, some states, such as 
Nevada, began loosening divorce laws. In Williams v. North 
Carolina (Williams 1),291 the Supreme Court upheld Nevada's power 
to grant a divorce binding in other states to persons previously 
domiciled elsewhere so long as the party seeking the divorce had 
acquired a new domicile in Nevada. 292 In a subsequent case, 
Williams v. North Carolina (Williams II),293 the Court clarified that 
the state of prior matrimonial domicile could re-examine the Nevada 
287. See, e.g., Tooker v. Lopez, 294 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1969). 
288. See, e.g., Sa bell v. Pac. Intermountain Express Co., 536 P.2d 1160, 1163 (Colo. 
App. 1975). 
289. See, e.g., Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765,768-73 (Mo. 1983). 
290. See, e.g., Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 139 N.E. 576 (N.Y. 1923). 
291. 317 U.S. 287 (1942). 
292. Id. at 298-99 ("[E)ach state, by virtue of its command over its domiciliaries and its 
large interest in the institution of marriage, can alter within its own borders the marriage status 
of the spouse domiciled there, even though the other spouse is absent."). 
293. 325 U.S. 226 (1945). 
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finding of domicile and refuse to recognize the Nevada divorce if it 
found that true domicile had not been established in Nevada. 294 The 
result was that a marriage lawfully rendered in one state could be 
undone by one of the marital partners' relocation to another state 
(Williams !).295 A second result was that a person could be legally 
divorced in Nevada but held to be legally wed in another state 
(Williams !!). 296 
To those worried about the lack of interstate recognition of 
same-sex marriages, this should sound familiar. In fact, we survived 
the transition from fault to no-fault divorce, enduring the lack of 
uniformity and uncertainty it produced. Today, apart from 
Louisiana's covenant marriage system/97 we have relatively uniform 
divorce laws. It no longer makes sense to run off for a quickie 
Nevada divorce. But the process by which we arrived at this state of 
uniformity was voluntary coalescence toward a perceived superior 
scheme of no-fault divorce. And it is fortunate that this uniformity 
was voluntarily achieved rather than constitutionally compelled.298 
Today, some question the wisdom of the no-fault divorce 
revolution. 299 Should social policy re-shift away from no-fault 
divorce, states would be free to make that choice. Had the Supreme 
Court recognized a constitutional right to no-fault divorce, we 
would be stuck with that choice regardless of later rethinking of 
marital policy. The other advantage of voluntary coalescence over 
constitutionalization is that a voluntarily adopted law is more 
meaningful than a law that a state is required to adopt. To be sure, 
the legal force of a law is the same whether it is enacted freely or 
under compulsion. But the expressive purpose of law-its role in 
speaking the justice the community perceives-is lost when it is 
compelled. 
294. !d. at 230 ("The State of domiciliary origin should not be bound by an unfounded, 
even if not collusive, recital in the record of a court of another State."). 
295. Sa317U.S.287. 
296. Sa 325 U.S. at 231. 
297. Sec lfOltmllv Katherine Shaw Spahr, Covenant Marrialfe Seven Years Later: Its as Yet 
Uu.fitljillcd l'romi.<e, 65 LA. L. REV. 605 (2005). 
298. The Court once flirted with but never recognized a constitutional right to divorce. 
See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-81 ( 1971) (holding that due process requires a 
state to entertain divorce actions by indigent petitioners); see generally Matthew J. Astle, An 
Ounce ofl'repcntirm: Marital Coun.<eling Laws as an Anti-Divorce Measure, 38 FAM. L.Q. 733, 
744 (20(l4). 
299. Sec, c"q., Lynn D. Wardle, Form and Substance in ParentaJJe Law, 15 WM. & MARY 
BILL RT,. ). 203,225 (2006). 
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B. Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law 
For the present we must live with the choice of law problems 
that same-sex marriage produces. How can we best accommodate 
this difference pending its resolution substantively? Fortunately, the 
best accommodation is reflected fairly well in existing law. 
As noted above, conflict of laws problems involving judgments 
are traditionally treated very differently from choice of law 
problems.300 This dichotomy achieves the appropriate balance 
between the concerns of interstate pluralism and the interests of the 
parties to the marriage. Taking judgments first/ 01 traditional law 
holds that a state must enforce a sister-state judgment regardless of 
its odiousness to local public policy. 302 This would presumably 
require a state to recognize a judgment that recognized a same-sex 
marriage formed in another state (for example, a judgment awarding 
loss of consortium damages to a same-sex spouse for injuries to his 
or her same-sex marriage partner). The Defense of Marriage Act'03 
would change that result, making recognition of the judgment 
optional, not mandatory. But from the standpoint of interstate 
pluralism, recognition of the judgment would not unduly intrude 
upon the forum state's ability to self-regulate and establish itself as a 
community. 304 As noted above, 30" judgments pose less of a threat to 
interstate pluralism because they require only a one-time (for the 
single particular case under consideration) yielding by the forum 
state to the law of another state. A judgment is required to be 
recognized largely because of the judicial investment in producing 
the judgment, not because of the superior interests of the rendering 
state. And because the claim for enforcement does not rest upon a 
balancing of substantive interests (but instead upon the procedural 
value of protecting investments in litigation) the enforcing state's 
claim tor self-protection of its own interests is less relevant. To the 
extent interests of the states matter, a refusal to recognize a 
300. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text. 
301. It should be clear that a marriage is not a judgment. See Rensberger, mpra note 11, 
at 421-24. 
302. See supra notes 30-55 and accompanying text. 
303. See supra notes 7-18 and accompanying text. 
304. I have argued elsewhere that DOMA is not unconstitutional. See Rensberger, .>"upra 
note 11. I still believe DOMA to be within Congress' powers. The point here, however, is that 
DOMA may be unwise, not invalid, as applied to judgments. 
305. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text. 
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judgment based on a same-sex marriage holds the potential for 
intruding into the self-definition of the state that created the 
marriage, at least where the forum is not significantly connected with 
the parties. Finally, the concern about judgment debtors fleeing the 
jurisdiction in order to avoid liabilities applies to judgments 
involving same-sex marriages as much as to any other. Thus, all of 
the reasons that require recognition of sister-state judgments 
generally apply also to judgments that are predicated upon a same-
sex marriage existing. 
But as to simple choice of law, interstate pluralism argues for a 
broader application of forum law. The definition of marriage is one 
of the fundamental orderings of any society. A choice of law rule that 
requires the application of the law of the place of celebration of the 
marriage without exception would necessarily intrude upon the self-
definition of the forum. This is most obviously the case when the 
parties to the marriage in question have significant contacts with the 
forum. If, for example, the parties were domiciled in the forum at 
the time of the marriage, allowing them to evade forum law by going 
temporarily to another state to wed would sanction blatant evasion 
of forum law.306 A somewhat harder case is presented when the 
parties' only connection to the forum arose after their marriage or 
where they have little connection at all to the forum. 307 In this 
context, interstate pluralism pulls both ways. The forum will 
subordinate its own policy against same-sex marriage if it recognizes 
the marriage. But tailing to recognize the marriage appears to 
undermine the self-definition of the state that created the same-sex 
marnage. 
The usual approach to choice of law under modern methods is to 
solve the problem by looking for tangible outcomes that flow from 
the application of one or another legal rule. For same-sex marriages, 
this approach would identifY the material consequences that would 
occur as a result of the forum recognizing a foreign same-sex 
marriage. Once the consequences are identified, one then asks in 
306. This is the position of the Second Restatement of Conflicts. Section 283(2) provides 
that a marriage which is valid where celebrated will be "recognized as valid unless it violates the 
strong public policy of another state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses 
and the marriage at the time of the marriage." RESTATEMENT (SECO~D) OF CONFLICT OF 
LAWS§ 283 ( 1971 ). 
307. for the wurt to have jurisdiction, it necessarily will have some contacts with the 
parties (at least if one sets aside jurisdiction based on service of process within the borders of 
the state). 
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which of the two states will the consequences be felt. If a state is 
being asked to recognize a foreign same-sex marriage because an 
issue of intestate succession turns upon whether there was a 
marriage, one identifies the state of domicile of the parties and of 
others who gain or lose if heirship is found to exist in a same-sex 
putative spouse. If the underlying question is whether a same-sex 
marriage created a marital property interest in the other's property, 
one asks where are the benefited and burdened parties and where is 
the property. 
But in the context of same-sex marriage, deciding applicable law 
by reference to only tangible outcomes and consequentialist 
reasoning is too narrow. The debate over same-sex marriage is, I 
believe, impoverished by focusing solely on the material benefits of 
marriage. To be sure, proponents of same-sex marriage make access 
to those benefits-insurance coverage, joint income tax filing, 
intestacy, and the like-a part of the case for same-sex marriage. 308 
But many of those concerns can be handled consensually (wills and 
contracts to will, for example, can take care of the intestacy 
problem). Benefits that cannot be created consensually (such as the 
ability to tlle joint tax returns) can be created through a civil union 
scheme. What marriage uniquely gives is an expression of state 
approval of a relationship. 309 And this too has been a basis of arguing 
for same-sex marriages. 310 It would seem uncontrovcrsial that states 
can rationally opt to create same-sex marriages in order to grant 
approval. It is uncontested that this is one of the bases for states 
creating marriages of any type. 311 Disapproval should also be 
recognized-at least until the Supreme Court concludes that this is 
an impermissible sentiment-as a legitimate basis for not recognizing 
same-sex marriages. Unlike most legal arrangements, the symbolic 
may be more important in same-sex marriage than the material. 
30R. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 79R N.E.2d 941, 955-56 (Mass. 200~) 
(listing material benefits). 
309. See Sunstcin, supra note 2R5 (noting material benefits and expressive function as the 
two consequences of marriage). 
310. See, e.H., Barbara Stark, Whm Globalization Hits Horne: Internatirmal Family LaJJJ 
Comes of Age, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1551, 1598 (2006) ("Arguably more important 
[than tangible benefits], however, is the symbolic signiticance of marriage for same-sex 
couples."). 
311. See, Cif., Sunstein, supra note 285, at 2093 ("[T]he ofticial institution of marri,1gc 
entails a certain public legitimation and endorsement."). 
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Choice of law doctrine accounts for such conflicts over values 
under the heading of public policy. A state will not apply another 
state's law-even if the normal choice of law rule points in that 
direction-if the other state's law is contrary to its own public policy. 
This has long been the law generally and in particular for recognition 
of marriages. 312 It should be noted that in a case in which the court 
invokes the public policy rule, the proper disposition is a dismissal, 
not a decision on the merits applying local law. That is, if the state 
lacks the local consequences that would call for the application of its 
law-the parties and things affected are not tied to the state-it 
applies neither its law, because it is simply inapplicable, nor the law 
of the other state, because it is repugnant. The parties are left to f1nd 
another state that can entertain their action and in which the 
underlying law (same-sex marriage in this case) is not repugnant. 313 
Employing this type of public policy analysis would allow states 
that tlnd same-sex marriages repugnant to not entertain suits based 
upon them. This protects those states' interests in having their law 
serve expressive ends. At the same time, states that allow same-sex 
marriage would be utilized as forums to enforce rights based on the 
same-sex marriage. The parties to the same-sex marriage would f1nd 
vindication,314 but not at the expense of states that disfavor same-sex 
marriages. This accommodation serves the interests of same-sex 
marriage states, states that reject same-sex marriages, and parties to 
such marriages. 
The scheme would be improved by one last step. Some incidents 
of marriage are mirrored in other private arrangements. Others are 
unique to marriage. for example, a surviving spouse's right to a 
forced share of his or her dead spouse's property is an arrangement 
that can be duplicated outside of marriage by the parties entering 
into a contract to will. 31 " On the other hand, people cannot privately 
312. Sec supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
313. Sa Rensberger, supra note II, at 441 . 
314. This assumes that the parties could tlnd a state amenable to entertaining a same-sex 
marriage-based lawsuit that also has jurisdiction over the defendant. This should not usually be 
a problem. Same-sex marriages in which the celebrants long resided in the same-sex marriage 
state arc the ones most deserving of protection. And the longer and more substantial the 
connections the same-sex married parties have to a same-sex marriage state, the more likely it is 
that the dekndant will also have tics there and be subject to jurisdiction. 
31S. Sec jason Thomas King, Lifetime Remcdiesji1r Breach of a Contract to Make a Will, 
SO S.C. L REV. 965 ( 1999); john V. Orth, Ni;_qht Thmwhts: R~flections on the Debate 
CouccminJT Same-Sex Marrilllfe, 3 NEV. Lj. 560, 563 (2003). 
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agree to have the right to file a joint income tax return. The more 
that the particular incident under litigation is unique to marriage, the 
greater the concern of a state opposed to same-sex marriage of 
endorsing and approving a same-sex marriage. On the other hand, 
when the incident has a counterpart that exists outside of marriage, 
the forum looks less as if it is treating a same-sex couple as married 
by recognizing the incident, since unmarried persons might also 
enjoy the same arrangement. Thus, the choice of law approach 
should be for a forum that has a strong policy against same-sex 
marriage to decline to apply foreign law when to do so treats the 
same-sex persons as if married in light of the particular incident of 
marriage that is under consideration. 316 
Finally, recognizing that same-sex marriage is more about values 
and symbols of those values leads to the somewhat surprising 
conclusion that the interests underlying same-sex marriage may 
actually be advanced more significantly by a choice of law rule 
allowing each state to recognize or not recognize a same-sex 
marriage on the basis of its own policy-a general rule of reference 
to forum law. As suggested above, one of the pathways to individual 
fulfillment is participation in a community. 317 For this function to 
work, however, the community must be voluntarily self-defining. If a 
same-sex marriage is to be a meaningful expression of social approval 
and endorsement, recognition of the marriage cannot be t()rced 
upon the society. Compelling recognition of a same-sex marriage 
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause would certainly fail to fulfill 
the endorsing function. So too would a grudging acceptance under 
choice of law rules. The simple truth is that a same-sex marriage in 
Massachusetts is more meaningful than one begrudgingly accepted 
in, say, Utah. The fractionalization of marriage laws in the United 
States, under this view, is not a bad thing. It is simply another 
manifestation of our robust interstate pluralism. 
316. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFfERENT STATES 107-0H (2006). 
Koppelman argues that when a particular incident of marriage can also be attained under a 
state's law by unmarried parties the state can have no legitimate ground in public policy against 
recognizing the incident in a same-sex couple who happen to be married under ti>rcign law. 
317. See supra notes 111-136 and accompanying text. 
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C. Conclusion: The Cautionary Tale of Slavery) Dred Scott) and the 
Civil War 
The conflicts of law problems posed by same-sex marriage are 
profound precisely because the underlying issue concerns values. Few 
conflict of laws problems are similarly value-laden. There is a 
historical precedent, which shares several similarities to the problems 
created by same-sex marriage, but recalling it gives little comfort. 
Imagine an arrangement that legally binds two people in a 
relationship that is intended to last potentially throughout one's life. 
The state creating the relationship believes it to be healthy, 
beneficial, and appropriate. Other states find this relationship to be 
offensive and against their strong public policy. This is an apt 
description of same-sex marriage. It is equally a description of 
slavery. The closeness of the analogy suggests that an analysis of 
interstate recognition of same-sex marriage could profit by 
consulting the history of interstate recognition of slavery. 
I am not suggesting that same-sex marriage is a form of bondage 
that is the moral equivalent of slavery; I am suggesting that the 
conf1ict of laws problems raised by same-sex marriage are eerily 
familiar. A slave is taken from Missouri, a slave state, to Illinois, a free 
state, where he and his master sojourn for a time. When the master 
desires to return, is the slave emancipated under Illinois law or still a 
chattel under Missouri law? Illinois finds slavery odious. Missouri 
regards it as a legal relationship deserving of enduring protection. 
One's property rights should not cease, it is argued, as one crosses 
state lines. With a few strokes of the pen, this hypothetical is easily 
converted to a same-sex married couple traveling to another state 
that does not recognize same-sex marriages. The relationship is 
honored by one state and disfavored by another. The argument that 
rights with regards to another person should not change as one 
crosses state lines reappears. 
I have suggested above that a lack of uniformity among the states 
is not troubling and is in fact beneficial. The example of slavery 
serves to remind that there are limitations to the benefits of interstate 
pluralism. In addressing Congress in 1862, Abraham Lincoln 
captured the conflict of laws problems created by slavery and 
geography. These problems are equally applicable to same-sex 
marnages: 
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A nation may be said to consist of its territory, its people, and its 
laws. The territory is the only part which is of certain durability. 
"One generation passeth away, and another cometh: but the earth 
abideth forever." It is of the first importance to duly consider and 
estimate this ever-enduring part. That portion of the earth's surface 
which is owned and inhabited by the people of the United States is 
well adapted to be the home of one national family, and is not well 
adapted for two or more. . . . Its vast extent and its variety of 
climate and production are of advantage in this age for one people, 
whatever they might have been in former ages. Steam, telegraphs, 
and intelligence have brought these to be an advantageous 
combination for one united people . 
. . . . There is no line, straight or crooked, suitable for a national 
boundary upon which to divide. Trace through, from east to west, 
upon the line between the free and the slave country, and we shall 
find a little more than one-third of its length are rivers, easy to be 
crossed, and populated, or soon to be populated, thickly upon both 
sides: while nearly all its remaining length are merely surveyors' 
lines, over which people may walk back and forth without any 
. f. 318 COnSCIOUSness 0 ItS presence. 
It remains to be seen whether the usual process of coalescence by 
the states toward a uniform legal standard as to gender and marriage 
can be achieved. Coalescence is generally achieved; few areas are 
intractable. With slavery, the potential for a political solution and 
coalescence was undermined by Dred Scott v. Sandford. 7" 9 Prior to 
the time of Dred Scott, the frequent result for the slave taken by his 
master to a free state for a time was emancipation; even slave states 
often reached this result. 320 In the years leading to Dred Scott, 
southern courts began to retrench, denying emancipation to slaves 
that had sojourned. 321 Although within its power to give a federal 
318. Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 1, 1862), reprinted in A 
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: 1789~1897, at 126, 133-
34 (Government Printing Otlice 1897). 
319. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
320. In the cases of sojourning slaves, many state courts, north and south, relied on Lord 
Manstlcld's opinion in Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.), that a slave 
acquires freedom by being brought voluntarily into a tree state. See Sarah H. Cleveland, 
ForeiHn Authority, American Exceptionalism, and the Dred Scott Case, 82 CHI.· KENT L. REV. 
393, 414 (2007); Louise Weinberg, Drcd Scott and the Crisis of J/l(j(), 82 CH!.-KE:\T L. REV. 
97, 114 (2007). 
321. See Louise Weinberg, Methodol!Lqical Interventions and the SlaPerv C,lSes; Or, Nicql;t· 
Thottqhts of!l LeHal Realist, 56 MD. L. REV. 1316, 1342--45 ( 1997). 
1806 
1703] Interstate Pluralism 
answer to this q uestion322 under Swift v. Tyson, 323 the Court declined 
to do so, holding that the question of emancipation was a matter of 
state law. 324 Because of the retrenchment of the southern states, 
Dred Scott limited the emancipation of sojourning slaves. This, along 
with its holding that slavery could not be forbidden in federal 
territories320 (overturning the Missouri compromise), lead to the 
regional balkanization of politics that set the stage for the Civil War. 
The Dred Scott of same-sex marriage would be a Supreme Court 
decision requiring non-same-sex-marriage states to recognize same-
sex marriages granted in other states. Although a political rupture of 
the scale that preceded the Civil War is unlikely to result, the 
cautionary tale is there for us to read. We live in such times, and the 
course toward a conclusion to this debate is hard to discern. The 
analogy of slavery argues for moderation all around. Until such time 
as the issue of same-sex marriage is resolved socially and legally, it 
exists to divide us. But we need not fear differentiation. It is integral 
to our political structure and is in many ways beneficial. What must 
be avoided is the hyperbole of extremists-"fire-eaters," as they were 
called in the run up to the Civil War-on either side of the issue. 
322. See Austin Allen, Rethinking Dred Scott: New Context For a11 Old Case, 82 CHI.-
KE~T L. REV. 141, 166-67 (2007). 
323. 41 U.S. I, IS (1842). 
324. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 452. 
325. Ser id. 
1807 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2008 
1808 
